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This thesis seeks to develop our understanding of the contemporary crime 
communication landscape. While this landscape is considered in its constituent parts, 
including specific features of current British politics, the evolving media sphere and 
the voice of the public, this thesis argues for a conceptualization of this realm that 
grasps its fluid and dynamic character. Original research is conducted through case 
studies of the 2010 UK General Election, the Phone Hacking Scandal and the 2011 
Riots. Discourse analysis is employed in order to enhance our awareness of 
supralinguistic behaviour and of the play of power in the construction of crime 
narratives. This is contrasted with influential current accounts of ‘populism’ which, it 
is argued here, tend to be unduly deterministic and to err towards the dystopian. 
  
The research suggests that structural shifts in the media landscape, specifically the 
recent ubiquity of new media coinciding with an undermining of the singular tabloid 
narrative, have enabled a redistribution of power in the symbolic construction of 
crime which can make it harder for political actors to capture the crime question for 
populist purposes. Furthermore, this shift has empowered the public voice and has 
infused political debate with a chaotic plurality of views. 
 
Nevertheless, the symbolic weight of crime issues remains prominent in this 
landscape and Randall Collins’ Interaction Ritual Chains (2004) is employed to add a 
microsociological picture of the escalation from small scale narrative to broad 
righteous anger. This requires an adaptation of this model to address interactions that 
occur outside the context of physical co-presence. Such perspectives on the plurality 
of mediated communication today both broaden and update our grasp of the political 
communication of crime and in so doing argue for a degree of optimism concerning 
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Political language - and with variations this is true of all political parties, from 
Conservatives to Anarchists - is designed to make lies sound truthful and 
murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind. One 
cannot change this all in a moment, but one can at least change one's own 
habits, and from time to time one can even, if one jeers loudly enough, send 
some worn-out and useless phrase - some jackboot, Achilles' heel, hotbed, 
melting pot, acid test, veritable inferno, or other lump of verbal refuse - into 
the dustbin, where it belongs. 
George Orwell, Politics and the English Language (1946) 
 
 
The interaction between social media and conventional media today means that 
what used to be a building wave of opinion, which if you intervened in the 
right way it would then ebb again, now reaches tsunami force within hours 
sometimes, days certainly and can capsize a government, it can literally wash a 
government away. 










Simply put, the primary interest of this thesis is the construction of crime narratives 
and as such, the central aim of this project has been to capture the crime 
communication landscape in a manner which provides a meaningful, original 
contribution to knowledge in this area. I have consistently felt that to best serve this 
subject matter would require an acceptance of the dynamic nature of this realm and 
as such, have prioritised fluidity in the research design here. A natural tendency in 
considering ‘The Political Communication of Crime’ would be to focus 
wholeheartedly on political speech, on the everyday behind-the-scenes pressures 
infused into the construction of criminal justice in politics. However, as has been 
commonly accepted since before Orwell bemoaned the deceptions of political speech 
in 1946, this is a realm within which it is difficult to derive certainty of intent, other 
than electoral success. A research project on this subject which focussed only on 
political cultures would have been limited in scope and undermined by the inevitable 
upheaval of this world which occurs every five years. More crucially here, I have 
asserted since the outset that the role of the media and the public ought to be given 
equal billing in a project of this nature. This facilitates a view of this realm which 
takes into account more enduring social structures and connects discussions of the 
meaning of crime in society to criminal justice outputs. As we will see, the political 
communication of crime today has evolved from our traditional view of the politician 
sermonizing from the podium to a vibrant, chaotic conversation in which 
manipulative narratives are derailed and the intentions of governments are capsized, 
are washed away by the wave of opinion. As such, the focus in this project is on 
these constituent elements as integral to the political communication of crime and I 
hope that I have approached the research and the theoretical discussion in a manner 
which best provides a sense of their evolving role and the impact that this will have 
on the future construction of ‘crime’. 
 An interest in this area and a sense that further research was required was 
prompted not only by the criminological literature which I will discuss in detail, but 
by a consideration of the field more generally. In reading broadly in criminology, I 
increasingly became aware of rich bodies of research that seemed to experience a 
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frustrating disconnect from practice. Indeed, we take for granted the solidification of 
truths self-evident only to those privy to the criminological canon, such as the 
negative impact of imprisonment which sits in direct opposition to the political 
maintenance of soaring prison populations in the UK and the still potent public 
desire for the retributive role of imprisonment. Beyond criminal justice policy, the 
lack of correlation between rising fear of crime and falling crime rates presented 
another divergence, a problem for criminology. These compelling examples, the lack 
of connection between research and policy and between fear and reality suggested 
that the contested meaning of crime in society was actively defining it away from 
reality and loading it with meaning which seemed not to prioritise rational policy 
decision-making which could ultimately reduce criminal activity. It seemed evident 
that if we wish to address these kinds of issues, if we wish to better understand the 
role of ‘crime’ in society, that a more detailed, forcefully modern view of the 
construction of crime narratives could better facilitate the negotiation of this 
landscape. Beginning with this premise provided another argument in favour of 
broadening focus to the public and the media, as it seemed clear that a view of 
criminal justice politicking alone could not explain the significant gap between 
research and policy outcomes.  
Indeed, it has been a key aim of this project to move accounts away from the 
overly critical and at times conspiratorial views of criminal justice politics that 
present the communication of crime as a top-down linear process of the forceful 
delivery of manipulative crime ideas on to a willing, fearful public, rabid with 
‘ontological insecurity’ (Giddens 1991). As I will discuss in Chapter 1, the tendency 
in criminological works has been to consider this realm as not only linear, but also 
intrinsic, immoveable even. From the outset, my aim here has been to add detail to 
these accounts and challenge the overly dystopian and deterministic nature of the 
arguments they espouse. Not only can a clearer picture of the crime communication 
landscape challenge the intrinsic nature of these links, but it can infuse some 
optimism into accounts by providing detail and thus by providing an approach by 
which we might reconnect research and policy. As the project has progressed, it has 
become clear that shifting structures have altered the narrative landscape in 
immeasurable ways and I have aimed to approach these alterations with my original 
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aims in mind. This thesis embraces the chaos of such changes and aims to appreciate 
how they might infuse a sense of optimism into the crime conversation. 
 
ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION 
It is hoped that this project will provide an original contribution to research in a 
number of ways. Firstly, my aim will be to develop our account of this relatively 
unexplored and contemporary subject matter, specifically the crime communication 
landscape and its constituent elements, including specific features of current British 
politics, the evolving media sphere and the voice of the public. I will argue for a 
progression of crime and politics literature beyond limiting dystopias and 
furthermore, beyond a constrictive conceptual determinism. The research conducted 
here will update our perspectives on media and crime by introducing accounts of the 
power and potential of the evolving new media sphere and by considering these 
shifts within the context of established literature. A theoretical account of the public 
voice will be developed in which a microsociological account of interactions, 
specifically Randall Collins’ Interaction Ritual Chains (2004) will be employed in 
order to better account for the progression of crime narratives at the public level. The 
employment of Collins’ work will build on a perceived need to utilise a symbolic 
interactionist perspective in this realm, integrating Goffman’s view of ‘the self’ and 
‘negotiated meaning’ and Durkheim’s account of symbolic power and which will 
constitute a distinctive expansion of literature in this area. I will apply Collins’ model 
to today’s evolving media sphere and suggest a necessary development in light of 
particular alterations in the structures of social interactions. Ultimately, I will hope to 
contribute an account of our narrative landscape which is fluid and modern and 
which can provide cause for optimism. 
 Original data has been collected in pursuit of an enhanced account of our 
crime communication landscape and the research approach employed here was 
designed in order to capture this potentially wide-ranging subject matter. A case 
study approach has been utilised which will assess varied forms of crime 
communication taking place as part of unique, sometimes unexpected events; the 
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2010 UK General Election, the Phone Hacking Scandal and the Riots of 2011. Each 
provides findings which will facilitate the observation of crime communication at its 
extremes and it is hoped that this body of data, which moves accounts beyond 
political cultures towards moments of scandal, of uproar and of the increased activity 
of electoral politics, will enrich our capacity for analysis. Furthermore, discourse 
analysis has been employed in order to enhance our appreciation of the context 
within which narratives are constructed and in turn to contribute to the fluid 
conceptualization of communication that is argued for. As such, I have chosen 
particular research tools and framed this approach towards what is at times new 
methodological terrain and would argue that the approach to the project can also be 
considered somewhat original in its constitution.  
  
THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter 1 presents a discussion of the key criminological works which evolve our 
recent understanding of the interaction between the political realm and ‘crime’. The 
aim of this chapter is to assess the utility of these approaches, to test them outwith 
the context of present day evolutions and to focus instead on the potential conceptual 
developments which might enhance their argumentative force. While these works 
add an enormous amount to our understanding of this vital realm, it is proposed that 
a useful development of this body of literature might move away from criminal 
justice dystopias, which have been limiting in their determinism. 
 
Chapter 2 will contend that theoretical progress in pursuit of a more optimistic 
perspective of this realm can be found in moving towards microsociology. 
Arguments are made in favour of a reinvigoration of Symbolic Interactionism. In 
particular, Goffman’s account of ‘the self’ and ‘negotiated meaning’ is proffered, 
which along with an approach to Durkheim’s account of symbolic power that 
eschews ‘Durkheimianism’, can begin to develop accounts of the crime 
communication landscape. It is then argued that the model provided by Randall 
Collins’ Interaction Ritual Chains (2004), which integrates these perspectives to 
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form a detailed microsociology of the natural escalation from small scale interaction 
to broad righteous anger, can enhance our understanding of the fluidity of this realm 
and can begin to move perspectives away from criminal justice dystopia. 
 
Chapter 3 pays attention to the significant role of the media in the political 
communication of crime by considering classic texts in this field and providing a 
consideration of their enduring relevance. However, this chapter also introduces an 
account of the evolution of the media landscape, which is portrayed as newly defined 
by immediacy, choice, symbolic force and interactivity. This new realm is then 
applied to Collins’ model and a development away from the necessity for physical 
co-presence is suggested, taking into consideration such influential structural shifts. 
 
Chapter 4 discusses some of the methodological decisions that were made in the 
process of conducting this research. An argument for the power of case study 
research in capturing a vast, constantly fluctuating subject such as political 
communication is made and justification is given for the prioritisation of scandal, or 
outrage, of capturing the crime narrative landscape at its extremes. An awareness of 
the value of discourse analysis is given, as an approach to understanding the potency 
and meaning in acts and inferences beyond spoken or written language. Some 
necessary discussion of the utilisation of online newspaper sources as data is also 
provided. 
 
Chapter 5 consists of a case study of the 2010 UK General Election. Justification for 
studying this particular event is given, along with a chronology of events, a 
discussion of the data considered and how it was collected and assessed. Academic 
literature on this event is assessed with the hope of providing some thorough analysis 
of the issues of the election. The central focus of this chapter, however, is the data 
gathered on the Leaders’ Debates, the party positions on criminal justice and the 
presentation of ‘crime’ through traditional media outlets. Conclusions are presented 
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on the vast uptake and seemingly substantial power of new media frameworks and 
the mobilization of non-elite narratives, supporting the public voice as a new force in 
the construction of crime. Reinforcement of the ‘second order consensus’ notion of 
crime in politics is highlighted, which contrasts the forceful, inevitable nature of 
previous ‘populist’ accounts. 
 
Chapter 6 presents a case study of the Phone Hacking Scandal of July 2011 and a 
similar approach is adopted, in which explanations are given regarding the choice of 
this event to serve as a case study. I then provide a chronology of events and 
academic literature on the area. The data focuses on the high profile Culture, Media 
& Sport Committee hearings and the Leveson Inquiry and conclusions are made on 
the unveiling and disabling of power sources in traditional populist political 
communication of crime. In particular, there is discussion of the potential strength of 
public expression through new media outlets to derail destructive, manipulative, 
dystopian narratives and to allow public outrage to have a serious impact on 
previously unfettered power relationships. 
 
Chapter 7 is a case study of the Riots of August 2011. There is some discussion of 
the choice to study an incident of public outrage and the benefits of case study 
analysis to the researcher concerned with these unpredictable events. Again, there is 
a chronology, a consideration of academic literature in the area and analysis of the 
political statements of that period is presented. This case study reflects on the public 
voice as empowered. The riots provide a potent example of the mobilization of the 
public voice through new media, in which rioters congregated through Blackberry 
Messenger and clean-ups were organized via Twitter and ultimately the force of 
these new formats as the tools for a challenge to established power is demonstrated. 
Furthermore, we see the ability for public narratives and a weakened traditional 




Chapter 8 serves as a final discussion and conclusion. The themes of each case study 
and the theoretical discussions from the earlier parts of the thesis are drawn together 
to make several concluding assertions. Firstly, it is suggested that viewing the crime 
narrative landscape from this more fluid, microsociological perspective can move 
accounts away from dystopia towards optimism. Furthermore, the findings suggest 
that structural shifts have enabled a redistribution of power in the construction of 
narratives, in which political attempts at punitiveness have been overwhelmed and 
have prompted a reversion to the ‘second order consensus’. It is also argued that 
developments in new media have coincided with an undermining of the singular 
tabloid narrative to empower the public voice and infuse political debate with a 
forceful, chaotic plurality of views. Bearing this in mind and considering the 
continuing symbolic weight of crime issues, the case studies present a compelling 
argument to utilise Collins’ framework to demonstrate the development of narratives. 
I also argue that they suggest the need for an extension of the Interaction Ritual 
Chains approach beyond physical co-presence, that to take into account the 
legitimacy of virtual communication unlocks an appreciation of meaningful debate in 
today’s public realm. Ultimately, I propose that this is a fluid and modern depiction 
of our narrative landscape and one which encourage a degree of optimism 












BEYOND DYSTOPIA IN THE CRIMINOLOGY OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 
 
This chapter explores the body of literature that locates recent conditions of criminal 
justice within shifts towards Neoliberalism and ‘Late Modernity’. The aim of this 
chapter is to consider the continuing force of these arguments, to test them outwith 
the context of present day evolutions and to focus on the potential conceptual 
developments which can be made. Particular focus is given to seminal works in this 
area, by David Garland, Loic Wacquant and the broader project of ‘Penal Populism’. 
It is argued that in recent years this body of literature has, through a reasonable 
preoccupation with the defining societal arrangements of Neoliberalism and ‘Late 
Modernity’, been prone to sweeping pessimism which it is argued, can be overly 
dystopian and unrealistic in its determinism. Furthermore, the central tenets of ‘Penal 
Populism’ are challenged, in particular, that the pursuit of electoral success as 
intrinsically linked to the public desire to restore moral order, is so powerful that it 
will continue to undermine the capacity for rational criminal justice debate. 
Ultimately, it is argued here that a move away from broad functionalism and towards 
an account which can incorporate optimism can better serve this project. 
 
The Culture of Control 
Within criminological considerations of law and order politics, several key texts have 
alluded to the significance of communication processes as part of any assessment of 
crime in today’s ‘late modern’ society. Indeed, much discussion of the notable 
politicization of criminal justice has been framed around this suggested temporal 
shift, described by Young as essentially “a situation of contradiction and of paradox 
[where] the major institutions have both repressive and liberative potentials” (2007: 
4). In ‘late modernity’ this institutional counter intuitiveness is supported by a 
society-wide “sense of insecurity, of insubstantiality, and or uncertainty, a whiff of 
chaos and a fear of falling” (Young 2007: 12), or as Giddens has termed ‘ontological 
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insecurity’ (1990). The effect of these chaotic societal tendencies on criminal justice 
issues and in particular, penal values, is the focus of Garland’s seminal ‘Culture of 
Control’ (2001).  
 Garland’s work observes the relatively recent and unpredicted shift away 
from penal-welfarism, the formerly dominant veneration of the ‘rehabilitative ideal’ 
(Allen 1981) within criminal justice institutions which tended to espouse welfarist 
approaches to sentencing such as participation in treatment programmes, as dictated 
by accepted criminological wisdom. In Garland’s account of the late modern shift, 
this approach is replaced with what he deems the ‘crime control complex’, in which 
“responsibilities for control are simultaneously both more dispersed and more 
intensely politicized” (Sparks 2009: 294). Indeed, he suggests that the public or 
private role in crime control developed from this ‘whiff of chaos’ into an urgent 
sense of risk-aversion and personal responsibility, while political answers adopted a 
tone of “regret and a firm determination to rewind the clock” (Daems 2008: 35). 
Coinciding with a rise in Neoliberalism and dominant centrist politicking, the ‘crime 
control complex’ fostered “a strikingly anti-modern concern for the themes of 
tradition, order, hierarchy, and authority” (Garland 2001: 99).  
 Garland argues that the social and institutional arrangements of late modern 
societies tend to produce higher crime rates as a by-product (2001: 106). The 
subsequent awareness of crime rates tends to challenge the validity of the state which 
leads to what Garland terms ‘acting out’, through “gestural penal politics as decision 
makers strive to demonstrate their strength and display solidarity with victims and 
their angry and indignant supporters” (Sparks 2009: 294). Indeed, within the context 
of this ‘acting out’, Garland suggests that the “political reaction has become more 
pronounced as the conditions of political speech have changed over time” (2001: 
131). He details the particular shifts in conditions of political speech of the 1980s 
and 1990s in the UK and the USA, referring to a notable politicization of law and 
order which re-defined crime as politically dangerous, particularly during election 
periods. In line with the bifurcation previously mentioned, the political 
communication of crime issues at this time veered away from the behind the scenes 
“neo-liberal agenda of privatization, market competition and spending restraints” 
	  10 
(2001: 131) and instead presented a vociferous neo-conservative assertion of the 
need for moral discipline in order to “restore public confidence” (2001: 132). This 
trend facilitated the move away from rehabilitative approaches which were 
previously embraced and continued a pattern of rhetoric which flagrantly 
contradicted actual practice: 
 
Of the many examples of this pattern, the most clear-cut is British Home 
Secretary Michael Howard’s volte face of 1993, which introduced new 
mandatory sentence laws with the declaration that ‘prison works!’ –shortly 
after his own government had publicly declared that ‘imprisonment is an 
expensive way of making bad people worse’.  
(Garland 2001: 132) 
   
Indeed, Garland demonstrates that during this period, this kind of political rhetoric 
begins to form the basis of pieces of legislative action, functioning primarily as a 
Foucauldian reinforcement of “the myth of sovereign power” (2001: 133), the quality 
of which consisted of no more than “impulsive and unreflective action, avoiding 
realistic recognition of underlying problems, the very fact of acting providing its own 
form of relief and gratification” (2001: 133). 
 As such, the legacy of this period appears to have been a total breakdown of 
the notion of bipartisan cooperation around crime matters, making way instead for “a 
highly charged political discourse now surround[ing] all crime control issues, so that 
every decision is taken in the glare of publicity and political contention and every 
mistake becomes a scandal” (2001: 13). Garland argues that due to the prominence 
of ‘sound-bite statements’, such as ‘Prison works’, ‘Three-strikes and you’re out’, 
‘Truth in sentencing’, ‘No frills prison’, ‘Adult time for adult crime’, ‘Zero 
tolerance’, ‘Tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’ (2001: 13), criminal 
justice policy decision-making has recently been constructed more for political 
events such as party conferences and television interviews, than in concurrence with 
the remit of longer-term evidence-based approaches as advised by policy elites. The 
result is an erratic but symbolically charged populism, both ‘volatile and 
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contradictory’ (O’Malley 1999) valuing ‘common sense’ and a certain level of 
‘toughness’, in essence; “the centre of political gravity has moved, and a rigid new 
consensus has formed around penal measures that are perceived as tough, smart and 
popular with the public” (Garland 2001: 14). Within Garland’s Culture of Control, 
the emergence of the ‘crime control complex’ in the last 30 years has seemingly been 
propelled by the politics of late modernity and these trends towards a certain 
shallowness, an ill-supported populism in the communication of crime ideas. 
 Garland’s view of crime in society as portrayed within The Culture of 
Control not only provides detailed analysis of crime and punishment as interlinked 
phenomena but also usefully avoids reductionism despite a vast subject matter 
(Young 2002). The landscape around which law and order politics are conducted is 
vividly portrayed, while we are introduced to the key theme that “the responses to 
crime are cultural adaptations by actors within the criminal justice system” (Young 
2002: 232), essentially enhancing our view of the public in this discussion, by 
portraying them anew as active responders to an ever-changing situation (Young 
2002).  
However, the dystopian and all-encompassing nature of the Culture of 
Control argument has also been criticized for linking these political trends too readily 
to “a larger master pattern” (Zedner 2002: 341), one which seems unstoppable and of 
which Garland provides inadequate suggestion of counterbalance. Zedner argues that 
Garland’s final suggestion in The Culture of Control, that the future of these 
seemingly unrelenting criminal justice practices “is not inevitable” (Garland 2001: 
201), is too flimsily expounded and that this does a disservice to his argument more 
generally. She adopts Braithwaite’s admonishment that “while criminologists take 
explanatory theory increasingly seriously, they do not take normative theory 
seriously at all” (Braithwaite 2000: 87) and that by her assertion, Garland is 
singularly placed to “suggest a way out of the current abyss” (Zedner 2002: 366), but 
that his lack of detail in this area displays an “abandonment of political commitment” 
(2002: 364). Indeed, there is a certain dystopian finality to Garland’s argument, that 
the current configuration of crime control is so intertwined with the structural 
boundaries of the sovereign state, now limited in its abilities by “the denials and 
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expressive gestures that have marked recent penal policy” (Garland 2001: 205). 
Zedner’s critique seems to focus on the political purpose of Garland’s approach, 
which leaves the vast explanatory force of the Culture of Control largely untarnished. 
However, the dystopian nature of the Culture of Control argument derives largely 
from its emphasis on the irreversible structural changes undertaken as part of the 
shift towards late modernity, changes which dramatically undermine the sovereign 
state as a whole and the crime control project. What this account underemphasizes in 
this crumbling Neoliberal dystopia are the structures of communication and 
interaction which operate within this sphere. In doing so, it fails to acknowledge the 
potential for total upheaval in broad societal trends that can be mobilized beyond the 
political realm. The Culture of Control argument portrays a powerful, broad-ranging 
dystopia, however, as we will see, the ‘crime control complex’ beyond this account 
does have the potential to be reshaped significantly.  
 
Punishing the Poor 
Loic Wacquant’s ‘Punishing the Poor’ (2009) presents another comprehensive 
reflection on the communication of penal politics, with significant explanatory force 
given once again to the power of present day trends towards Neoliberalism. 
However, Wacquant’s notion of the Neoliberal society is quite distinctly political 
where the Culture of Control was not, indeed in his analysis of the eruption of the 
American penal state, he goes so far as to characterize Neoliberalism “as a 
transnational political project carried out by an emerging global ruling class” 
(Wacquant 2009: 291 in Piven 2010: 112). Wacquant’s version differs from similar 
accounts of penal politics in that he proposes that: 
 
the flexibilization of labour, the transformation of welfare policies toward 
workfare and stricter sanctions, and the expansion of policing and punitive 
powers and practices are forming constituent ingredients of the neoliberal 
state- which the prevalent theories of neoliberalism fail to acknowledge  
(Mayer 2010: 93) 
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Wacquant is explicit in declaring ‘Punishing the Poor’ to be a selective excavation of 
fact which utilizes a materialist analysis of Marx and Engels as well as a symbolic 
approach derived from Durkheim and Bourdieu. Therefore, whereas Garland’s view 
of the Neoliberal sovereign state and its subsequent penal practices is understood as 
“one of the manifestations of a deep-seated cultural shift, Wacquant sees it more as 
something purposefully pursued to consolidate the dominance of neo-liberal rule” 
(Sparks and Loader 2011: 80). Punishing the Poor thus espouses a significantly 
divergent account in its understanding of the role of politics in strengthening the 
sovereign state. In ‘Crafting the Neoliberal State’ (2010) Wacquant acknowledges the 
“sweeping and stimulative” (2010: 207) account put forward in the Culture of 
Control, that “the distinctive social, economic, and cultural arrangements of late 
modernity’ have fashioned a ‘new collective experience of crime and insecurity’, to 
which the authorities have given a reactionary interpretation and a bifurcated 
response combining practical adaptation via ‘preventative partnerships’ and 
hysterical denial through ‘punitive segregation’ (Garland, 2001:139–147 in Wacquant 
2010: 207). As previously outlined, Garland’s argument follows that this predicament 
seems to highlight the ‘limits of the sovereign state’ as high crime rates become 
normal and previous approaches at maintaining order seem lacking. In Wacquant’s 
words, this both “marks and masks a political failing” (2010: 207), which brings us to 
the essence of disparity in these two accounts.  
 The view of the Neoliberal sovereign state in ‘Punishing the Poor’ is not one of 
failure, but of success, of revitalization through the strategy of “punitive 
containment” (Wacquant 2010: 207): 
 
On the contrary, Punishing the Poor asserts that punitive containment has 
proved to be a remarkably successful political strategy: far from ‘eroding one 
of the foundational myths of modern society’, which holds that ‘the sovereign 
state is capable of delivering law and order’ (Garland, 2001:109), it has 
revitalized it. (Wacquant 2010: 207) 
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Within this context, Wacquant demonstrates the revitalization of the sovereign state 
with the use of law and order posturing. He takes us through the political 
circumstances which ultimately reorganized social services into an instrument of 
surveillance while describing the massive and systematic recourse to incarceration, 
which in effect, warehoused the poor. We see President Clinton’s political 
positioning as a ‘New Democrat’ move him towards Republican welfare policies, an 
approach which is replicated around the world: 
This is true not only in the United States, where the leaders of both parties have 
reached complete consensus over the benefits of punitive penal policies 
targeted at the inner city (Chih Lin, 1998), but also in Europe: Blair in the 
United Kingdom, Berlusconi in Italy, and Chirac and Sarkozy in France have 
all parlayed their martial images of stern ‘‘crime fighters’’ intent to clean up 
the streets into victories at the polls. (Wacquant 2010: 207) 
Punishing the Poor provides a startling exposition of political speeches from around 
this period which serves to highlight the influence of American law and order policy 
around the world, particularly when political capital is at stake. This features as part 
of a broader history of the events surrounding the ‘penal upsurge’ and demonstrates 
that the rolling back of the welfare state in America has been coupled with the 
immense expansion of the penal state in a turn of events which has inflicted a binary 
punishment on the poor members of American society.  
 This is an account which pays attention to the significance of political 
circumstances and yet the picture is one of knowing dystopia, of a global trend 
towards oppression through the penal state and through a weakening of welfarism, as 
a result of such conditions. Various criticisms have been leveled at ‘Punishing the 
Poor’, for instance that the discussion of welfarism gives a selective view of relevant 
poverty policies (Mayer 2010: 93). However, I would argue that for the purposes of 
understanding the political communication of crime landscape, we ought to consider 
that this selectiveness is coupled with an overstated account of global political trends 
to portray Neoliberalism as a sweeping dystopia, an unstoppable force in the penal 
realm, as delivered by a knowing, weak political class. For instance, the Clinton 
example in ‘Punishing the Poor’ addresses the political pressures felt at the time 
which led to a shift to the centre and which was indeed replicated by Blair in the UK, 
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but it views this shift as more than motivated by circumstance or the political climate 
of the time. While the repressive approach to welfarism that resulted from this 
centrist politicking has certainly had the effect of heralding a punitiveness which 
Wacquant portrays as characteristic of the Neoliberal state, too much is given to 
Neoliberalism as the driving force or the political landscape as inevitably punitive or 
repressive in pursuit of success. While Garland’s dystopia is a product of lamentable 
circumstances, Wacquant’s reflects on the shame of a politics which would subscribe 
to a model of success which would knowingly repress and utilise the penal landscape 
as an arm of repression. 
 
Penal Populism 
If these accounts have erred too far on the side of broad functionalism, of penal 
dystopias, I would argue that a consideration of this realm which does not view 
Neoliberalism as the driving force, which focuses closely on political realities might 
move towards an account which can better understand the political construction of 
crime narratives. A consideration of the criminological body of work focusing on the 
phenomenon of ‘Penal Populism’ constitutes a central element of this project and of 
the introductory argument that conceptual development is required in this area. Much 
like the already discussed works of Garland and Wacquant, the literature on ‘Penal 
Populism’ is grounded in political circumstance but also suggests that a particular 
approach to criminal justice has developed as part of a broad ranging societal shift 
towards ‘Late Modernity’. However, ‘penal populism’ adds to these accounts by 
honing in on forces beyond Neoliberalism, such as the media, in accounting for the 
political circumstances which can produce repressive criminal justice policy. 
 ‘Penal Populism’ has become prominent in the study of punishment and is 
widely cited as the underlying cause of what criminology has termed the ‘punitive 
turn’ (Muncie 2008). Loader’s article on the development of this field, ‘For Penal 
Moderation’ (2010) describes the prominence of the ‘punitive turn’ as a fertile 
subject for criminology: 
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For some time now analysts of punishment have been drawn-like bystanders to 
a car crash-to what has become known, perhaps a little complacently, as the 
‘punitive turn’. Article after article, and book after book, has sought to 
document and explain the rise and consequences of the penal state in the USA 
and UK- as registered by such indicator as record levels of imprisonment… and 
the generally shrill tone of political and popular debate about crime. 
(Loader 2010: 350) 
 
Indeed, ‘the generally shrill tone of political and popular debate about crime’ gives 
an idea of the one-note perspectives on this realm, regularly dismissed as simply 
noise, as largely inconsequential in the pursuit of a greater understanding of this 
field. My argument here is that our focus ought to move away from article after 
article on such broad-ranging, intangible notions as ‘the penal state’ and move 
towards understanding what exactly is happening in that noise and its very real 
effects on for instance the construction of a piece of repressive welfare legislation.  
Nonetheless, much of the work which aims to address this ‘punitive turn’ has 
been conducted under the guise of ‘Penal Populism’, which views crime in the 
political realm as “the pursuit of a set of penal policies to win votes rather than to 
reduce crime or promote justice” (Pratt 2007: 3). The regular political employment 
of this cynical practice was explained by Tyler and Boeckmann’s (1997) work which 
proposed that “penal populism emerges out of concerns to restore a disintegrating 
moral and social cohesion… rather than a specific response to crime problems” (Pratt 
2007: 37). Therefore not only did this discussion re-emphasize the significance of 
electoral politics in the construction of crime, but it suggested that this practice had 
been intrinsically linked to the perception of a need to heal our damaged social 
fabric. This work proposed that ever-escalating law and order grandstanding at 
elections had not only fed into a general rise in punitive sentiments, but that this 
practice was linked with electoral success through a perception that a strong stance 
on law and order would heal our ‘ontological insecurity’ (Giddens 1991), would 
restore our society to a perceived golden age of moral and social cohesion, an 
essentially false but powerfully conjured image of better times. The penal populism 
argument, therefore, was that the forceful and emotional nature of this relationship 
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would ensure that law and order issues would continue to remain at the forefront of 
electoral politics, feeding into an ever-escalating populist punitiveness which would 
be extremely difficult to derail, so strong was its intrinsic link to ‘ontological 
insecurity’. In essence, this work views the electoral success of punitive criminal 
justice policy-making as assured, as inherently connected to a public desire to 
“reassert community commitment to those values” (Tyler and Boeckmann 1997: 
240). This work argues that rule-breaking is threatening in that it “poses a threat to 
the moral cohesion of society” (Tyler and Boeckmann 1997: 240). Pratt (2007) 
argues that penal populism derives its success in criminal justice politics by 
appealing to ‘commonsense’ in policy decisions. The rhetorical approach is to allude 
to the notion that other parties had failed to champion the victim, the everyman. This 
is a potent tactic that seems to builds on Downes and Morgan’s notion of the ‘second 
order consensus’ (2002: 317).  
 Downes and Morgan’s definitive account of elections and ‘law and order’ 
outlines the development of this trajectory; a 1960s rise in crime rates were employed 
by the 1970s Conservative Party who ended the post-war consensus by laying blame 
for the first time with the opposing party; Thatcher’s 1979 campaign criticized 
Labour’s undermining of the ‘rule of law’ and “dispelled the last vestiges of the 
bipartisan consensus on law and order” (Downes and Morgan 2007: 204). The 
Labour Party approach of viewing social development as a legitimate method of 
dealing with crime was now viewed as too weak, which led to a ‘second-order 
consensus’ that “no party could any longer afford to cede law and order ground to the 
opposition” (Downes and Morgan 2007: 205).  The Labour Party ‘tough on crime, 
tough on the causes of crime’ slogan which followed, served to reinforce this 
‘second-order consensus’ by proving that this was also a powerful vote-winning 
strategy and the argument is that this firmly set the precedent for electoral politics 
and criminal justice in the political realm generally, that desperately ensuring that the 
party did not ‘cede the ground’ on law and order became the singular priority of law 
and order politics. The argument of the ‘second-order consensus’ is intuitively 
appealing in the face of broad-ranging accounts. It is grounded in the political 
realities that can be dictated by circumstance and can then crystallize to form an 
enduring political truth. Although a product of centrist politicking and the seeming 
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prioritization of success over rationality, the second-order consensus is not motivated 
by Neoliberalism or by the conditions of Late Modernity. Downes and Morgan’s 
account is grounded in the language of “fateful twists” (Downes and Morgan 2007: 
213), in the development of a “hegemony on law and order” (Downes and Morgan 
2007: 215) which existed but was not necessarily certain. It is more optimistic in that 
it espouses an approach to the political realm which states that here were the political 
occurrences and this was the result, rather than focusing on societal movements 
which by dint of their overarching nature suggest an unstoppable, forceful 
continuation of repression. 
 Penal Populism, while not necessarily as broad-ranging as the accounts 
provided by Garland and Wacquant, argues more than the second-order consensus in 
that it views the link between public fear, the ‘ontological insecurity’ and the political 
desire to succeed as intrinsic, as so potent that it dooms law and order to continued, 
unflinching politicization. The argument here is that this link is overstated, that it 
gives too much power to the notion of the crime communication landscape as defined 
by a manipulative political class, supported by a singularly minded tabloid narrative, 
defining crime on to a fearful public, rabid in their desire for punitiveness. This is a 
hopeless account and one which gives to much credit to an imagined hierarchy of 
narrative construction. We will see that to view the media as a mouthpiece of any 
kind is to grossly underestimate the forces which propel this sprawling realm and 
gives too much credence to the now obsolete notion of a singular tabloid narrative. 
Furthermore, this account provides an overly simplistic sense of the public, as shrill, 
as panicked, as receptors of law and order information. Penal Populism and each of 
these accounts omits any sense of the public as active in this realm. These works see 
clearly defined, impenetrable boundaries around legitimized knowledge creators. 
They see politics, the media and the public as separate identities and a central aim of 
this thesis is to infuse some fluidity into these accounts, to view the spilling over 
from one realm to the other, to see this relationship as increasingly equal and 




From ‘Cultural Criminology’ to a ‘Criminology of Political Culture’ 
 
The cultural criminology project defines itself as “the placing of crime and its control 
in the context of culture; that is, viewing both crime and the agencies of control as 
cultural products- as creative constructs” (Hayward and Young 2004: 259). Also 
basing itself temporally in the “late modern socio-cultural milieu” (Hayward and 
Young 2012: 114), cultural criminology aims to capture the fluidity of culture; its 
constant transformation of meaning, yet invariable force of presence within our 
social interactions. Furthermore, it is portrayed as understanding our distinct late 
modern anxieties, while attempting to address our emotional responses to crime from 
a more personal perspective. As such, this collection of works might seem to offer a 
perspective within which the fluidity of narratives could be appreciated, in which a 
grounding in culture could capture the conditions of Late Modernity while allowing a 
more nuanced understanding of the public role to emerge. Ultimately I have opted 
not to conduct this project under the guise of ‘Cultural Criminology’, despite sharing 
several of its central aims. In the next chapter, I will discuss the theoretical model 
which I argue can best capture this realm, one which is grounded in Symbolic 
Interactionism, also a key element of Cultural Criminology. However, I will argue 
here that elements of this movement render it not wholly suitable for this project and 
in doing so, I will aim to clarify what this project is, by clearly stating what it is not.  
 
While the subject matter of cultural criminological works is broadly defined 
as crime and deviance, the theoretical approach takes centre stage, being described as 
“a loose federation of outlaw intellectual critiques” (Ferrell 2007: 99), which imbues 
the advantage of “keeping cultural criminology open and invitational” (Ferrell, 
Hayward and Young 2008: 210). Indeed, a number of theoretical perspectives are 
cited in the expositional chapters and articles which form the inception of the project. 
Merton’s Strain Theory is explicitly referenced, along with Shaw and McKay and 
‘the Chicago School’. Also featuring prominently are Taylor, Walton and Young’s 
‘New Criminology’, the ‘Birmingham School’ of 1970s cultural studies as well as 
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postmodernist perspectives mixed with “a structurally and politically informed 
version of labeling theory” (Cohen 1988: 68). These cherry-picked theoretical 
perspectives add a diverse layer to the mélange and aid the attempt to reframe 
accounts towards a consideration of cultural forces. 
 The cultural criminological approach to understanding the communication of 
crime in our politicized society is set out by Jeff Ferrell in ‘Cultural Criminology’, an 
expositional paper from 1999. He posits that the mixture of cultural studies and 
postmodernism promotes “a journey into the spectacle and carnival of crime” 
(Ferrell 1999: 397) and allows cultural criminologists to explore: 
 
networks...of connections, contact, contiguity, feedback and generalized 
interface” (Baudrillard 1985:127; see Pfohl 1993) out of which crime and 
crime control are constructed, the intertextual “media loops” (Manning 1998) 
through which these constructions circulate, and the discursive 
interconnections that emerge between media institutions, crime control agents, 
and criminal subcultures (Kane 1998). 
(Ferrell 1999: 397) 
 
Certainly, in attempting to evaluate the political construction of crime narratives 
within today’s late modern society, this dynamic cultural criminological approach 
appears to move beyond a preoccupation with Neoliberalism. Furthermore, there is a 
notable inclusion of Symbolic Interactionism on the vast list of theoretical 
perspectives on offer, which seems to present some further utility: 
 
In examining the mediated networks and discursive connections noted above, 
cultural criminologists also trace the manifold interactions through which 
criminals, control agents, media producers, and others collectively construct 
the meaning of crime. In so doing, cultural criminologists attempt to elaborate 
on the “symbolic” in “symbolic interaction” by highlighting the popular 
prevalence of mediated crime imagery, the interpersonal negotiation of style 
within criminal and deviant subcultures, and the emergence of larger symbolic 
universes within which crime takes on political meaning 
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(Ferrell 1999: 398)  
 
Indeed, among the various expositional papers and introductory texts presented by 
proponents of cultural criminology, there is certainly an initial stance to be found 
which aims to move discussion towards considering the relevance of communication 
in understanding the construction of crime in politics.  
 Since its inception, cultural criminology has vociferously operated under 
these loose terms, as a self-styled miscellaneous and eclectic collection of works. Its 
initial proponents were quite clear in their establishment of the ‘notion’ of cultural 
criminology and invitation for subsequent developments from like-minded 
contributors; “cultural criminology posits a manifesto, but not a unified theory; it is a 
perspective rather than a school” (Webber 2007: 146). However, once ‘unleashed’, 
cultural criminology in practice has proven somewhat unwieldy, wandering away 
from the specifically cultural, emotional aims and resulting largely in internecine 
critique, with “a series of criminologists interested in culture, rather than a cultural 
criminology” (Webber 2007: 146). 
 While its original proponents, Hayward and Young, make a particular effort 
to not only establish the movement and more recently defend it (Hayward and Young 
in Maguire, Morgan and Reiner 2012), the results of this movement have largely 
been “fascinating stories of edgework and transgression, [which] leave the 
conclusion unfinished” (Webber 2007: 154). Quite typically, we are introduced to a 
great many innovative and loosely cultural texts, but due to cultural criminology’s 
resistance, the aims specified are never concluded. There is no opportunity to fulfill 
the task proposed, as this would conform too rigidly to theoretical dogma. “The 
outcome is that those policy makers, agents of social control and less sympathetic 
academics are able to write their own conclusions” (Webber 2007: 154). Indeed, 
research produced under the guise of cultural criminology tends to vary significantly 
and rarely comes close to addressing the initial aim of merging late modern 
existential anxieties with an account of culture. Perhaps more damaging still is that 
this lack of unity has allowed stronger voices, with distinctly politicized views, to 
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dominate and steer cultural criminology in a direction which is in many ways 
counter-intuitive to its aims. This work contrasts significantly with the neutral and 
measured stance of The Culture of Control, yet its over-politicization seems to yield 
few answers to the questions posed of Garland’s work. 
 More specifically, it is the ever-present Marxist, (former) left-realist voices 
which remain as a residue from 1960s and 1970s radicalism and the previously 
mentioned ‘New Criminology’ which find cultural criminology appealing, many 
having integrated their views into the cultural criminology movement. This can tend 
to damage the project, not only because “not everyone in cultural criminology shares 
the same political outlook” (Webber 2007: 139), but also because the focus of 
cultural criminology too-frequently becomes some kind of resolution of these 
previous movements. This politicized approach is consistently emphasized; “If ever 
we could afford the fiction of an ‘objective’ criminology- a criminology devoid of 
moral passion and political meaning- we certainly cannot now” (Ferrell, Hayward 
and Young 2008:13), infusing the movement with an overly provocative nature, 
which is surely the reason that some commentators reduce its worth to merely “ a 
necessary antidote to the boredom of criminology” (Webber 2007: 154). A great deal 
of energy is expended on provocation, both towards the field and towards traditional 
targets of Marxist outrage. In the introduction to the self-styled ‘audaciously and 
suggestively’ titled ‘Cultural Criminology Unleashed’ (2004), Ferrell, Hayward, 
Morrison and Presdee admit, “Cultural Criminology Unleashed is meant to be 
provocative, irreverent, even confrontational, both in title and in content” (Ferrell et 
al 2004: 1). However, while these particular proponents make vocal attempts to court 
controversy, we become ever-aware of the lack of focus on the fundamental 
theoretical aims. O’Brien (2005) criticizes the tendency within the much lauded 
ethnographic endeavours to favour those considered victims within a Marxist 
framework, rather than applying a rigorously similar method of evaluation to all 
parties. He cites the key work ‘Crimes of Style’ (1996) by Jeff Ferrell, which 
provides an account of graffiti artists in Denver and notes a disparity in the accounts 
of the noble, wronged graffiti artist against the oppressive property owner:  
the only justification there can be is political… what is less clear is whether 
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this anarchist-cultural approach is capable of advancing criminology’s more 
general grasp of who is on the receiving end and what it means and feels like to 
do being punched. (O’Brien 2005: 604)   
 
To frame the question in terms of Becker’s ‘whose side are we on?’ (1967), Webber 
argues that “cultural criminologists are more likely to be found in support of 
transgressors” (Webber 2007: 142). 
 Furthermore, by placing “a stress on the interpretative rather than the 
mechanistic; the naturalistic rather than the positivistic” (Hayward and Young 2004: 
260), proponents of the perspective insist on the utilization of ethnographic 
methodologies, while explicitly denouncing positivist, statistical endeavours which 
in their minds produce; “a mess of figures, techno-speak and methodological 
obfuscation” (Hayward and Young 2004: 262). Indeed, to oppose these methods is 
proudly cited by many as a mission; “for cultural criminologists, the possibility of 
effectively moderating, if not curing the blind obsession with quantitative 
(in)significance, is in large part a question of method” (Kane 2004: 304). While we 
might assume that this support of qualitative methodologies could assist cultural 
criminologists in their aims of appreciating the expressive, emotional and personal 
elements of crime, the reality found in the work produced again veers towards 
confrontational politicization and loses sight of this opportunity. Even in 
methodology, we cannot escape the fact that “cultural criminology is a political, 
rather than analytical orientation” (O’Brien 2005: 600). 
Indeed, the sheer volume of cultural criminological work which is dedicated to 
the fervent anti-positivism is gratuitously large for a theoretical pursuit and risks the 
movement becoming “a useful but ultimately ineffectual staging post for an 
argument against technocratic risk-management criminologies”. Furthermore, it is 
largely due to the loosely defined structure as previously outlined, that those 
proponents who feels passionately about the problem of the over-statistical in 
criminology, are freely able to come to the fore: 
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And what sort of discipline results from this contemporary triumph of the 
bureaucrat and the survey statistician?... what then does criminology 
become?... It becomes lifeless, stale and inhuman. 
(Ferrell et al 2008: 165)  
 
This particular impunity around the subject of methodologies does a disservice to the 
rest of cultural criminology, in that it becomes the loudest voice among a collection 
of potentially very useful ideas. 
 The aim of this project, as I will discuss in Chapter 2, is to move beyond the 
rigidity of researching within particular established theoretical movements. I will 
employ Symbolic Interactionism and Durkheim, as well as Randall Collins’ 
Interaction Ritual Chains (2004), with an eye on their place in sociology and 
criminology, but with the express aim of circumventing the limits of theoretical 
dogma. Certainly my approach does share some similarities with the central tenets of 
Cultural Criminology and as we will see in the conclusion, does end on something of 
a radical note, yet I have aimed throughout this project to adopt the approach which 
best fits progress in this area, rather than one stymied by anti-positivist tendencies or 
a preference for Marxism from the outset. My criticism of Garland and Wacquant 
and to an extent Penal Populism has been that their approaches have been limited by 
their overly broad functionalism and their belief in some intrinsic, deterministic link. 
Therefore, to conduct this project under the guise of Cultural Criminology would not 
move our perspective far enough away from these criticisms. Instead, I will focus 
here on microsociology, the power of adding the inter-personal experience to this 








A THEORETICAL ACCOUNT OF SYMBOLIC FORCE IN THE 
COMMUNICATION OF CRIME 
  
This chapter discusses the potential for present-day applications of ‘Symbolic 
Interactionism’, by way of Goffman, Durkheim and Randall Collins’s Interaction 
Ritual Chains (2004). Symbolic Interactionism is presented as a useful re-emphasis 
of ‘the self’ in today’s context, with the ideas of ‘negotiated meaning’ as specifically 
human and central to our personal development (Mead 1934).  Furthermore, the 
potential for the symbolic force of crime today to feed into the ‘generalized other’ is 
proposed. The particular applicability of Goffman’s ‘Presentation of Self in 
Everyday Life’ (1959) is demonstrated, as offering a distinct focus on the symbolic 
relations outwith internal thought, as well as developments and applications in 
‘Asylums’ (1961) and ‘Stigma’ (1963). I will also examine the links that this work 
may fruitfully share with a classic Durkheimian account of symbolic power which 
“is attentive to the capacity that the state has to… produce social reality” (Wacquant 
2009: xvi) and which is similarly aware of group interaction through rituals, as 
linked now by Randall Collins in ‘Interaction Ritual Chains’ (2004). In this work, 
Collins takes us beyond Durkheim and Goffman-influenced definitions of ritual, to 
detail the processes in which the participants develop a mutual focus of attention and 
become entrained in each other’s bodily micro-rhythms and emotions (Collins 2004: 
48). I will argue for the Interaction Ritual Chains (2004) model as enhancing our 
understanding of the fluidity of this realm, which can begin to move perspectives 
away from criminal justice dystopia. Finally, I will argue for the development of 
Collins’s model beyond the necessity of physical co-presence. This is an exploration 
of the communication of symbolic force through ritual which aims to understand the 
progression from small scale interaction to broader righteous anger and which is 







The Symbolic Interactionist approach examines how our notions of ‘the self’ and 
personal identity can be developed and in turn disrupted.  It is therefore my 
contention that a re-examination of the work conducted under this guise may provide 
us with a more nuanced understanding of the microsociology of ‘ontological 
insecurity’ (Giddens 1991), and that an updated account, as applied to today’s 
specific circumstances, may provide a contribution to our understanding of the 
construction of crime narratives in the public realm. I will present a brief trajectory of 
the ideas of the symbolic interactionism movement with the hope of identifying some 
specific aspects which can be appropriated for an updated account which seeks to 
better understand the processing of ‘ontological insecurity’. Having given particular 
consideration to the Meadian notions of ‘the self’ and ‘the generalised other’, I will 
attempt to move away from the particular trajectory of ‘symbolic interactionism’ as it 
has previously unfolded and instead employ the most essential elements of the theory 
in understanding this crime narrative landscape. Ultimately, I will aim to apply these 
fundamental propositions to our current circumstances in order to move towards a 
more nuanced understanding of the public role in political communication. 
 
 
The Foundations of Symbolic Interactionism 
 
Symbolic Interactionism initially manifested itself as a movement of sociological 
thought which sought to understand the formation of our notions of ‘the self’ through 
our relations to one another. According to Blumer, a fundamental premise of this 
theoretical persuasion “is that human beings act toward things on the basis of the 
meanings that the things have for them” (Blumer 1969:2). Mead’s work in this area 
further highlighted a focus on ‘the self’ and how we negotiate meaning as 
specifically human and central to our individual development.  
 As a subsidiary of this approach, the second key premise was crucially “that 
the meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that 
one has with one’s fellows” (Blumer 1969: 2). Thus, not only does symbolic 
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interactionism focus on ‘the self’ as best understood in terms of how we decide to act 
in particular contexts, it also prioritises our interactions with others as key to our 
personal development.  Again, this view is largely derived from the Meadian concept 
of ‘the self as a process’ (Mead 1934), which uniquely conceived of a distinct 
difference between the ‘I’ which referred to the self as an acting subject and the ‘Me’ 
which alternatively represented the self as an object. In Mead’s conception, the ‘I’ 
represents the untarnished, subjective, human organism, whereas “the ‘Me’ reflects 
the attitude of the community since it is viewed through the ‘generalized other’” 
(Blumer 2004: 66). The essence of Mead’s argument is that as we develop we 
internalise the reflections we receive from various ‘generalised others’ which in turn 
facilitates the expected internalisation of societal norms and values. In this model, the 
role of the wider community is key in facilitating the continuation of norms and we 
negotiate meaning from these ‘generalized others’ through the symbols which they 
provide us with. This is the unembellished basis of symbolic interactionism; a theory 
of how we understand and develop ourselves through interaction with others and the 
symbols they emit. Blumer’s third premise “is that these meanings are handled in, 
and modified through, an interpretive process used by the person in dealing with the 
things he encounters” (Blumer 1969: 2). This process is described by Cooley’s 
classic piece, the ‘Looking-Glass Self’ (1902): 
 
As we see our face, figure, and dress in the glass… and are pleased or 
otherwise with them according as they do or do not answer to what we 
should like them to be; so in imagination we perceive in another’s mind 
some thought of our appearance, manners, aims… and are variously 
affected by it.  
(Cooley 1902: 183) 
 
 Erving Goffman’s ‘The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life’ (1959) offered 
a slightly different sociological perspective to the works which had derived their 
meaning from Mead’s texts. In a sense, Goffman’s alternative sociological account 
of ‘the self’ offers a version of the approach which answers critics of Mead, such as 
Garfinkel (1984) who famously disapproved of the portrayal of Mead’s subjects of 
analysis as “cultural dopes” (Garfinkel 1984: 68). Garfinkel took issue with the 
suggestion that societal forces are supposedly bearing down upon the subjects and 
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implanting meanings into their development, without any account of the person’s 
cognition or ability to alter the outcomes. We might level this critique similarly at 
some of the criminological works on the politics of crime, as discussed in Chapter 1 
and it is in this ambition to move beyond a simplistic, linear view of narrative 
development, of the public as powerless, that aligns this project with Goffman.  
Goffman’s version is commonly accepted as a complementary text to Mead 
which can provide an understanding of ‘the self’ which accounts for a greater sense 
of the employment of personal control. Furthermore, “Goffman differs from Mead in 
that he does not assume that the members of society present themselves to others in 
an unproblematic way” (Fontana 1980: 63). ‘The Presentation of Self in Everyday 
Life’ (1959) thus drew heavily on certain Meadian traditions, concentrating similarly 
on the way in which people tend to guide and control other people’s impressions, but 
differed with a distinct focus on the testing symbolic relations out with internal 
thought. In particular, Goffman employed the imagery of theatre and stagecraft to 
convey that ‘the self’ ought to be thought of as a performed character: 
 
The issues dealt with by stagecraft and stage management are sometimes 
trivial but they are quite general; they seem to occur everywhere in social 
life, providing a clear-cut dimension for formal sociological analysis. 
(Goffman 1959: 11) 
  
In keeping with this theme, Goffman notes that for an effective presentation of our 
‘self’, we require “stage settings and backstage… dramaturgical skills and 
dramaturgical strategies” (Goffman 1959 in Lemert and Branaman 1997: 24), in 
order to effectively carry out our preferred performances. It is therefore Goffman’s 
suggestion that should these circumstances, or lack of, have the unintended effect of 
hindering our performances, that this can have detrimental effects on the 
development of our self-conception. 
 Goffman himself later elaborated on the relationship between individual 
negotiated meaning and institutions in his work ‘Asylums’ (1961), noting that: 
Each moral career, and behind this, each self, occurs within the confines 
of an institutional system, whether a social establishment such as a 
mental hospital or a complex of personal and professional relationships. 
(Goffman 1961: 168) 
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He also proposed that when ‘Stigma’ is felt in a particular situation, it is often the 
result of ‘spoiled identities’, which manifest themselves as “an attribute that is 
deeply discrediting within a particular social interaction” (Goffman 1963: 3).  
 Symbolic Interactionism retains a similar resonance in explaining the 
psychology of the self today as it had done over one hundred years ago when Cooley 
first considered the looking-glass. It is therefore my contention that these classic 
theories of ‘the self’, which form the foundations of Symbolic Interactionism, can 
and ought to be utilised in the criminological understanding of the non-deviant, of 
the everyday ‘self’ whose personal psychological development is affected daily by 
crime.  
The classic theoretical Meadian precepts which focus centrally on ‘the self’ 
and negotiated meaning emphasise the important role that interactions play in our 
personal psychological development and wellbeing. As discussed, Mead’s concept 
of the ‘generalized other’ is persuasive in explaining the crucial role of the 
community and of interactions in our feelings of personal security. As such it is our 
distance from the community which has created a binary opposition, and a Meadian 
perspective would emphasise that an uncertainty in the role of the ‘generalized other’ 
leads to a fundamental unease in our sense of self and personal security. What this 
approach does not suggest, however, is that there is a direct link between knowing 
our community and feeling secure. Rather, the symbolic interactionist approach 
speaks more to our underlying social-psychological ‘selfs’, suggesting instead that 
the relationship between the ‘I’, the ‘Me’ and the ‘generalized other’ is subtle rather 
than overtly tangible, but that disruption of this crucial relationship can have the 
detrimental effect of wreaking havoc on our very notions of ‘self’. If we feel subject 
to such a disruption, a Meadian analysis would suggest that not only are our personal 
conceptions of ‘self’ challenged, but also, we are forced to question whether the 
norms and values of society correspond with those which we feel we ought to 
internalise. I would suggest that in this sense, Symbolic Interactionist approaches 
can prove particularly useful in allowing us to understand how far-removed social 
changes can impact on an individual’s sense of ‘self’.  
 Following from this, the Symbolic Interactionist perspective presents another 
potentially crucial dimension here in its emphasis on the symbol. As noted, it is 
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proposed by Mead and others that our norms and values are communicated to us 
through the symbols which are emitted by the forms of ‘generalised other’ with 
which we interact. In this sense, Symbolic Interactionism can perhaps explain how 
large scale forces like the media can communicate our norms and values through 
their various outlets and through certain symbolic measures. Thus, we are provided 
not only with an enhanced understanding of the very personal social psychological 
relationships which could be augmenting our sense of ‘ontological insecurity’ 
(Giddens 1991), but also with a persuasive account of how this can be further 
influenced by broader forces. Indeed, by understanding that certain important and 
current ‘generalized others’, ranging from our local communities and people we 
know to the government and media, tend to present certain inclinations through 
symbolic gestures which threaten the core of our personal security, we gain a more 
nuanced perspective of the fluid construction of emotion and narratives in today’s 
society. In constructing an analysis of wider societal forces, Goffman’s interpretation 
of these Meadian themes can also be utilised in enhancing an understanding of our 
symbolic relationships with institutions. Whether the subject matter is globalisation, 
immigration, or crime, it seems that the symbols we are privy to today and that we 
readily absorb and interpret could act as a disruptive or unnerving influence if they 
make us question our fundamental norms and values, in that this also forces us to 
question the presentation of ourselves. The argument here is that Symbolic 
Interactionism helps us to understand that this challenge to our personal sense of self 
is so invasive and discomfiting, that it forces us to reach out and indulge our excesses 
by demanding punitive action. I would therefore argue that in offering us a 
theoretical vocabulary that enables a more nuanced understanding of personal 
insecurity, Symbolic Interactionism can provide a significant contribution to our 
perspectives on the construction of crime narratives and it is the argument of this 
project that such an understanding can move us towards a more detailed sense of this 








In aiming to account for the role of symbolic power in the construction of crime 
narratives, I will argue here for the employment of Durkheim’s works on morality, 
ethics and the functional interactions of society which have been utilised throughout 
criminology. Those constructing comprehensive accounts of crime and punishment 
have frequently sought a greater understanding of these issues through reference to 
Durkheim’s ‘The Division of Labour’ (1893) or within his classic conceptions of 
society, which have illuminated the role of social interactions; “what are the bonds 
which unite men one with another?” (Lukes 1973), as well as providing a rich 
account of crime and punishment as intrinsically linked to such societies.  
Here, I will attempt to consider the specific elements of Durkheim’s work in 
its original format which can provide us with a profound and useful perspective on 
society, and which can be appreciated as instrumental to this specific project, of 
understanding the construction of crime narratives.  
 
 Durkheim’s writings on religion, particularly ‘The Elementary Forms of the 
Religious Life’ (1912) advances our understanding of symbolic power, an account 
which it is argued can add further nuance to an approach which aims to understand 
the role of the public in the construction of crime narratives. Durkheim argued that 
“society in all its aspects and in every period of its history, is made possible only by a 
vast symbolism” (Durkheim 1912: 264). Within the religious context, Durkheim 
focused on the symbolic power imbued in religious totems, the sacred object. He 
argued that the ritual and symbols of religion provided comfort to society and as such 
were cherished, infused with meaning to the community. Durkheim’s account of 
symbolic force is not limited to religion, as Durkheim’s discussion of religious totems 
was meant to serve as a consideration of what can cause uproar, can provoke outrage 
in the collective conscience. This account is particularly useful in aiming to 
understand the construction of crime in today’s society, in which as we will see, the 
dispersal of media structures puts the power to create or disrupt established narratives 
back into the hands of the public, which in turn reinforces the significance of the 
sacred object in society. I will argue in Chapter 6 for instance, that the notion of the 
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‘Ideal Victim’ (Christie 1986) is a sacred object of our time and demonstrates the 
power of symbolism to play a role in the construction of crime narratives. 
Durkheim’s influence in criminology advanced beyond the text and into the 
field, particularly through his utilization of the idiom ‘Anomie’. This term, taken 
from the Greek ‘anomia’, meaning lawlessness, is utilized by Durkheim in his theory 
of the Division of Labour, when he gives focus to the problem of occurrences which 
do not adhere to ‘the norm’ within his theories. As Morrison notes, Durkheim claims 
that at times of economic or industrial crisis, “when there is widespread commercial 
failure, this crisis… tends to breach the social solidarity existing between specialized 
functions and creates a decline in social cohesion” (Morrison 1995: 149). In these 
situations, social solidarity and cohesion is diluted to such an extent that “a common 
authority no longer links persons to each other, but only to their private interest” 
(Morrison 1995: 150). Durkheim described individuals in these situations as taking 
on an ‘abnormal’ or ‘pathological’ role because they “deviate[d] from the path of 
organic solidarity” (Thompson 1982: 80). This further exacerbates inequalities 
among different classes, the severe divisions of labour placing some members of 
society in inordinately powerful positions, while others languish in abject poverty. It 
is, in Durkheim’s view, the creation of these situations which leads to Anomie, and 
hence, crime. Anomie became an oft-cited idiom which was utilized in 
criminological theories. In particular, Robert K. Merton’s ‘Strain Theory’ (1952) 
employed the term to mean a certain normative conflict or friction which is inspired 
in those whose goals do not correspond with the means they have of achieving such 
socially constructed aspirations. According to Merton, Anomie in this sense would 
provoke deviance. However, while Merton’s work was critically acclaimed within 
criminology, it serves as a good example of the beginning of the trend which also 
occurred within sociology, that of the noticeable shifting away from the text and a 
moulding of Durkheim’s works into something entirely novel.  
 
In David Garland’s key text, ‘Punishment and Modern Society’ (1990), it is 
noted that full details of the concept are never really proposed and that its existence 
is too readily taken as proven, without any exploration as to how or why this 
‘common mentality’ was constructed. In ‘The Idea of the Sacred’ (Garland 1990: 54) 
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we are informed of Edward Shils (1982) and Clifford Geertz’s (1983) disagreements 
with Durkheim, in that they would locate Durkheim’s notion of ‘sacredness’ in the 
strategic interventions of ruling elites rather than something that permeates society in 
general.  Similarly, in ‘The Social Necessity of Punishment’ (Garland 1990: 58), we 
are reminded that “In Durkheim’s view a failure to punish violations of the 
conscience collective undermines the collective force of social morality and runs the 
risk of demoralizing citizens” (Garland 1990: 58). However, according to Ralf 
Dahrendorf (1985); “since the Second World War, the sanctions used against 
offenders in Europe have become so ‘emasculated’ and lenient that they have 
contributed to the collapse of authoritative social order”, and that therefore, the 
conditions do not exist for Durkheim’s theory to operate and it is thus extremely 
limited.  
A further criticism of Durkheim’s theories is perhaps the suggestion that 
crimes and punishments do not actually impact on social solidarity as strongly as 
proposed. In fact, an observer of criminal justice and punishment discourses would 
note that, rather than becoming more measured and ‘organic’ as industrialization 
grows; that crime and punishment today is becoming increasingly hysterical as new 
forms of societies emerge, we have seen that this is the opinion of the ‘Penal 
Populists’ and Loader (2010) who portrays the public voice as ‘shrill’. Furthermore, 
it is arguable that new technologies as well as increasing globalization and 
immigration issues now represent a new form of economic and societal expansion 
and change. However, with this transformation, rather than becoming more measured 
and following Durkheim’s model, it seems apparent that our criminal justice policies 
are significantly more panic-stricken and emotional than they have been in previous 
years.  
However, it is argued here that we can enhance an account of Symbolic 
Interactionism in understanding the role of the public in the construction of crime 
narratives. Indeed, if Symbolic Interactionism provides us with an account of the self 
which is contingent on symbolically loaded external forces, Durkheim’s account of 
the impact of symbols on the collective conscience can tell us the nature of the kinds 
of totemic symbols which might feed into the generalized other and could have the 
potential to disrupt our sense of self. Using this mapping of the relationship we have 
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to society’s more ephemeral forces we can start to get a sense of the kinds of issues 
that can rouse public emotion. It is in this theoretical endeavor that this project 
becomes more than an understanding of political narratives but also probes what are 
the particular qualities of a crime narrative which can mobilise the public. We will 
see some examples of this potent relationship in the case studies which will follow. 
For now, I would argue that Durkheim’s collective conscience and his notion of the 
power of symbols within a ritualistic context, enriches an account of the force of the 
public, of the origins of outcry, or as a key passage of Durkheim’s is usually 
translated of “the public wrath” (Giddens, 1972: 128; Valier, 2005: 91). 
 I will now introduce and discuss the work of Randall Collins, a sociologist 
who has also found value in combining Durkheim’s view of symbolic force with 
Symbolic Interactionism. As we will see, Collins’s work and his model, ‘Interaction 
Ritual Chains’ (2004) begins with this premise and develops a microsociological 
account which I will argue can be instructive in an exploration of the crime 
communication landscape.  
  
Interaction Ritual Chains: Randall Collins’s Sociology 
 
Not only was Collins a student of Erving Goffman and Herbert Blumer, but he notes 
that the circumstances of the time brought out in Blumer an emphasis on the concept 
of ‘the situation’ which would stay with Collins throughout his theoretical work. He 
would go on to create an entire sociology of the situation, based on Goffman’s work, 
which emphasized microsociology and to some extent, Blumer’s ‘symbolic 
interactionism’. He viewed himself as taking a different route to other students of 
Goffman who had mostly become pure ethnomethodologists or had come to focus 
heavily on deviance, but rather someone who would more regularly connect the 
fundamental premises of microsociology to macro-political movements: ‘connecting 
Blumer and Goffman’s ideas to the political movement put it into a different 
perspective. It’s not just like little things like pickpockets and horse race touts are 
constructing the situation, the whole political world is being constructed.’ (Collins in 
McLean and Yokkom 2000). These ideas would form the key elements of an 
important body of original theoretical work by Collins, but in particular, ‘On the 
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Microfoundations of Macrosociology’ (1981) which ‘not only provide[d] a novel 
social psychology but also claim[ed] to offer a foundation to the analysis of 
institutions in the political and economic spheres; that is, foundation to a 
macrosociology’ (Barbalet 2006: 446). Indeed, the article provided the definitive 
outline of the utility of microanalysis in the sociological enterprise, for instance: 
 
A micro-translation strategy reveals the empirical realities of social structures 
as patterns of repetitive micro-interaction. Microtranslation thus gives us a 
picture of the complex levels of abstraction involved in causal explanations. 
(Collins 1981: 985) 
 
Here, Collins also defines for the first time his term ‘Interaction Ritual Chains’ as 
‘chains of micro-encounters [which] generate the central features of social 
organization… by creating and recreating “mythical” cultural symbols and emotional 
energies’ (Collins 1981: 985).  
 This emphasis on the symbolic and emotional energies is also explained by 
Collins’s particular approach to the utilization of Durkheim. Crucially for Collins’s 
work, in accordance with Goffman’s views, he began to view the Durkheimian 
model for processes of group solidarity as extremely useful, in that “it’s the groups 
that are in conflict with each other much more than individuals” (Collins in McLean 
and Yokkom 2000). This solidified Collins’s belief that the core point of analysis 
ought to be the situation and the group rather than the individual. 
 
 
A Radical Microsociology of Emotion in Randall Collins’s  
Interaction Ritual Chains 
 
 
“To see the common realities of everyday life sociologically requires a gestalt shift”, 
Collins insists (2004: 5). Perhaps the most central notion of this project is that we 
must re-frame our analytic starting point by beginning with the ‘situation’ rather than 
the ‘individual’. Collins argues that previous attempts to focus on the individual 
throughout sociology have begun with a fundamentally flawed subject, and that 
influences such as religious, political and cultural trends render “the social actor, the 
human individual, a quasi-enduring, quasi-transient flux in time and space” (2004: 
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4). Collins also levels a critique at the unquestioned reification of the individual as 
ideologically aligned with a “secular version of the Christian doctrine of the eternal 
soul”, suggesting that we ought to take seriously the various layers of social 
construction which have polluted our idea of the individual and research based on 
this notion.   
Moving away from the individual towards the situation is not only motivated 
by the pollution of the individual, but also by a distinctly Goffman-centred approach 
to analysis and a belief that examining the situation in a meaningful way can provide 
us with extensive and more consciously neutral information about society: “from this 
we can derive almost everything we want to know about individuals, as a moving 
precipitate across situations” (2004: 4). Collins sets out this shift as a fundamental 
premise of his work early on and continues to challenge the reader not to view it 
within established theoretical frameworks, but to question ingrained epistemological 
features of the field. He argues “the agency/ structure rhetoric is a conceptual 
morass, entangling several distinctions and modes of rhetorical force” (2004: 5).  
Having accepted the primacy of the situation over the individual, Collins 
takes us through his particular use of Durkheim and Goffman, before explaining to 
us that we are merely the subjects of momentary encounters or rituals, which serve to 
generate symbols and interactive continuities as part of interaction chains. Collins 
identifies Goffman’s influence in his theory as that which insists analysis ought to be 
conducted on the micro level, as part of a social constructionist view that the 
situation is paramount in that it “makes demands that [individuals] feel impelled to 
follow” (2004: 16). Collins also adopts Goffman’s famous tenet that our personal 
notion of self is constructed in relation to the situation, an unprecedented micro-
functionalism of Goffman’s time which Collins argues provides unparalleled insight 
into “the micro-production of solidarities and realities” (2004: 17). 
It’s clear that Collins is a proponent of Goffman, not only in his wholehearted 
adoption of these bold analytical frameworks and particular perspective on the 
construction of the self, but also in his utilization of the term ‘ritual’. Collins quotes 
Goffman directly here, stating that: 
 
I use the term ‘ritual’ because this activity, however informal and secular, 
represents a way in which the individual must guard and design the symbolic 
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implications of his acts while in the immediate presence of an object that has a 
special value for him.  
(Goffman 1967: 57) 
 
This view of the ritual as a key moment of symbolic production will form a central 
part of Collins’s Interaction Ritual Chains theory, but also presents an opportunity 
for Collins to set out his argument for merging the perspectives of Goffman with 
particular readings of Durkheim. Collins begins by stating that on the small-scale, the 
Durkheimian view of rituals was noticeably similar to Goffman’s definition: “Rites 
are the rules of conduct which prescribe how a man should comport himself in the 
presence of these sacred objects” (Durkheim 1912: 56). 
Collins draws similarities here, the acknowledgement of sacred objects and 
the assertion that the conditions of production of rituals are key: “rituals are the 
nodes of social structure, and it is in rituals that a group creates its symbols” (Collins 
2004: 26). Behr describes ‘Interaction Ritual Chains’ as a “bare-knuckle defence of 
Durkheim’s legacy” (Behr 2005: 464), which is most prominent in Collins’s 
thorough reconsideration of Durkheim’s sociology of religion. Collins’s loyalty to 
the text allows him to clearly link many of Durkheim’s concepts to Goffman and 
creates an interesting new theoretical grouping, which seems well suited to 
“understanding the social world of flux and variation” (Behr 2005: 464). Indeed 
‘Interaction Ritual Chains’ states immediately that “this book argues for the 
continuity of a chief theoretical pathway from classic sociology to the present” 
(Collins 2004: 1), which sets the tone for this linking of Goffman with Durkheim and 
their intrinsic shared notions that “ideas are symbols of group membership, and thus 
culture is generated by the moral- which is to say emotional- patterns of social 
interaction” (2004: 1). 
 In using Durkheim and Goffman as complementary perspectives, the key 
focus of analysis is not the individual, but the situation, and that social interaction 
and subsequent emotionally and symbolically charged interaction rituals ought to be 
at heart of microanalysis, which in turn is the foundation of abstracted 
macroanalysis. Chapter 2 takes us beyond the known, into the unfamiliar but 
fascinating terrain at the heart of ‘Interaction Ritual Chains’: ‘The Mutual-Focus/ 
Emotional Entrainment Model’. In this chapter Collins materially develops 
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Durkheim and Goffman-influenced definitions of ritual, to detail the processes in 
which the participants develop a mutual focus of attention and become ‘entrained’ in 
each other’s bodily micro-rhythms and emotions (Collins 2004: 48). The four key 
ingredients of an interaction ritual are detailed as follows: 
 
1. Two or more people are physically assembled in the same place, so that they 
affect each other by their bodily presence, whether it is in the foreground of 
their conscious attention or not. 
2. There are boundaries to outsiders so that participants have a sense of who is 
taking part and who is excluded. 
3. People focus their attention upon a common object or activity, and by 
communicating this focus to each other become mutually aware of each 
other’s focus of attention. 
4. They share a common mood or emotional experience.  










Crucially, the elements numbered 3 and 4, the mutual focus of attention and shared 
mood, are said to reinforce each other; “As the persons become more tightly focused 
on their common activity, more aware of what each other is doing and feeling, and 
more aware of each other’s awareness, they experience their shared emotion more 
intensely, as it comes to dominate their awareness” (Collins 2004: 48). Collins 
acknowledges that in this part of his theory, he has attempted to map out Durkheim’s 
collective conscience as “a micro-situational production of moments of 
intersubjectivity” (2004: 48). The outcomes of interaction rituals are defined as 
follows:  
 
1. group solidarity, a feeling of membership; 
2. emotional energy [EE] in the individual: a feeling of confidence, elation, 
strength, enthusiasm, and initiative in taking action; 
3. symbols that represent the group: emblems or other representations (visual 
icons, words, gestures) that members feel are associated with themselves 
collectively; these are Durkheim’s “sacred objects.” Persons pumped up with 
feelings of group solidarity treat symbols with great respect and defend them 
against the disrespect of outsiders, and even more, of renegade insiders. 
4. feelings of morality: the sense of rightness in adhering to the group, 
respecting its symbols, and defending both against transgressors. Along with 
this goes the sense of moral evil or impropriety in violating the group’s 
solidarity and its symbolic representations. 
 
(Collins 2004: 49) 
 
Collins also relates his term ‘emotional energy’ or [EE] to Durkheimian social 
solidarity. 
 The essence of the Interaction Ritual Chains (2004) model is that it uses this 
merging of Goffman and Durkheim to map out a microsociology of the natural 
escalation from small scale interaction to broader righteous anger. The initial 
‘Interaction Ritual Chain’ is set in motion by physical co-presence, a group defining 
barrier, a mutual focus of attention and a shared mood. A key element in the mutual 
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focus of attention, a power source in this Interaction Ritual Chain is the Durkheimian 
notion of symbols, the sacred object which carries high levels of ‘emotional 
entrainment’. Once these particular elements come together, the Interaction Ritual 
Chain is set in motion, stoked by symbolic power and progresses through what 
Collins describes as ‘mutual entrainment’, in other words the shared emotional or 
cognitive experience. Collins suggests that there is a rhythmic nature to this process, 
much like the build up of laughter or a conversation, in which meaning is internally 
heightened and becomes more pronounced. Finally, Collins suggests that these 
intense micro situational moments of subjectivity feed into the collective 
consciousness, which produces a strong sense of pleasure, an elation, a sense of 
membership, of morality and rightness, as well as a reinforced respect for symbols, 
for the power source. 
 
 
Using ‘Interaction Ritual Chains’ in Analysis of the Political Communication 
of Crime 
 
Firstly, Collins’s ‘Interaction Ritual Chains’ provides a more useful approach to 
functionalism or constructionism from Goffman’s perspective. This model could 
serve as an argument in favour of this kind of theorizing in criminology, which 
answers complaints leveled at works like The Culture of Control as noted previously 
in Chapter 1, that macroscopic analysis of this nature is too broad to provide utility 
for purposes of empirical exploration. Furthermore, it provides support for 
‘reframing the analytic starting point’, taking the lead from Goffman to follow ‘the 
functional requirements of the situation’.  
 Most prominently, though, the application of the ‘Interaction Ritual Chains’ 
model to the Political Communication of Crime provides an approach which can 
utilise Goffman’s Symbolic Interactionism, Durkheim’s perspective of symbolic 
force and a microsociology of the natural escalation from small scale interaction to 
broader righteous anger to understand how this expressive symbolism is received and 
how further external societal factors interact with classic-type communication to 
influence crime narratives. This is an account which can map the public role in the 
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construction of crime by understanding how righteous anger around crime issues can 
develop and emphasizing interaction and ‘the situation’. 
As a result, my research will not only focus on the expressive symbolism of 
political rhetoric, but it will consider the heightening of emotion and crystallisation 
of symbolic force through media sources. It will then attempt to understand how 
these processes feed into our many ‘generalized others’, how we negotiate meaning 
and internalise norms accordingly and crucially how we, as varied members of a 
pluralistic public, mirror back these norms with increased certainty, thus contributing 
to the symbolic mélange at play in the formation of crime narratives. We will see in 
the case study research in this project that Durkheim’s ‘sacred object’ also plays a 
crucial role in the public communication of crime, so much so that it can enable the 
derailing of established narratives and redresses the power imbalance portrayed by 
linear accounts.  
It is hoped that investigating the research problem through this framework 
will provide a necessary re-examination and broadening of scope in light of 
perceived alterations in the communication of crime landscape. Notably, the gradual 
dilution of power in traditional media sources and the dispersal of communication 
tools into the public domain has resulted in the weakening of rhetorical force for 
classic-type emotive crime messages (such as those commonly alluded to by 
Wacquant 2009). I would therefore argue that an account which recognises this shift 
by placing greater emphasis on the public role is essential in developing our 
understanding of the fundamental power of crime as a narrative in society today.  
 The model I have suggested attempts to facilitate research which considers 
tangible communication structures and processes of emotion in a specifically non-
deterministic manner. This account does not presuppose that there is a broad societal 
movement towards more or less punitiveness (Pratt 2007) or excess (Loader 2009) 
and does not aim to challenge or disprove these views. Rather it engages in a quite 
different task through utilizing the symbolic interactionist approach of engaging 
microanalysis to move towards macroanalysis, that of mapping out structures, 
understanding the landscape and allowing assertions to be made about the processes 
at work. This engagement with symbolic interactionism will also function in a 
distinctly different manner to recent similar appropriations of the theoretical 
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approach in cultural criminology, in that this model rejects any preference for 
structural Marxism (Ferrell, Hayward and Young 2008) and the array of alternative 
works cherry-picked by cultural criminologists in order to propel this aim.  
 
 
Understanding Crime Through Interaction Ritual Chains 
 
Moving beyond an appreciation of the varied and hyper-modern nodes of 
communication through which we are delivered certain constructions of crime, an 
attempt to gain the fullest picture of the formation of these narratives must further 
consider the personal interactions present in this negotiation. Indeed, while the media 
landscape has evolved to incorporate interactivity through technological advances, 
there is an argument to be made for the inclusion of personal interaction in any 
account of crime narratives, that the construction of meaning in society cannot 
simply be derived from a top-down politics-led, media-enhanced delivery of 
message, but that there is something crucial in the public feedback and 
reconstruction of these issues, a regurgitation of meaning which is constantly in flux. 
Randall Collins’s Interaction Ritual Chains (2004) does this by presenting a 
model grounded in microsociology which refocuses our gaze on the public and 
enhances the role of ‘the situation’ in understanding personal interactions and 
decision-making (Collins 2004: 4). His detailed vision of the process occurring 
during interactional situations provides a Goffman-esque view of personal 
motivations and their reliance on social resources, their re-definition by each 
personal encounter.  
 Central to Collins’s Interaction Rituals is “the process in which participants 
develop a mutual focus of attention and become entrained in each other’s bodily 
micro-rhythms and emotions” (2004: 47). His microanalysis of the process of shared 
meaning draws upon Durkheim’s collective consciousness. In this model, this 
Durkheimian shared cognitive or emotional experience is reframed as the “micro-
situational production of moments of intersubjectivity” (2004: 48) and broken down 
into its discrete elements. Here, as I have noted, Collins’s ‘Ritual Ingredients’ 
include physical assembly, with boundaries to outsiders, in which this shared 
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emotional experience is focused upon a particular subject. In understanding the 
public digestion of crime messages through this model, Collins’s approach provides 
us with a particular level of detail in addition to the Durkheimian ‘collective 
consciousness’ idea, that the dynamics of these rituals can render powerful not just 
traditionally envisioned crowd-based gatherings, but “it is the same on the small-
scale level of a conversation; as the interaction becomes more engrossing, 
participants get caught up in the rhythm and mood of the talk” (2004: 48). Indeed, 
Collins’s assertion that the mutual focus of the group and shared emotional 
connection can result in a “feedback intensification through rhythmic entrainment” 
(2004: 48) is particularly useful in considering the public consumption and 
regeneration of crime messages. This approach captures the force of the 
Durkheimian model while refining its workings for the ‘liquid modern’ world, for a 
society in which scandals can erupt and yet they are far less dependent on the 
formation of a mob, surviving still through the voracity and ‘rhythmic entrainment’ 
present in certain visible circles.  
I would argue that the feature of physical co-presence is one which would 
seem to require extension to the virtual world, given the previously discussed shifts 
in the media landscape and increasing prevalence of online communication. Collins 
asserts that the “ritual is essentially a bodily process” (2004: 53). His inclusion of the 
physical in this model aims to highlight the role of our evolutionary nervous systems, 
which he argues are acutely sensitive to ritual and the surge of emotional entrainment 
through the comfort of a physical gathering. Indeed, this is derived from a Goffman-
esque assertion that we are inherently drawn to act upon the physical reaction of 
others when constructing our notions of self. Both Goffman and Collins argue that 
the emotional impact of interacting physically with another person is so strongly 
intertwined with the formation of deeply held beliefs, touching upon truly life-
affirming or undermining sentiments, that it must be considered a crucial element in 
opinion-making. Indeed, the penetrating nature of this interaction might suggest a 
certain environment in which the processing of information on crime can take place 
amidst a ‘feedback intensification’ which tends towards the reactionary, or the need 
for reassurance given the sensitive constructions of self within which these rituals are 
inextricably bound.  
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In addressing the possibility of virtual emotional entrainment, Collins 
suggests that we must only take seriously this proposition if it can be argued that 
within these situations we reach a stage in which “we could compare the amount of 
shared attention and emotion generated by these various interactional media, and 
their outcomes in levels of solidarity, respect for symbolism and individual EE 
[emotional energy]” (2004: 54). I would suggest that the burgeoning world of social 
media and its inherently personal and interactive nature comes closer to fulfilling 
these stipulations in a much more meaningful way than virtual communication as 
perceived more traditionally as telephone calls, TV and newspapers ever did and we 
will see this demonstrated powerfully in the case study research here. For instance, 
there are unique functions in social media which allow for shared attention to form 
around specific issues in society, which will become apparent when I discuss the 
Phone Hacking Scandal and The Riots. The newspaper comments section, the 
Facebook group, the Twitter hashtag all provide virtual gathering points for an 
outpouring of emotion in the company of members of society who find themselves 
concerned with the same issue at that particular moment. Each of these everyday 
points of mediation move us beyond the role of the television viewer who might have 
been dismissed as the passive earpiece of a manipulated message, to a genuinely 
interactive voice in the construction of narratives.  
We will see in the case study findings significant evidence that the 
Durkheimian sacred object is still potent in this realm, in fact it is a driving force 
behind the public voice and I would argue that the process of an ‘Interaction Ritual 
Chain’ still occurs. We see rhythmic coordination happen in a meaningful way, the 
shared mood and mutual focus of attention set in motion by a shared cognitive or 
emotional experience. We will see this occur through Twitter in the 2010 election in 
which the build up of ‘Interaction Ritual Chains’ has the power to completely derail 
established narratives. Not only have new media developed enormously since 
Interaction Ritual Chains was written in 2004, but we have seen them embraced by 
large portions of society and integrated into the public construction of narratives in 
unexpected ways. It will be one of my tasks in this project to demonstrate this 
through my case study research, but I would note at this point that I would argue for 
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the development of the ‘Interaction Ritual Chains’ model beyond physical co-
presence.  
 Taking Collins’s original objection into consideration, a slight difference 
might be observed in the intent of the discussant in relation to the online world. In 
this case a person seeks out the community in which to share, whereas the Collins 
and Goffman models see ideas formed as part of naturally occurring rituals. In that 
case, we might look to the provision of a field of communal discussion in the case of 
scandals which might take place on the Facebook wall between established social 
circles. A respect for symbolism is certainly found in the realm of social media. 
Indeed, the constant din of messages circulated on a daily basis is only transcended 
successfully by issues which contain symbolic force. In this case, we see crime 
issues like the phone hacking of victims which are loaded with symbolic force, not 
only in terms of their immediate resonance but in their accompanying visual 
imagery, rise more easily to the top of the pile, to move the narrative beyond human 
rights news story observed by the interested, to modern day scandal experienced 
more broadly. These crime narratives are driven by their symbolic force through 
these various virtual interactions, reshaping opinion as they move.  
But the question remains, can communications made in this hyper-modern 
world ever truly emulate the specific sensitivity and allusions to our nervous systems 
and inherent construction of self that personal interactions could? An updated 
reading of Goffman’s The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959) might include 
the careful construction of a Facebook profile as part of the props we now utilise in 
constructing our specific ‘self’. Its public nature, its encapsulation of our lives 
through imagery and its susceptibility to manipulation render it similar to the face to 
face performances which take place and yet is it truly as powerful? Perhaps there is 
something more removed and less visceral about the formation of meaning through 
social media, which means that we are engaging in many Interaction Rituals on a 
daily basis, but that they are slightly shallower, slightly less affronting to our inner 





Interaction Ritual Chains in Moments of Cultural Significance 
 
I would argue that this model not only helps us to understand the everyday 
construction of crime narratives through microsociological moments of 
intersubjectivity, but that it helps us to understand the construction of crime which 
occurs in moments of scandal and of panic. In this project, as the opportunity to 
collect data has arisen, the research has naturally evolved in way which has meant an 
increased focus on moments of scandal and outrage. I will discuss in more detail the 
particular benefits of this approach and their grounding in a contemporary reading of 
Hall et al.’s Policing the Crisis (1979). As we will see through the case study 
research, it is in these moments of extremes that we see the crime communication 
landscape functioning at its most exposed, in which the underlying structures of 
communication become evident. I would argue that this model is extremely useful in 
helping us to appreciate these moments of extremes. The development from small-
scale ‘Interaction Ritual’ to a broader ‘righteous anger for violations’ is articulated 
by Collins as a natural escalation, a ‘collective effervescence’ (Alexander and Smith 
2005: 215) of the emotional stimulus present in the interactive setting. In the initial 
‘Interaction Ritual’, meaningful co-presence and a group-defining barrier to outsiders 
are bolstered by a mutual focus of attention and a shared mood. He argues that this 
correlation of activities naturally progress “as the persons become more tightly 
focused on their common activity” (Collins 2004: 48). That is, the recognizable 
features of the interaction ritual when combined set in motion a particular group-
specific pattern of elaborations. We might tend to relate this to settings in which the 
heightening of emotions feature prominently, but Collins suggests that this escalation 
can move in various directions; “members of a cheering crowd become more 
enthusiastic, just as participants at a religious service become more respectful and 
solemn, or at a funeral become more sorrowful, than before they began” (2004: 48). 
Therefore, just as some communal feeling becomes more outwardly vocalized, so too 
can emotion concentrate and solidify internally, it is certainly heightened but it is not 
necessarily audibly so. 
Collins demonstrates that this development does not rely on a particularly 
established form of community setting; the increasingly rare town hall meeting, the 
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baying crowd, the religious service, but that the ‘rhythm and mood of talk’ make 
simple conversations an interaction which can also engross and escalate meaning in 
this way. The key here is not scale, but rather “participants’ mutual entrainment of 
emotion and attention, producing a shared emotional / cognitive experience. What 
Durkheim called collective consciousness is this micro-situational production of 
moments of intersubjectivity” (2004: 48). The setting then for ‘righteous anger for 
violations’ is, in this model, equally the angry mob, the solemn church service and 
the infrequent shared conversation. 
The detail of small-scale social encounters is examined through a micro-
situational linguistic observation of ‘the conversation’ (2004: 65), in an attempt to 
further demonstrate the power of these elements of interaction in heightening 
emotion and solidifying meaning. For instance Collins uses analysis of the build up 
of laughter in a conversation to demonstrate that the collective experience and 
particular rhythms promote the participants’ entrainment. Crucially, building on 
McClelland’s assertion that “perhaps the strongest human pleasures come from being 
fully and bodily absorbed in deeply synchronized social interaction” (1985 in 2004: 
66), there is an argument that not only do these ‘Interaction Rituals’ serve as a 
powerful stimulant in the development of meaning, but that there is something 
inherently appealing about this interactive reinforcement. Collins specifies that his 
observation of laughter “exemplifies the more general pattern of collective 
effervescence, and explains why people are attracted to high-intensity interaction 
rituals, and why they generate feelings of solidarity” (2004: 66).  Indeed, moving 
beyond the features of everyday mutual entrainment and their evident function, it is 
suggested that there is a known quantity of pleasure which can be derived not only 
from general interaction rituals, but specifically those which seem to constitute a 
higher level of intensity. Interaction Rituals then, are an everyday function 
commonly and easily participated in, a pleasurable experience regularly sought and 
finally, a key contributor to social solidarity. 
In understanding the natural escalation from small scale interaction to broader 
righteous anger and as such, the construction of crime at extreme moments, the 
presence of symbols becomes an important factor in the level of emotional 
entrainment and the subsequent amount of solidarity produced. Collins emphasizes 
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the dependent nature of this relationship by suggesting that “symbols, in turn, differ 
as to what kind of group solidarity they invoke, and thus what symbolic / emotional 
memories or meanings will do in affecting group interactions, and personal 
identities, in future situations” (2004: 81).  
The forum within which symbols are received can have a significant effect on 
the eventual solidarity produced, the key ingredient being activity over passivity. For 
instance, Collins describes a spectrum of group circumstances which heighten as 
activity and focus on a specific ‘Durkheimian sacred object’ increase. From an 
airport departure lounge, to a crowded bar, to an audience gathered at a show, to 
sports fans, there are increasingly more collective symbols shared as the focus 
tightens, but the anonymity of the crowd means that long term solidarity is weaker 
than, for instance, a conversation between a defined group of friends. As such, for 
the Interaction Ritual to have force, the symbols shared must “circulate and prolong 
group membership beyond ephemeral situations of emotional intensity” (2004: 87). 
In such circumstances, symbols play a key role in defining personal identities and 
developing established narratives. They appear to constitute the power source with 
which small scale interactions can grow into broader righteous anger.  
With various symbolic power sources heightening mutual focus and 
emotional entrainment, there are several key outcomes outlined by Collins, which 
seem to reinforce the notion that this interactive spiral is in some way reassuring, 
pleasurable, something to be sought. The first is group solidarity, the comforting 
feeling of membership provided by this reinforcement of the purpose of the group. 
Furthermore, at the individual level, what Collins defines as ‘Emotional Energy’ also 
features prominently, namely “a feeling of confidence, elation, strength, enthusiasm, 
and initiative in action” (2004: 49). Thus, we have both reassurance of the validity of 
self through a role in a now reinforced group setting, with a surge in personal well-
feeling, with emotions as strong as ‘elation’ surfacing. Thirdly, the role of the 
Durkheimian ‘sacred object’ becomes important. Having provided such a swell of 
positive emotion and general reassurance, whichever symbolic power source was the 
focus of active attention in the scenario will now be deified, defended against all 
costs, treated with a sometimes disproportionate amount of respect. Finally, building 
on membership, elation and respect, these emotions are bolstered further by feelings 
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of morality, in which ‘a sense of rightness’ is attributed to the whole routine, thus 
enshrining its purpose in social life even further. 
It is certainly useful to note Collins’s allusions to Goffman and Durkheim 
throughout Interaction Ritual Chains, indeed the model outlined might simply be 
understood as the functioning of the collective consciousness on an interpersonal 
level. Yet, more than a merging of the two, this model provides a detailed step by 
step process of the construction of meaning in the personal realm, a 
microsociological approach grounded in the minute detail of interaction. Having 
observed the human experience in such detail it seems that the only question left in 
appreciating the construction of narratives might be found in the electronic realm, in 
virtual gatherings and more fluid symbols which provide a different kind of focus in 
a way which perhaps blurs the line between passivity and activity, becoming instead 
a uniquely integrated part of the daily routine. As Collins notes of email and the 
internet, “these lack the flow of interaction in real time; even if electronic 
communications happen within minutes, this is not the rhythm of immediate vocal 
participation, which… is honed to tenths of seconds” (2004: 63). Therefore, the place 
of new media presents a challenge to the ‘Interaction Ritual’ approach which I will 
aim to develop here. I will aim to consider how we might accurately integrate this 
newer outlet of interaction into the microsociology of interaction rituals and will 
assess how exactly the particularly symbolically charged issue of crime passes 
through these processes and has a particular impact on our construction of self.  
 To conclude, I have argued here that the ‘Interaction Ritual Chains’ model, as 
based on Goffman and Durkheim’s view of symbolic power adds microsociological 
detail to our view of the public construction of knowledge and the communication of 
ideas. It is particularly useful in a discussion of the political communication of crime 
in that the model focuses on the development from small scale interaction to broad 
righteous anger, the form of public interaction that most commonly provokes a 
contribution to the ‘generalized other’, to the mélange of narratives that constitute 
‘crime’ in society. In employing this approach we gain a much more nuanced picture 
of the ‘shrill’ public (Loader 2010: 350) and their particular voice in moments of 
outcry. I have argued for the development of this model beyond physical co-presence 
and will discuss this development in light of case study findings in my conclusion.  
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CHAPTER 3 





The media – understood as the mouthpiece by which crime narratives travel from 
political office to the public sphere - have frequently played an integral role in 
accounts which lament the erosion of evidence-based criminal justice decision-
making. Indeed, the role of the media in the political communication of crime can 
tend be viewed as wholeheartedly serving the political elite or cynically reshaping 
the message for commercial gain or some combination thereof. While there is 
certainly significant rhetorical force behind these critiques and much to be gained in 
pursuit of an account of today’s media landscape from a detailed appreciation of 
these particular arguments, I will suggest that recent shifts in what could more 
broadly be termed the ‘mediated sphere’ should positively alter our understanding of 
the relationship between politics, the media and the public. 
 In this chapter, I will introduce and discuss a number of leading sociological 
and criminological accounts of the relationship between the media, public and 
politics, drawing attention in each case to their theoretical strengths, as well as 
anticipating their continued relevance (or otherwise) today. I will then introduce an 
account of the recent evolution of the media landscape and a shift towards 
immediacy, choice, symbolic force and interactivity. Finally, this updated vision of 
the construction of crime narratives will be applied to Collins’s Interaction Ritual 
Chains (2005) and an argument for the development of this model beyond the 








2. Enduring Accounts of the Media as a Force in the Construction of 
Narratives 
 
Habermas’s The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962) 
charts the development of this condition - of media as politically serving and the 
consumption of knowledge as capital-driven - by observing the “refeudalization of 
the public sphere” (1962: 292). In what he describes as a structural shift away from 
public opinion formed by open assembly and rational-critical dialogue, which had 
initially functioned as a force for opposing state power and influencing state policy 
and practice towards an essentially docile public, Habermas views the developed 
media as a site for manipulation by corporate interests, feeding a public who can be 
viewed as largely uncritical, concerned instead with mass consumption (Habermas 
1962). In Habermas’s account of this shift, we are presented with a powerful 
potential explanation of the crime and media predicament so widely lamented in 
recent years. This would be that a structural reframing of this sphere due to the 
capital-driven move away from an unfettered free press towards the attraction of 
audiences in a competitive market (Greer 2009: 11), has neutered the “process of 
participatory democracy underpinned by the values of universal access, rational 
debate and disregard of rank” (Habermas 1962: 231). As such the delivery of ideas 
about crime and punishment can be understood as having been framed by an 
encompassing capitalism in the media. This dominance is further bolstered by a lack 
of challenge from a public that has become the lethargic consumer of those 
narratives in place of an active, democratic voice. 
Still, the account portrayed by Habermas is essentially hopeful, arguing for 
the possibility of a re-energized public: 
 
What is needed is a ‘rational reorganization of social and political power’  
between the private citizens, rival organisations and the state, along with an  
active citizenship that can not only articulate its political will, but also work 
to ensure that it is implemented by the government. 
(Habermas 1962: 231) 
 
Most prominently, this reorganization has naturally occurred as a result of the 
shifting, hyper-technological media sphere. In his 2006 paper ‘Political 
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Communication in Media Society’ Habermas considers the possible re-energising 
features of electronic communication. He suggests that “the Internet has certainly 
reactivated the grassroots of an egalitarian public of writers and readers” (Habermas 
2006: 423), but proposes that this form of public activity can only gain traction in 
certain specific scenarios; in either undermining censorship by authoritarian regimes, 
or within liberal regimes, it can engender crystallization around a huge number of 
fragmented issues. As such, there is something of a shift back towards the ‘active 
citizenship’ of Habermas’s original idealized free press, but that the specific format 
within which this public discussion occurs is said to limit the particular outcome. 
More recently, in a 2010 interview with the Financial Times, Habermas expanded his 
view of the potential impact of electronic communication: 
 
The internet generates a centrifugal force. It releases an anarchic wave of 
highly fragmented circuits of communication that infrequently overlap…  
As regards its impact on the public sphere, accelerated communication opens 
up entirely new possibilities for organising activities and for large-scale 
political mobilisations of widely dispersed addressees. I still receive at least 
one e-mail per week from Obama’s election team. These communications refer 
to issues and events within the political system, which they in turn influence. 
However, they remain contingent on their relation to the real decision-making 
processes that take place outside the virtual space of electronically networked 
nomads. 
(Habermas in Jeffries 2010, ‘A rare interview with Jürgen Habermas’, The  
Financial Times, 30th April) 
 
 
Therefore, while the electronic media sphere cannot in and of itself convincingly 
constitute a new public sphere, with an awareness of its increasing social role and its 
contingency to political forces, we can at the very least assume some reversal of the 
all powerful capitalist driven media forces portrayed in The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962). 
 Herman and Chomsky’s Manufacturing Consent (1988) remains, among 
Chomsky’s vast contribution to political science and linguistics, one of his most 
essential works. In approaching an analysis of the mainstream media from a Marxist 
perspective, Herman and Chomsky’s work here illuminates some of the impact of 
corporate forces which have propelled the Habermasian demise of the active public 
sphere. Beginning from the fundamental assertion that “the mass media serve as a 
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system for communicating messages and symbols to the general populace” (Herman 
and Chomsky 1988: 1), their main argument revolves around what is termed ‘The 
Propaganda Model’, a framework which delineates the process by which corporate 
influences driven by power and money seem to determine which messages and 
symbols are communicated.  
Accordingly, ‘The Propaganda Model’ “traces the routes by which money 
and power are able to filter out the news fit to print, marginalize dissent, and allow 
government and dominant private interests to get their messages across to the public” 
(Herman and Chomsky 1988: 2), by setting out five particular ‘filters’ as key 
components. The first is ‘size, ownership, and profit orientation of the mass media’, 
which suggests that news choices are strongly affected by the fact that dominant 
media firms are “controlled by very wealthy people … who are subject to sharp 
constraints by… profit-oriented forces” (Herman and Chomsky 1988: 14). Secondly, 
‘the advertising license to do business’ is pinpointed as the source which skews 
much media content towards particular affluent audiences, thus undermining any 
democratic tendencies which are often cited as being found through large audiences. 
This varies depending on the media source, for instance television networks are more 
concerned with ‘flow’ or sustaining ratings from one programme to the next, but the 
outcome is the same across the board; “the dissemination of a selling message” 
(Herman and Chomsky 1988: 18). Thirdly, the approach towards ‘sourcing mass-
media news’ enables a dependence on ‘experts’ who are frequently government and 
corporate bodies, indeed; “the mass media are drawn into a symbiotic relationship 
with powerful sources of information by economic necessity and reciprocity of 
interest” (Herman and Chomsky 1988: 18). The fourth element refers to ‘flak and the 
enforcers’, essentially the somewhat powerful negative responses to media which 
can be mass-mobilized and can form a source of power in their groups. These flak-
producers keep media sources from offending traditional government or corporate 
power, while through this role flak machines attain a “propagandistic role” (Herman 
and Chomsky 1988: 28). Finally, ‘anticommunism as a control mechanism’ which 
was more pronounced during McCarthyism, but today might be seen in the US right 
wing media opposition to health care reforms, in which President Obama’s 
programme was widely derided as ‘socialist propaganda’ in order to demonize these 
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reform efforts. This final filter is described as a ‘political-control mechanism’; “this 
ideology helps mobilize the populace against an enemy, and because the concept is 
fuzzy it can be used against anybody advocating policies that threaten property 
interests or support accommodation with Communist states and radicalism” (Herman 
and Chomsky 1988: 29). 
This model is ultimately useful in highlighting some of the capitalist-driven 
functions of the media in the Habermasian inactive public sphere. Therefore, if we 
are to understand the possible shift back towards an engaged public, we can begin by 
assessing how many of these elements of the Propaganda Model still remain in place 
in today’s media landscape. For instance, following the News of the World phone 
hacking scandal which seemed to briefly disempower the Murdoch Empire, one of 
Britain’s traditional news conglomerates, along with a notable shift within the now 
hyper-technological media sphere, is it still true to say that advertising-motivated 
business models and concentrated ownership are among the most prominent filters of 
news today? 
 
Also focusing some detailed analysis on capitalist forces at the heart of media 
production, Manuel Castells’s work on the shift from ‘industrial capitalism’ to 
‘informational capitalism’. This is particularly relevant in aiming to understand 
today’s evolving media sphere, as Castells takes seriously the movement towards 
what he terms a ‘Network Society’ (Castells 2000). This is linked to the upsurge of 
‘informational capitalism’, which is essentially “driven by the rapid expansion of 
Information and Communication technologies (ICTs) [which have in turn] created 
new and unprecedented capacities for information processing and the global 
exchange of symbols” (Greer 2009: 56). The Network Society (2000) crucially 
depicts our mediated sphere as exchanging these symbols through ‘information 
flows’, a fluid circulation of knowledge spanning a huge spectrum from cultural to 
technical information. In An Introduction to the Information Age (1997) Castells 
outlines the specific processes involved in this ‘network society’, many of which 
emphasize the societal shifts which facilitate our embracing of this ICT-based media 
realm, with one eye firmly on capitalist forces. He considers some of the most 
prominent features of media today; 
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Media are extraordinarily diverse, and send targeted messages to specific 
segments of audiences and to specific moods of the audiences. They are 
increasingly inclusive… connected throughout the globe, and yet diversified by 
cultures, constituting a hypertext with extraordinary inclusive capacity. 
Furthermore, slowly but surely, this new media system is moving towards 
interactivity… that will eventually link up with the current media system. 
(Castells 1997: 5) 
 
Indeed, Castells’s account above many others, demonstrates a profound 
understanding of the potential for global significance of evolving technological 
media. Chomsky, for instance, focuses on the faddish nature of particular forms; 
“Text messaging, Twitter, that sort of thing … is extremely rapid, very shallow 
communication… I think it erodes normal human relations. It makes them more 
superficial, shallow, evanescent” (Chomsky 2011 in ‘The Secret of Noam: A 
Chomsky Interview’, March 9th). Chomsky’s view here is not without merit, but 
focuses on the form rather than the outcome. Indeed, Castells’s account sees these 
shallow communications as part of a shift in social activity, a broader move in the 
reception and generation of particular narratives.  
 
A particularly deconstructionist analysis of the way that we consume 
information and a more fluid examination of the relationship between advertising 
and consumption is found in Jean Baudrillard’s Simulacra and Simulations (1981). 
This account is well-suited to a greater understanding of the impact of evolving 
media as the focus is on the shift from the modern to the postmodern world in which 
“the image becomes the reality – a mediatised ‘hyperreality’ – in which simulations, 
signs and codes come to structure and constitute everyday life” (Greer 2009: 70). 
Baudrillard’s ‘simulacra’ encapsulates our approach to self-definition and the 
consumption of knowledge in a hyper-technological media sphere. Through this he 
creates an account which, although abstract in its terms, insightfully captures aspects 
of our present day comfort around simulated imagery and the role that the 





3. Capturing the Role of Media in the Construction of Crime 
 
As criminal justice narratives are regularly viewed as having been cultivated within 
news media, particular approaches to understanding the nature of this relationship 
have emerged, such as the large body of work conducted by Ericson, Baranek and 
Chan between 1987 and 1991. Visualizing Deviance (1987), Negotiating Control 
(1989) and Representing Order (1991) constitute a significant contribution to our 
understanding of the formation of ideas around deviance and control, while arguing 
critically for analysis which moves beyond a surface-level consideration of content. 
Indeed, drawing on Clifford Geertz, Ericson et al.. contend that ‘appreciative’ 
ethnographic research which engages not only with the news but with the broader 
newsroom, can move discussion beyond the mere selection of particular news items 
towards a crucial understanding of how journalists and news sources “play a key role 
in constituting visions of order, stability, and change, and in influencing the control 
practices that accord with these visions” (Ericson et al. 1987: 3).  
Viewing crime news as a significant but contingent element in the broader 
project of the construction of deviance, Ericson et al.. contend that we must move 
beyond textual crime news analysis towards an understanding of ‘news as 
knowledge’, in which “knowledge is a key aspect of organizational power and social 
stratification” (Ericson et al. 1987: 11). They view knowledge as integral to not only 
the formation of meaning surrounding institutions, but also cultural engagement. As 
a result it constitutes “the fibre out of which are woven the ‘webs of significance” 
(Geertz 1973: 5 in Ericson et al. 1987: 11) and demands a level of attention 
comparable with that which is regularly given to news text. As such, this approach 
encourages engagement beyond the text and while Visualizing Deviance (1987) 
comprises a vast newsroom study, essentially there is a strong argument here for 
research which observes the construction of news as knowledge wherever its power 
is constituted, whatever organizational structures are formed around it.  
Beyond the crucial examination of organizational power around the 
production of knowledge, Representing Order (1991) demonstrates that the product 
of such institutional control is an active public discourse which is “dominated by talk 
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of crime, law and justice” (Ericson et al.. 1991: 3). Drawing on Wuthnow et al. 
(1984) and their view of the integral role of symbolic force in human interaction, “to 
inspire or to give meaning to individual or collective activity, to delegitimate other 
activity and to bring to bear the force of social control” (Wuthnow et al. 1984: 37 in 
Ericson et al. 1991: 5), Ericson et al.. reframe the act of receiving and regenerating 
symbols as ‘representing’. In this context ‘representing’ is the public act of absorbing 
discourse and symbolic meaning and reconstituting it, much like Goffman’s 
Symbolic Interactionist approach. Similarly, the goal of ‘representing’ is “an effort to 
represent a world in which one’s descriptions make sense” (Ericson et al. 1991: 5). 
Therefore, for Ericson et al., the study of news media requires an appreciation of this 
public ‘representing’ which is driven by a desire to satiate feelings of disorder. 
While Ericson et al.. highlight the significance of organizational construction 
of news, as well as the public reception and regeneration of meaning, they also 
suggest that issues of crime are at the heart of this burgeoning and dependent 
relationship: “A concern with deviance and control in social relations and 
organizations is the defining characteristic of newsworthiness” (Ericson et al. 1987 in 
1991: 239). They track the central role of crime news from Milton (1671) (“Evil 
news rides post, while good news baits” (Ericson et al. 1991: 239)) and find in their 
own detailed content analysis that “conceptions of deviance and control not only 
define the central object and character of news stories, but are woven into the 
methodology of journalists, influencing their choices from assignment, through the 
selection and uses, to the final composition of the story” (1991: 239) and as a result 
of this institutional tendency, that news concerning crime, law and justice 
“constituted just under one-half of all news coverage in newspapers and popular 
television, and approximately two-thirds of all news coverage on radio” (1991: 341). 
Ultimately they contend that their five crucial components of representation in news 
discourse--‘visualizing, symbolizing, authorizing, staging, and convincing’ (1991)—
are regularly rallied around the particularly dominant issue of deviance because of 
the symbolic force which this issue holds in society. They suggest that “law is a kind 
of conceptual device for order, an imaginative and interpretive tool for constructing 
social relations” (Ericson et al. 1991: 342) which satisfies our desire to receive 
symbolic representations of order. Furthermore, they suggest that this provides “a 
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vocabulary with which we rationalize our actions to others and ourselves” (Macauley 
1987: 185 in Ericson et al. 1991: 342).  
On this view, the inherent desire to understand ourselves and to feel a sense 
of security and order, is given to us through a steady flow of deviance-related news 
and through our own ‘representing’ of this news. This brings us to an obvious 
paradox around the idea of reading news of a murder and feeling subsequently 
comforted. Yet Ericson et al. suggest that this triggers in us a ‘morality play’. We 
digest not only the facts, but more powerfully a sense of “how what happened fits 
into the order of things” (1991: 343). They suggest that this is facilitated by the 
particular media approach of emphasizing the proper role of authority and justice, 
since “ultimately it is the authoritative strength of institutions and ‘the system’ that is 
on view” (1991: 344). 
 
David L. Altheide’s work draws on Ericson, Baranek and Chan’s body of 
research, with a particular focus on the seemingly powerful and ubiquitous 
production of fear in the media and takes an approach to considering this particular 
problem which values the researcher broadening their theoretical base at the outset. 
His article on ‘The News Media, The Problem Frame and the Production of Fear’ 
(1997) highlights C. Wright Mills’s concern in The Sociological Imagination (1959) 
that “sociologists were blinded by limited theoretical perspectives that prevented 
them from seeing major social shifts” (Altheide 1997: 647). Accordingly, Altheide 
delineates a broad conceptual approach, claiming that this is necessary to study 
‘fear’, a research subject which he suggests transcends the issue of crime content in 
the media, through its pervasive and expansive nature (Altheide and Michalowski 
1999: 477). This is a persuasive approach, Altheide prioritizing what he sees as the 
driving force of fear over any arbitrarily defined topics. However, for the purpose of 
understanding the construction of crime narratives today, this perspective is perhaps 
overly preoccupied with an element which we might view as no longer holding such 
unfettered dominance in the mediated sphere. Nonetheless, this is a valuable 
approach to understanding the role of crime in the media. The research values 
espoused here are particularly applicable still, yet whether the focus on fear as 
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dominant over the issue of crime remains valid is something to be explored 
empirically. 
Altheide embraces several theoretical perspectives, including ‘Symbolic 
Interactionism’ which “suggests that the impact of any message is its contribution to 
the actor’s definition of the situation” (Altheide and Michalowski 1999: 477). This 
process of the interpretation of media such as news reports through any person’s 
particular lens of analysis is useful, not only in highlighting individualism and 
context as driving forces that can seem to supersede the initial media output, but also 
in introducing the idea of ‘meta-power’. Drawing on Hall’s (1997) analysis of meta-
power, Altheide and Michalowski suggest that “Meta-power refers to altering the 
type of game actors play; it refers to changing the distribution of resources of the 
conditions governing interaction” (1999: 477-8). This is an approach grounded in 
Symbolic Interactionism which essentially relocates our gaze in the analysis of fear 
in the media, towards the reception of symbolically charged messages in a context-
laden interactive realm. 
As such, a conceptual model is proffered which aims to view the production 
of fear in American society as having been “produced through the interaction of 
commercial media, entertainment formats and programming, and the rise of the 
‘problem frame’” (Altheide 1997: 648). The ‘problem frame’ is suggested as a term 
which captures a form of generic and often utilised fear production in the media. It is 
the outcome of increasingly commercial and entertainment-focused media outlets 
and is essentially an attempt to make everyday issues satisfy these modern news 
demands by manufacturing news stories into “a secular morality play” (Altheide 
1997: 653). In order for the public to most strongly identify with these stories and 
process them within their particular personal contexts, they are constructed to be 
“both universal and specific, abstract and real” (Altheide 1997: 654). The ‘problem 
frame’ describes certain qualities which are infused into news, distorting them until 
they contain the emotional resonance of a morality play: a familiar and story-like 
narrative structure, universal moral meanings, a specific time and place, a lack of 
complexity or ambiguity, cultural resonance and crucially, a focus on disorder (1997: 
654).  
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Drawing from Ericson et al. (1989), Altheide argues that “repeated 
presentations of similar scenarios ‘teaches’ the audience about the nature and causes 
of disorder” (1997: 654). Here we see that while Altheide views fear as the ultimate 
goal and the absolute scourge of modern media, that disorder plays a key role in the 
process of the production of fear. He suggests: 
 
It is immaterial whether the audience has other experiences with crime or 
related problems; the resulting messages both reinforce certain experiences and 
perceptions, and provide a meaning about the pervasiveness of fear. (Altheide 
1997: 654). 
 
Indeed, what Altheide’s model emphasizes is the forcefully entwined relationship 
between media and crime in the pursuit of commercial success, a success that is 
achieved by stoking societal fear and is defined by entertainment values.  
 Altheide also addresses the broader socio-political implications of this 
relationship, suggesting that the problem frame is at the heart of the distortion of 
social issues which can inevitably lead to “politicians, funding agencies, academic 
disciplines and even agency personnel who actually deal with the alleged problem to 
make adjustments that are counterproductive and make matters much worse” (1997: 
655). As such, his analysis of the production of fear in the media views this 
commercial endeavour as the ultimate power, above any political interests. In this 
account, he views politicians as constrained within rather than as orchestrating the 
media system. This perhaps is a reflection of his belief in the production of fear as 
the ultimate thematic and certainly challenges accounts which view the media as 
merely the mouthpiece for political gain. It seems that accounts can vary on their 
identification of a particular social ill as having primacy. In truth the reality today is 
possibly more of a variety of cross-cutting power struggles, rather than either 








4. Policing the Crisis 
 
 
Hall et al.’s Policing the Crisis (1978) is enduringly highly-regarded for its “hard-
edge stance on analysis and prescription and its intellectually eclectic explanatory 
framework” (McLaughlin 2008: 145). This seminal examination of the realm beyond 
the criminal act assesses ‘Mugging’ via an exploration of race and youth, utilizing a 
theoretically rich research model which established a blueprint for understanding the 
role of crime in the media. Their focus on the ‘Handsworth mugging case’ of 1973 
was constituted as an ideological rather than a content analysis (Hall et al. 1978), in 
concurrence with a forceful critique of the popular Marxism of the time, utilizing “a 
commitment to grounded theorizing, albeit from a Marxist vantage point” (Jefferson 
2008: 114). Indeed, in Policing the Crisis the theoretical approach is at the fore of 
the project, very much reflecting the movements of its time by purposely moving 
away from moral panic theory which had utilised an interactionist paradigm 
(Jefferson 2008: 114), viewing this approach as insufficiently critical of power, 
towards a particular version of theoretical Marxism which is multifaceted and 
employed in objection to “conventional, reductive Marxism” (Jefferson 2008: 114). 
As Woollacott (1982) notes, the particular use of Gramscian and Althusserian 
Marxism in Policing the Crisis is focused on an understanding of the media which is 
sufficiently critical of power but which is also committed to grounded theorizing: 
 
The work reflects an analysis of the signifying practices of the mass media 
from the perspective of Marxist cultural theory inflected through Gramsci’s 
theory of hegemony, and ‘an Althusserian conception of the media as an 
ideological state apparatus largely concerned with the reproduction of 
dominant ideologies’, claiming relative autonomy for the mass media. 
(Woollacott 1982: 110) 
 
This approach has been termed ‘conjunctural analysis’, an analytical method 
commonly utilised in cultural studies, which Clarke (2008) describes as “trying to 
identify the multiple forces, tendencies, pressures in play in a historical moment and 
to identify how the balance of forces is being worked on, shaped, directed in the 
search for a ‘solution’ and a ‘way forward” (Clarke 2008: 125). Applying this 
approach to their primary interest of assessing the societal and media reaction to the 
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moral panic of ‘mugging’, Hall et al. employ a methodology, which much like 
Ericson et al., aims to understand the media by extending their gaze beyond the text.  
 They forcefully constitute ‘public opinion’ as “an ideological rather than 
empirical domain” (McLaughlin 2008: 148), eschewing interviews with media elites 
or a newsroom ethnography, instead “reading newspapers in order to identify the 
ideological frameworks used to structure the news” (McLaughlin 2008: 148). This 
approach is taken in order to broaden the lens of analysis beyond the crime of 
mugging, towards the ‘social phenomenon’ and the broader implications of the 
reaction to the crime: 
 
[It is] not a book about why certain individuals, as individuals, turn to 
mugging; nor about what practical steps can be taken to control or reduce its 
incidence; nor about how awful a crime ‘mugging’ is. It is not a case study, a 
practical manual nor a cry of moral outrage… We are concerned with 
‘mugging’ – but as a social phenomenon, rather than as a particular form of 
street crime. (Hall et al. 1978: vii) 
 
Policing the Crisis begins with a detailed excavation of an account of ‘mugging’, 
looking chronologically at the history as well as the contextual ‘equation of concern’.  
In ‘the social production of news’ detailed descriptions of the moral panic and the 
police campaign are wedded to a classic account of the media. The Handsworth 
mugging case is presented in detail and stands as an example which “crystallises the 
operation of the media, so that in one moment we can observe the shape of a whole 
news process” (Hall et al. 1978: 82). This piece of research begins in the form of a 
case study. We are taken through the details of how this particular mugging unfolded 
in the press, and presented with a comprehensive content analysis of the news values 
and debates which crystallised public opinion, the headlines, editorials, the particular 
case of The Sun which abandoned traditional distinction between ‘news fact’, 
‘feature exploration’ and ‘editorial opinion’ in favour of the exclusive shaping of the 
event. Subsequently ‘public opinion’ is explored in an account which incorporates 
knowledge, rumours and folk-lore to provide a thorough analysis of the interactions 
which occur beyond the criminal act. 
 Hall et al. further make their mark in establishing a perspective on media and 
knowledge production in their methodological distinctions of primary and secondary 
‘definers’. They place particular emphasis on primary definers as the most powerful 
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in the media sphere through their ability to “frame what the problem is” (Hall et al. 
1978: 59). These are authority figures who “command the field… and set the terms 
of reference within which all other coverage or debate takes place” (1978: 58). As a 
result the mass media are viewed in this perspective as the ‘secondary definers’, 
playing “a crucial but secondary role in reproducing the definitions of those who 
have privileged access” (1978: 57). Notably, the critical perspective espoused by 
Hall et al. means that their view of the media, while infused with explanatory force, 
is in essence one which views the media as a channel rather than a motor of change. 
It is an account which sees political authority as the ultimate driving force in the 
construction of crime narratives.  
 
 
5. The Evolving Media Landscape 
 
In aiming to understand the role played by crime and the everyday allusions to its 
prevalence in our society, some constructive ‘conjunctural’ analysis might begin by 
considering the modes of communication through which we receive this kind of 
information. If we wish to know the impact of policy decisions as they are 
transmitted throughout society, if we wish to appreciate the impact of law and order 
rhetoric, if we wish to study the public opinion on any topic which is primarily 
communicated through a mediated landscape, it follows that we must begin with a 
certain grasp of this particular field of communication. Indeed, a curiosity around 
crime in society has on many occasions begun with analysis of the media and rightly 
so, as a vessel through which our centralized governments have distilled crime 
promises and policy action, the media is the realm within which society’s 
understanding of crime is received, reshaped and communicated in various ways.  
Much criminological analysis of media has focused on more established 
elements, such as the widely studied print press or television journalism. For 
instance, the notion of ‘newsworthiness’ of crime matters has traditionally been 
constructed with an organized, commercial newsroom in mind (Ericson et al. 1987, 
1989, 1991; Jewkes 2004). This has resulted from many years of an established 
tradition of the prominence of print press and a logical assumption that tradition 
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suggests longevity, where newer forms of media are often cautiously viewed as 
ephemeral. Certainly there is much to be gleaned from classic studies of newspapers 
beyond the specific workings of a newsroom, such as Ericson et al.’s (1978, 1989, 
1991) seminal works. More commonly, content analysis has been regularly utilised 
in order to study “communications in a systematic, objective, and quantitative 
manner for the purpose of measuring certain variables… free of the subjective bias 
of the reviewer” (Dominick 1978: 106-7). While there are many criticisms of this 
approach, namely its inability to “justify inferences about the effects of content on 
the audience” (Reiner 2007: 303), I would argue that in light of alterations to the 
media landscape and the increase in media sources experienced briefly by most 
members of society on a daily basis, that this form of neutral and inflexible content 
analysis is no longer viable. Furthermore, if we limit our understanding of public 
opinion to those who read actual printed newspapers, if we continue to follow the 
research model of content analysis, we may only gain an awareness of the knowledge 
held by an increasingly restricted portion of society.  
The broad spectrum of digital media is one which is increasingly pervasive, 
flexible and widely adopted by large sections of the population. Indeed, in order to 
understand public opinion today, that is as something naturally occurring in daily life 
rather than in a constructed research setting, we must first attempt to grasp a clearer 
picture of our hyper-modern media landscape, one which is uniquely fluid and 




Technological developments of new media sources are the driving force behind the 
demise of the print press. With the widespread development of online news, both by 
TV news outlets such as the BBC and print press outlets in almost every instance 
now providing free access to extremely up to date news information, the timeliness 
and traditional ubiquity of printed newspapers has significantly diminished. Within 
the hyper-modern media landscape: 
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Digital media and contemporary technogenesis constitute a complex adaptive 
system, with the technologies constantly changing as well as bringing about 
change in those whose lives are enmeshed with them.  
(Hayles 2012: 18) 
 
Some of the most prominent news outlets that were initially reluctant to provide their 
services for free online have either adapted their advertisement model or in the case 
of papers like The Times have chosen a subscription model or ‘paywall’. Most online 
newspapers developed quickly and embraced the format by creating original online 
content including videos, hyperlinks and a new aesthetic which would better suit 
computer screens as well as tablets and smartphones. As a result, the availability, up 
to date news information and enhanced ‘reader experience’ of online news has 
dramatically shifted consumption online; a 2012 study of news consumption in the 
US found that since 2008, online or digital news consumption had surpassed radio 
and print at 39%, 33% and 29% respectively (Pew Research Centre for the People & 
the Press, 27th September 2012). Therefore, today’s active consumer of news no 
longer reads information about a particular news event the next day, but instead is 
now able to access it as immediately as they connect themselves.  
 In recent years, developments in social networks and in technological 
hardware have brought news information even closer and integrated it seamlessly 
into many more instances in our day in that those who own smartphones or a tablet 
reader can access information available online while they travel and while they 
complete their day to day activities. The rapid rise towards the apparent ubiquity of 
smartphones is noteworthy, so much so that indeed, many news outlets have adapted 
by creating apps in which they might deliver news, again, as accessed by the user. It 
is apposite at this point perhaps to note the sheer strides in immediacy which have 
occurred in the transmission of messages in recent years, where previously a news 
consumer may have waited until the next day to read information in a printed 
newspaper, today they may receive a message to a device which they now carry at all 
times updating them constantly on events. In this way, the flow of information is 
constant and thoroughly integrated into the normality of a routine day.  
 Immediacy of news information is heightened even further when we consider 
how many people are connected not only to their social groups, but also to news 
sources through social networks such as Facebook and Twitter (1 billion and 500 
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million users respectively, Lee (2012) ‘Facebook surpasses 1 billion users as it 
tempts new markets’, BBC News, 5th October and Barnett (2012) ‘Twitter to hit 500 
million registered users’, The Telegraph, 22nd February). The slight difference in 
news consumption as between these two networks may be due to differing formats, 
namely that Facebook users may tend to receive opinions or links to news articles 
from other sources, while Twitter users can actually follow specific journalists who 
will outline events as they happen:  
 
We used Twitter to do live coverage of stories of our choice. There’s an 
emphasis here on ‘choice’. Live-tweeting school board meetings might not 
quite work. Live-tweeting a high-profile court case, on the other hand, might. 
It’s all about listening to readers and applying news judgment in deciding 
which stories lend themselves to which medium 
(Lowery 2009) 
 
As a result, events like the London riots of 2011 can unfold in real time to followers 
and can even be susceptible to some kind of escalation, a hyperactive deviancy 
amplification (Young 1971) of sorts. Real time news can also unfold visually for the 
news consumer who watches 24 hour news programming, now widely available on 
UK TV. As a result, the news cycle now occurs in hyper-speed, with whole 





This vast eruption of news sources and outlets through which we may consume 
information has facilitated a new level of consumer choice in news. Whereas in 
previous years our choices were limited to which newspaper or TV news report we 
chose from amongst a familiar set, informed in many cases by political persuasion, 
class, family tradition or ease of access, today choice is not only vast, but our 
preferences now span far beyond political persuasion, far beyond the world of 
organized press and into a much more diffuse and vibrant community fulfilling this 
traditional role. Today we determine whom we trust to find news issues and 
repackage them for our consumption, which allows us far greater power in the 
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construction of our life views and seriously threatens any opportunity for a 
politically-serving Westminster press to conduct any form of manipulation. Indeed, 
for a politician to construct and deliver rhetoric, they must aim beyond a single 
prominent interview, through several channels of communication or indeed must 
construct a narrative which will travel well, an approach which requires politicians to 
be much more aware of the power of this new realm. As Tony Blair commented at 
the Leveson Inquiry; “today this whole issue of managing media is far more difficult 
and far more important… [because] it occurs in a way and with an intensity that in 
the old days wouldn’t have happened” (Halliday and Baird 2012, ‘Tony Blair at the 
Leveson Inquiry’, The Guardian, 28th May). The key is that through the vast 
expansion of the media, not only have our choices weakened the power of the few, 
but they have prompted a complete overhaul of strategic communication in politics. 
The vast scope of today’s media allows various choices to be made and while 
there is almost no way of categorizing the endless combination which can be utilised 
by a typical person on a daily basis, there are media choices which suit certain 
groups, much as there were demographic certainties in traditional print press, each of 
these groups gravitate towards narratives which then have their own force in today’s 
society. For instance, the UK-based liberal, left-leaning consumer who may have 
previously read The Guardian and regularly viewed the Channel 4 news, might now 
include in their roster The Huffington Post, The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, The 
New York Times, VICE, Jezebel, Slate, The Atlantic, The New Republic and NPR. 
Obviously it would be incorrect to categorize too rigidly, but similarly some right 
leaning news sources might include the Daily Mail website which is now the leading 
online newspaper in the world (Greenslade 2012,‘Mail online goes top of the world’ 
The Guardian, 25th January), the increasingly popular online content of FOX News, 
Politico and Drudge Report. While many modern consumers favour particular online 
news providers, some demographics will favour traditional print editorials or local 
news programming. The significance of the ability to make such a choice is, as 
noted, a distinct and powerful capacity to undermine the dominance of traditional 
print press, as was demonstrated in the downfall of the News of the World. When the 
phone hacking scandal left the public feeling a sense of outrage towards the practices 
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of the Murdoch-run newspaper, they were easily able to abandon their years of 
loyalty and find sources of news and entertainment elsewhere.  
With the public now able to exercise consumer choice over the kind of news 
that they consume, a significant effect is that by doing so they tend to reinforce the 
legitimacy of their existing views through daily reiteration from a like-minded news 
group, as was demonstrated, for instance, by the Fox News support for the Tea Party 
movement. A conservative political group prominent in the US during the 2010 mid 
term elections, Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi said of the Tea 
Party “We call it Astroturf; it’s not really a grassroots movement” (Pilkington 2010, 
‘The Tea Party Has Just Begun’, The Guardian, 3rd November). Speaker Pelosi’s 
comment insinuated that what had been portrayed as locally prominent voter-led 
gatherings were not wholly authentic and were in fact being funded and promoted by 
big business billionaires lobbying for tax cuts from the Republican establishment. 
However, despite much discussion in some news outlets of these business links, for 
members of the tea party the strength of rhetoric surrounding the movement was 
unflinchingly constructed and reinforced on a daily basis by Fox News talking head 
contributors, such as Glenn Beck. Beck utilised his platform on Fox to become “for 
the fractious Tea Party movement… a unifying figure and an intellectual guide” 
(Wilentz 2010, ‘Confounding Fathers’, The New Yorker, 18th October), acting as an 
opinion-giver rather than a neutral news anchor and drowning out any dissenting 
voices for those politically inclined towards the right. In essence, the vast expansion 
of choice in news today has promoted increased specialization. This move has 
replaced neutrality with opinion and the effects can be dramatic in mobilizing 
particular groups at the extreme ends of the political spectrum. 
 
 
5.3 Symbolic Force 
 
When our symbolic environment is, by and large, structured in this inclusive, 
flexible, diversified hypertext in which we navigate every day, the virtuality of 
this text is in fact our reality, the symbols from which we live and 
communicate  
(Castells 1997: 12). 
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In our digital society, as we negotiate an everyday barrage of ideas, occurrences and 
opinions, the symbolic power of certain pieces of rhetoric or policy ideas is central to 
their ultimate success in gaining our attention. The communication of particular 
narratives no longer comes from a considered editorial piece read by the majority but 
rather in fleeting messages, easily encapsulated in a slogan or a picture, distilled to 
the most basic element and easily re-communicated. The result of the media of today 
favouring 140 characters or less as well as the particularly visual approach that news 
show simulations, YouTube, Facebook and online picture blogs such as Tumblr and 
Pinterest promote, is a sense that the visual image is now as important as print in 
conveying a message and in forcing that message to the top of the pile. Furthermore, 
sentiments are reduced and repackaged in a way which now, more than ever, must be 
eye-catching to the browsing viewer. A typical news website will gain some 
advertising revenue from the number of times someone chooses to click through to a 
link on their page and so the headline and picture must entice the ‘unique monthly 
visitors’ and page views. This, in many ways, can be more important to the publisher 
than any of the content, than the message, than any organizing views and as a result, 
can move the emphasis away from content and towards symbolically forceful 
imagery and catchy headlines. 
 This shallow approach can have the somewhat positive effect of allowing the 
particular issue which contains enough potential ire and which is appropriately 
formatted, to gain enough traction to rise to the top of the public consciousness very 
quickly and become a brief talking point. As a result, new campaigns can form 
around an issue, now prompted by individual parties rather than the more frequently 
tabloid-championed approaches of the past. Now, rather than the forceful imagery of 
a front page picture, social media campaigns as recently employed for instance by 
the group ‘Hacked Off’, are used to move an issue through this media landscape and 
capture the public imagination in this new way. However, while these issues can 
burn brightly within this context, it is difficult for campaigns to sustain any 
momentum, as was experienced prominently by ‘Hacked Off’. Initially prompted by 
the News of the World phone hacking scandal, championing victims rights and lead 
by Hugh Grant, this combination of celebrity, victims and scandal, supported by 
Twitter campaigns, online petitions reaching 171,933 people, easily shared YouTube 
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videos and the slogan ‘We need social media to rival column inches. Share us with 
your friends because the newspapers won’t!’, seemed to have utilised the new media 
landscape powerfully. In helping raise awareness of victimization in the phone 
hacking scandal, Hacked Off were instrumental in campaigning for press regulation 
as part of the Leveson Inquiry. However, they found that while the issue remained 
prominent around the time of the closure of the News of the World and again at the 
hearings for the Leveson Inquiry, much was made of the fact that the Hacked Off 
campaign documentary aired on Channel 4 on the day of Lord Leveson’s 
announcement, had floundered, receiving disappointingly low ratings of 552,000 
viewers, or a 2.3% share of the audience that night. The public interest waned as the 
issue became less potent and immediate, while the bombardment of imagery and 
short blasts of information, now totally out of the control of any kind of editorial 
discretion or long-term view, had turned to whichever issue had risen somehow to 




More than ever, the public voice in news issues is heard through an increasingly 
interactive system which provides several interesting forums for expression. Through 
Twitter and other active forms of social media which are increasingly utilised by 
news programming, viewers can comment personally on topics or ask a question. 
Indeed, TV and radio news programmes can easily gather the public opinion on 
issues by suggesting the use of a ‘hashtag’ which viewers will quote and thus be 
collated within a single stream, such as #r4today for listeners of Radio 4’s ‘Today 
Programme’. This is significant, not necessarily in the actual interactions which are 
rarely revelatory, but in the spirit of this shift. Where previously newsrooms were 
regarded as an important part of democratic society in that they employed skill and 
editorial guidance in order to investigate issues and present them in a controlled 
manner, often providing a crucial check against corrupt governments, now the 
untethered public voice is viewed as a key part of the presentation, that it is now 
required for a certain credibility. In a sense this could be viewed positively, allowing 
the public to take an active part in the construction of narratives, once again diluting 
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the power for elite manipulation of the masses and democratizing the news. 
However, the opportunity for such interaction, particularly around law and order 
issues, can attract the expression of reactionary views. In talk radio, news podcasts, 
newspaper comments sections, YouTube videos and comments sections, the 
anonymity available has tended to promote a certain viewpoint which counteracts 
any neutrality aimed at by the editorial approach.  
 
5.5 New Media Scholarship on Social Media 
 
I have stressed throughout this project that the seismic shifts around media have 
occurred not exclusively around social media, but rather with a more general 
broadening of access to news media, through rolling 24 hour televised news, through 
internet access to online media and through the ubiquity of personal tablets and 
smartphones. These changes have been instrumental in enhancing the 
aforementioned qualities of interactivity, immediacy, choice and symbolic force and 
the power of these elements should not be underestimated, or subsumed by 
discussions of social media. The introduction of social media certainly has had an 
impact on this realm, as we will see in the following case studies, it has enhanced our 
capacity to gather physically and figuratively around an issue and yet it is by no 
means the whole picture here. To make assertions about a change in society based 
around social media alone would take for granted longevity, which we have seen is 
inherently lacking in the ‘social’ element of social media. Formats driven by young 
demographics are subject to the rise and fall of trends and shift in popularity as 
generations grow. Millennials may have in recent years been defined by their 
proclivity towards interaction through social media, but we have seen that enormous 
brands of the social media world can still be undermined by their own popularity. 
For instance, as Facebook membership reaches a staggering 1.2 billion monthly 
active users, it has still reported concerns of a mass exodus of the most profitable 
young groups to apps such as WhatsApp and Snapchat, reportedly “part of the reason 
is that gradual encroachment of the grey-haired ones on Facebook” (Olson 10 
November 2013 The Observer, ‘Teenagers say goodbye to Facebook and hello to 
messenger apps’). As such, this is a fast-paced, fluctuating realm and we cannot for 
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instance speak on the potential long term effects of particular formats, rather, the 
most important point here is to observe the general encroachment of social media 
into our daily lives in its multiple forms. Some essence of social media is likely to 
endure; its interactivity, the ability to connect in particular circles, its particular 
delivery of news. In this section, I will provide an overview of new media 
scholarship on social media, with the aim of drawing out some of the important and 
enduring elements of this realm. 
 In the 2015 Reuters summary of news consumption, one of the key questions 
around the ‘starting points for news’ highlighted social media as a particularly 
dominant source, especially in Brazil and Australia where it was the most common 
over search, email and going direct to a news brand.  
 
(Reuters 2015: 75) 
Keitzmann, Hermkens, McCarthy and Silvestre (2011) aimed to categorise the 
variety of social media outlets according to scope and functionality as follows: 
 
Some sites are for the general masses, like Friendster, Hi5, and of course- 
Facebook, which opened only 4 years after Sixdegrees closed its doors. Other 
sites, like LinkedIn, are more focused professional networks… Media sharing 
sites, such as MySpace, YouTube, and Flickr, concentrate on shared videos and 
photos… Today the resulting ‘blogosphere’ of more than 100 million blogs and 
their interconnections has become an important source of public opinion… [On 
Twitter] more than 145 million users send on average 90 million ‘tweets’ per 
day. 




Even in the few years since Keitzmann et al. published this categorisation, as 
mentioned the landscape has shifted even further, yet this provides us with a sense of 
the breadth of the field in which users can share, communicate, receive messages 
which are given to them by trusted users. Crucially in social media, the user actively 
controls the stream of messages they receive with far greater autonomy than other 
forms of media. Mason (2010) aims to hone in on the exact kinds of uses for each 
source: 
Facebook is used to form groups, covert and overt—in order to establish those 
strong but flexible connections. Twitter is used for real-time organisation and 
news dissemination, bypassing the cumbersome ‘newsgathering’ operations of 
the mainstream media. YouTube and the Twitter-linked photographic sites— 
Yfrog, Flickr and Twitpic—are used to provide instant evidence of the claims 
being made. Link-shorteners like bit.ly are used to disseminate key articles via 
Twitter. (Mason 2010: 75)  
 With so many sources of media available, it can be difficult to further assess 
user motivations or the place of a particular source in society. Madianou and Miller 
(2012) suggest that most users adopt a form of ‘polymedia’, which they see as an 
integrated structure driven by each form of media’s functional propensities. They 
also suggest beyond function, that these varied sources no longer constitute “a 
horizontal distribution of media whereby each particular medium shifts its meaning 
and implication relative to the other media” (Madianou and Miller 2012: 183). 
Rather the internal relationship between forms of media is now multi-faceted and 
“constitutes a shift in the relationship between communicative media and society… it 
amounts to a resocialization of communicative media” (Madianou and Miller 2012: 
183). The social relationship of media is enhanced by the literacy of media users; as 
we become more familiar with the varied forms of media on offer, choosing a 
particular source becomes a socialized act. This is what Couldry (2012) and Hepp 
(2009) have termed a ‘mutual shaping of social processes and the media’.  
 While the adoption of social media has been fast-paced and represents a shift 
in the idea of a media consumer, we have also seen that the open sourced and 
unfettered elements of these forums have encouraged enormous uptake around 
political events and have shifted our idea of citizenship. Skirky (2011) argues that 
“as the communications landscape gets denser, more complex, and more 
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participatory, the networked population is gaining greater access to information, 
more opportunities to engage in public speech, and an enhanced ability to undertake 
collective action” (Skirky 2011: 1). He takes on the two main criticisms leveled at 
the idea that social media can make a difference in politics: that the tools themselves 
are ineffective and that they can harm when repressive governments use these tools 
to suppress dissent. In the first case, he suggests that critiques of ineffectiveness, of 
‘slacktivism’, in which Facebook groups for or against issues only extend bumper-
sticker politics, fail to appreciate the broad range of possibilities now available to 
activists through these modes. While modes of communication such as Facebook 
groups do allow for ‘slacktivism’, the use of social media to coordinate action has 
been revelatory on the world stage, for instance, recent protest movements against 
fundamentalist vigilantes in India in 2009 or protests against education laws in Chile 
in 2006 have taken advantage of the enhanced capacity for coordination (Shirky 
2011: 4). Of the second critique, the potential for authoritarian intervention through 
these modes, Shirky suggests that most examples of this kind so far have 
demonstrated a vast misunderstanding of the capabilities of social media, of the 
inability to control entire narratives; “When the government of Bahrain banned 
Google Earth after an annotated map of the royal family’s annexation of public land 
began circulating, the effect was to alert far more Bahrainis to the offending map 
than knew about it originally. So widely did the news spread that the government 
relented and reopened access after four days” (Shirky 2011: 7). These critiques aside, 
Shirky suggests that the key challenges for the future of social media and politics 
will come under international standards of freedom of speech and the issue of most 
of these large companies; Google, Facebook, Youtube are privately run and under 
few obligations to prioritise freedom of speech for their users above profit.  
 Shirky’s point on the enhanced ability to congregate around ideas and around 
moments of protest through social media is amplified by the great many observers of 
the ‘Arab Spring’ of 2010 and 2011. Howard et al. (2011) recount the self-
immolation of vegetable merchant Mouhammed Bouzazi who set himself on fire in 
Tunisia on December 17th 2010 in protest against the government and whose story 
was “told and retold on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube in ways that inspired 
dissidents to organize protests, criticize their governments, and spread ideas about 
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democracy” (Howard et al. 2011: 2). The impact of these events was enormous and 
demonstrated how social media could ‘play a central role in shaping political debates 
in the Arab Spring… spike online revolutionary conversations [which] often 
preceded major events on the ground… helped spread democratic ideas across 
international borders’ (Howard et al. 2011). Essentially, while social media is a 
realm often criticized for its faddishness and lack of substance, against these odds in 
the short time it has been an active part of legitimate communicative processes, it has 
seriously contributed to politics and protest in meaningful and noticeable ways. 
 
 
5.6 Citizen Journalism 
 
As the technology of the media landscape has developed, so too has the public role in 
capturing newsworthy events. With increased access to the internet and the 
proliferation of recording devices on phones and tablets, the phenomenon of ‘citizen 
journalism’ has allowed the public to play “an active role in the process of collecting, 
reporting, analyzing and disseminating news and information” (Bowman and Willis 
2003: 2). Jewkes (2011) argues both that the emergence of the citizen journalist 
ought to be considered one of the most notable corollaries of the expansion of new 
media and that this was a significant occurrence worthy of consideration in the 
context of crime news. She describes the ‘user-generated content’ of citizen 
journalism as “encompass[ing] images taken on mobile phone cameras, texts and 
emails sent by audience members to media outlets, and contributions to Internet sites 
such as Twitter and Youtube (which has its own dedicated channel for citizen 
journalists; YouTube direct)” (Jewkes 2011: 65). Citizen journalism has tended to 
indicate an active collection of news imagery beyond that of the public contribution 
to news previously discussed in this project, one which goes beyond the day to day 
interaction, now providing newsworthy material and in many cases shifting the focus 
of news. 
In particular, the capturing of video has notably provided evidence to refute 
official claims, frequently those of the police. Recent prominent examples include 
the uploading of pictures and video of police brutality in the events surrounding the 
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killing of an unarmed black teenager by police in Ferguson, Missouri. Of the power 
of citizen journalism, Gillmor (2014) notes; “Video and pictures are an equalizer: 
they’re not the only ones, and most of the power remains with the state, but they can 
be essential tools to help restore some balance in a system that, in recent years, has 
tilted in favor of those who interpret ‘protect and serve’ as license to act with 
impunity” (Gillmor 2014: x), reflecting the sense that this form of public action has 
become a meaningful check against unjust claims of state authority and crucial 
evidence in cases of police violence. Greer and McLaughlin (2010) note the 
particular impact of citizen journalism on policing, highlighting the shift in recent 
years away from media reporting which had tended to support official accounts, 
towards policing which is “enmeshed in a complex web of internal and external 
stakeholders and ‘publics’ with different agendas and needs who are willing and able 
to use the news media and internet to represent their interests” (Greer and 
McLaughlin 2010: 1044). The outcome of such a shift has, as Greer and McLaughlin 
suggest, created space for potentially undermining narratives and reinforced critique 
of the state. Citizen journalism, then, does represent a shift in the media landscape 
which allows the public voice to emanate in a particularly powerful way. 
In his discussion of the rapidly evolving media realm, Yar (2012) 
incorporates the media analysis concept ‘prosumer’ (Tapscott 2008, Ritzer and 
Jurgenson 2010 in Yar 2012: 249) to emphasise the modern merging of production 
and consumption of media, in which this form of ‘user-generated content’ now plays 
a significant role in the construction of news narratives. Similarly, Greer and 
McLaughlin emphasise the significance of this shift in their development of Becker’s 
‘hierarchy of credibility’ (Becker 1967) within the context of policing. They note in 
particular that: 
 
The pluralization and professionalization of possible sources of ‘policing news’ has 
created a multiplicity of alternative ‘knowledge workers’ (Ericson and Haggerty 1997: 
19) with access to potentially ‘newsworthy’ information that may or may not 
correspond with the official police perspective. (Greer and McLaughlin 2010: 26) 
 
Citizen journalism and the many active ‘knowledge workers’ have shifted the 
established hierarchy of credibility, which, using Yar’s development of ‘prosumer’ is 
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now more fluid, less of a vertical hierarchy, or indeed much more notably dominated 
by members of the public, now empowered with the technological capability to 
capture and deliver news imagery. The increasing regularity and force of citizen 
journalism in news does seem to indicate a blurring of boundaries, where crucially 
the non-media elite now frequently play an active and legitimate role in constructing 
narratives. We have seen that in particular, when these forces are directed towards 




5.7 Contemporary News Consumption and Reception 
 
One of the most significant shifts in this realm and one of central importance to this 
project is the way in which news is now consumed. Recent literature has aimed to 
illuminate the rapid developments in this area by highlighting research which tells us 
more about the consumption of news through mobile devices, through multiple 
platforms, through social media and which aims to understand the resulting impact 
on civic participation. 
 The most recent (2015) Reuters Institute Digital News Report provides a 
detailed international overview of news consumption as it occurs today. They report 
that ‘television remains the number one source of news in most markets’ (Reuters 
2015: 51). However, as the chart below demonstrates, in most cases online media 
including social media provides a serious challenge to the primacy of television, now 
dominating consumption in a major markets including the US and Ireland. In all 
cases, key sources of news tend to be much more heavily weighted towards TV and 
social media than more traditional formats of radio and printed newspapers.  
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(Reuters 2015: 51) 
 




(Reuters 2015: 51) 
 
When the under 35 demographics were questioned on the value of online news 
(excluding social media), they cited high levels of ‘accuracy and reliability, bringing 
new stories to me, analysis and speed’ which outweighed their perception of TV 
news, suggesting that these were the driving forces behind a move towards online 
news for this age group. As seen below, while social media scored higher than TV on 
bringing new stories, the accuracy and reliability of sources was rated fairly low, 




(Reuters 2015: 53) 
 
Similarly, Hermida’s (2012) key study ‘Decoding the social media news consumer’ 
emphasizes that social media is now ‘central to the way people experience news’, in 
particular, the sharing function involved in social media plays an integral role in 
consumption and reception, with the result that “editorially, the traditional 
gatekeeping function of the media is weakened as a significant proportion of news 
consumers turn to family, friends and acquaintances to alert them to items of 
interest” (Hermida 2012: 820). Newman, Dutton and Blank’s (2012) specific study 
of social media consumption in the UK assesses the now fluid relationship between 
old media and the public through social media outlets: 
 
The press and mass media are using the Internet strategically to maintain and 
enhance their communicative power, but networked individuals are using the 
Internet to source their own information, more independent of the press and 
other estates, and to network with other individuals in ways that enhance their 
communicative power… [they] are involved in an ecology of media that is also 
enabling the two estates to be mutually complementary and reinforcing 
(Newman, Dutton and Blank 2012:18). 
 
In developing their analysis of new media consumption, Reuters compared 
the UK and Denmark’s modes of consuming news, noting overwhelmingly that the 
increase of mobile devices had made a significant impact on how, for instance, news 
is consumed on public transport: 
 
 
(Reuters 2015: 60) 
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The impact of increased accessibility through mobile news devices, particularly in 
younger demographics has emerged as a key theme in recent news consumption 
literature. Chyi and Chadha (2011) studied in detail the use of computers, 
smartphones, e-readers and tablets and concluded that multiplatform news 
consumption is now an undeniable, dominant reality in media, with the computer still 
acting as the main platform, despite the portability of other devices.  Chan-Olmsted, 
Rim and Zerba (2013) suggest that the mobile phones and tablets like the iPad are 
most popular in young adults, concluding that “it is plausible that usability and/or 
needs and gratification factors might play a more significant role in this aspect of 
mobile news behaviour” (Chan-Olmsted, Rim and Zerba 2013: 140). 
 Mitchelstein and Boczkowski’s (2010) summary of research findings on 
studies of news consumption suggest that in aiming to appreciate consumer 
behaviour, most empirical studies have concluded that “despite the proliferation of 
sites and technologies, most users are still influenced by past consumption habits” 
(Mitchelstein and Boczkowski 2010: 1086). Their main argument in assessing the 
research landscape is to stress that traditional consumption habits still exist across 
demographics and in this new technological landscape. While this vast expansion is 
notable, consumption in many demographics is still motivated by traditional models, 
for instance, a focus on specific interests and content. Readers interested in sport will 
still be motivated to consume according to this interest. Livingstone’s study (2004) 
forcefully concluded that “the search for news information in a specific content area 
drives the consumption of specific news types across different media outlets” 
(Livingstone 2004: 55). 
In considering the impact of political events on news coverage, Reuters 
concluded that elections and referendums in the UK stimulate interest in politics. 
Using the Scottish Independence Referendum as a case study, Reuters noted “A 
quarter (26%) regularly post political comments via social networks. More than a 
fifth (20%) follow a politician on social media, while the percentage of people 
contributing money to a political party has tripled in two years” (Reuters 2015: 62). 
Considering sources of political news, it is noted that “Broadcaster brands like the 
BBC, ITV and sky and newspaper brands (in print and online) remain the most 
important sources of news but their overall reach is on a downward curve. By 
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contrast, those who say they get political news from social networks like Facebook 
and Twitter has risen from 15% to 25% in four years. More people are also getting 
information directly from political parties (7% to 14%)” (Reuters 2015: 63). 
 Halpern’s (2013) study of the impact of participation with social media on 
civic engagement supports these findings, suggesting that “being exposed to political 
opinions and beliefs of peers may stimulate interest and knowledge, results showed 
that the positive effect of news consumption and political discussion on civic 
engagement was found even in non-active information seekers and those exposed 
serendipitously to information” (Halpern 2013: 181). These findings stress the force 
of peer-driven news consumption even on non-active information seekers. Finally, 
political participation in younger demographics when impacted by online news 
consumption is assessed by Xiaoming (2014), who makes the argument that we now 
see a general reversal in youth apathy, when we consider online political 
engagement. He cautions against extending this link too concretely to offline 
political engagement but sees strong links otherwise.  
 
 
5.8 New Political Communications Scholarship 
 
We have seen how the reception of news has shifted and how this has forcefully 
affected consumption, how then have these changes impacted on the way that issues 
are communicated in the political realm? This area of scholarship has in recent years 
provided new insight into the relationship between politics, the media and the public, 
in particular the enhanced manner by which the public may access the political 
realm, how political communications have been affected by the widespread 
introduction of new media and how this seems to have redirected activity around 
elections and scandals. 
 The relationship between politicians and the public, by way of the media has 
been recently reexamined by Lee (2014) in the American context, using the President 
as the focal point for the political realm. His study found that despite the recent 
recalibration of this now multidimensional relationship, that the news media still 
plays an integral role in framing issues both for the President and for the public and 
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that this relationship could not exist similarly between the President and public 
without the media, noting that “the significant influences of the news media on the 
president and the public imply that the manner in which the news media make news 
of issues is critical to understanding changes in public opinion” (Lee 2014: 276). As 
such, despite these shifts, we see that the role of the media is still integral to political 
communication.  
 The impact of evolving media on this relationship is of increasing interest in 
the realm of political communication, with many actors adopting these new formats 
to aim to deliver policy or campaign messages. As such, much of the focus of 
research in this area has been on the potential shift in retention of messages and the 
possibility of persuasion in today’s media landscape. Hill, Lo, Vavreck and Zaller 
(2013) aim to understand the limits of persuasion within today’s mediated political 
context. They examine the apparent problem of ‘rapid decay’ in mass political 
communication but found that ‘online processing’ actually produced increased 
durability when compared with ‘memory-based processing’, but that the 
internalization of communication is quite shallow; “citizens would internalize the 
implications of communication while forgetting its details” (Hill et al. 2013: 545). 
Essentially we see a positive impact on the ability to communicate only simple 
messages to the public. Neiheisel and Niebler (2015) build on this research, aiming 
to understand how retention of political messages are influenced by ‘voters’ 
interpersonal discussion networks’ and find that retention is enhanced when 
individuals are situated in networks which are ‘agreeable’, which correspond with 
and reinforce their political views; “Individuals situated within more agreeable 
networks are more likely to strengthen their candidate preferences and, 
correspondingly, resist shifting their support to a different candidate when exposed to 
ads that are consonant with their initial vote choice” (Neiheisel and Niebler 2015: 
448). We see this kind of network regularly in social media and as such, this has 
strong implications for political messages now transmitted through these formats. 
Moving beyond these agreeable groups, Lyons and Sokhey (2014) aim to understand 
what emotions motivate public engagement with ‘disagreeable discussion’ in 
politics, what causes a person to engage with other political persuasions and debates 
of this nature. Both online and in person, they suggest that “disagreeable discussion-
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regardless of conceptualization and operationalization- is poorly predicted by 
emotions associated with information seeking (e.g., fear) while it is better structured 
by emotions associated with expression and participation (e.g., enthusiasm)” (Lyons 
and Sokhey 2014: 237). Therefore, to move a person beyond their agreeable 
networks, to engage with other political groups, they are better motivated by 
enthusiasm than fear. 
 The persuasive capacity of politics is extremely active during campaigns, 
however, research by Hansen and Tue Pedersen (2014) suggests that persuasion 
during these periods can extend beyond and into the general public consciousness 
and that this is largely driven by media messages. Focusing specifically on 
newspaper output, they found that “Broadsheet readers experienced a significant 
increase in both knowledge and internal efficacy. In contrast, tabloid readers became 
significantly less externally efficacious, suggesting that the tabloids may be partially 
to blame for cynicism and mistrust among the electorate” (Hansen and Tue Pedersen 
2014: 319). Surprisingly they also found that TV and radio did not have positive 
effects on knowledge and efficacy. Their study did not include any other new media 
sources, but provided an interesting perspective on the effects of communication 
through these traditional modes, seeming to categorize TV and radio as less 
persuasive than broadsheet news. While research into the differences in newspaper 
coverage is wide-ranging, recent work by Dunaway and Lawrence (2015) considers 
newspaper coverage during elections and the particular conditions which can lead to 
more measured reporting. They find conclusively that as election races become 
tighter and the winner is less clear, that policy discussions are abandoned in favour 
of ‘game-frame’ coverage: 
 
Given a close race, newspapers of many types will tend to converge on a game-
framed election narrative and, by extension, stories focusing on who’s up/who’s 
down will crowd out stories about the policy issues they are presumably being 
elected to address. And, as the days-’til-election variable shows, this pattern will 
intensify across the course of a close race. Ownership structure, in other words, 
does not trump journalists’ (and audiences’) attraction to the horse race when a 
close race is on.  
(Dunaway and Lawrence 2015: 59) 
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As such, persuasiveness and any approach aimed at effective policy-based 
communication will under these conditions be superseded in favour of close race 
politics. In moments such as these, Boydston, Hardy and Walgrave (2014) have 
aimed to assess the impact of media storms, exploring the activity around such 
moments and the impact this has on public reception of political communications. 
Their main finding was that public interest and activity tends to spike during these 
moments; “When media attention to an event/issue explodes, people start searching 
for more information regarding the item in a similar explosive fashion” (Boydston, 
Hardy and Walgrave 2014: 529). They suggest that the broader impact of these 
surges is notable, that these surges should be considered important in understanding 
how members of the public develop ideas around specific policy issues. They argue 
for the media storm as a way of “think[ing] about media effects in a non-linear, 
conditional fashion” (Boydston, Hardy and Walgrave 2014: 529). 
 
 
6. A Blurring of Boundaries 
 
It is clear that many of the most rigorous and appealing conceptual frameworks 
which aim to understand the role of the media in the construction of crime narratives, 
view this particular relationship as a top-down linear process feeding from politician 
to media to public unchallenged. For instance, the Policing the Crisis (1978) account 
sees the creators of knowledge, the ‘primary definers’ as serving information to the 
willing media, the ‘secondary definers’, the recipients, the commercially interested 
middle man. The argument proposed by Altheide instead views commercial interests 
as maintaining absolute dominance over any other powerful societal forces, in his 
account politicians are portrayed as the victims, stymied in any attempt at social 
justice by unflinching capitalist forces.  Similarly, Herman and Chomsky use their 
‘Propaganda Model’ to demonstrate how the everyday functioning structures of the 
newsroom facilitate such dominance. While these varied Marxist-influenced 
approaches are fiercely critical of the power wielded on to the media, they 
overwhelmingly view the media as weak and tend to downplay any motives beyond 
commercial gain. The Habermasian account sees the effects of this particular 
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arrangement as having produced a docile public, no longer active participants in the 
construction of knowledge, but lethargic consumers of cynical politics or commercial 
interests. 
  Moving away from Marxist accounts towards a more fluid understanding of 
today’s media sphere, one which takes into account the prevailing forces of 
immediacy, choice, symbolic force and interactivity, in “trying to identify the 
multiple forces, tendencies, pressures in play in a historical moment and to identify 
how the balance of forces is being worked on, shaped, directed in the search for a 
‘solution’ and a ‘way forward” (Clarke 2008: 125), it is clear that we must enhance 
our understanding of the media as complicit and the public as active. 
 Interaction Ritual Chains provides a model which refocuses us towards these 
particular elements, by placing emphasis on the reception of symbols and by 
providing a microsociology of the regeneration of knowledge. Herman and Chomsky 
suggest that “the mass media serve as a system for communicating messages and 
symbols to the general populace” (1988: 1). As a fundamental starting point this 
aligns well with the symbolically charged media sphere of today and is 
complemented by the Interaction Ritual Chains model which views symbols as 
integral in the ‘mutual focus of attention’.  
Collins’s depiction of the ‘Interaction Ritual Chain’ suggests that co-
presence, a group-defining barrier, a shared mood and a ‘mutual focus of attention’ 
combine to set in motion the natural escalation from small scale interaction to 
broader righteous anger. They merge to form a shared emotional and cognitive 
experience which is internally heightened, which feeds into the ‘collective 
consciousness’ and micro-situational moments of intersubjectivity to produce a high 
intensity pleasure. For Collins, this Durkheim and Goffman inspired symbolic 
interactionist model depicts the individual consumption of symbolically charged 
knowledge and the regeneration and heightening of meaning which can occur. In this 
model symbols are the power source which trigger our mutual focus of attention. 
Symbols are crucial in triggering emotional entrainment because they transcend 
language and they are fundamentally shared. Collins emphasizes the dependent 
nature of this relationship by suggesting that “symbols, in turn, differ as to what kind 
of group solidarity they invoke, and thus what symbolic / emotional memories or 
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meanings will do in affecting group interactions, and personal identities, in future 
situations” (2004: 81). The forum within which symbols are received can have a 
significant effect on the eventual solidarity produced, the key ingredient being 
activity over passivity. For instance, Collins describes a spectrum of group 
circumstances which heighten as activity and focus on a specific ‘Durkheimian 
sacred object’ increase. From an airport departure lounge, to a crowded bar, to an 
audience gathered at a show, to sports fans, there are increasingly more collective 
symbols shared as the focus tightens, but the anonymity of the crowd means that 
long term solidarity is weaker than, for instance, a conversation between a defined 
group of friends. As such, for the Interaction Ritual to have force, the symbols shared 
must “circulate and prolong group membership beyond ephemeral situations of 
emotional intensity” (2004: 87). In such circumstances, symbols play a key role in 
defining personal identities and developing established narratives; they appear to 
constitute the power source with which small scale interactions can grow into 
broader righteous anger.  
 This account not only emphasizes the powerful role that the media might play 
in processing and providing these symbols, the fuel of growing narratives, but it 
views the public and the individual as an integral part of the construction of 
narratives. It moves our assessment of the production of knowledge away from a top-
down linear power source towards an account which elaborates on the ‘news as 
knowledge’ format, taking seriously the Policing the Crisis (1978) notion of rumour 
and folk-lore as being at the heart of our enquiry. Furthermore, the IRC model adds a 
detailed elaboration of the notion of pleasure felt in feeding back or in ‘representing’ 
as Ericson put it. It views the natural progress set in motion by an initial IRC as 
developing towards a shared emotional or cognitive experience through a collective 
rhythm, such as the build up of laughter, a conversation, a religious service or a 
cheering crowd. Even the more private, internal IRC is heightened, leading similarly 
to a high intensity feeling of pleasure, derived from the Durkheimian sense of 
solidarity which reinforces the validity of the process of the IRC and also directs 
legitimacy at sacred symbolic objects, which in Ericson’s account would include 
authority figures and the ephemeral notion of law and order. This account 
complements the Altheide depiction of the media as constructing a ‘problem frame’ 
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in order to produce a ‘morality play’. In this scenario, the morality play would form a 
part of the IRC, adding texture to the drama of the active ‘representing’ process.  
 As such, these perspectives on the public construction of crime narratives 
once more emphasise the need to shift our focus from the high level power players, 
to a fluid and multilayered interpretation of context, to Ericson’s ‘meta-power’. 
While, the Habermasian view of the consumer-driven media context as having 
produced a lethargic consumer public doesn’t seem to fit with these modern 
conditions, his view of the potential for a more active public does seem to hold some 
relevance in today’s altered media landscape, in which the public can and do 
contribute to the construction of knowledge through these IRC interactions. Indeed, 
the IRC model moves away from an understanding of the media that is overly critical 
of traditional hierarchies of power. Instead, Castells’s ‘Informational Capitalism’ is a 
better fit in aiming to assess the flow of power and commercial interests in today’s 
hyper-modern media sphere, in this ‘Network Society’. Essentially, in conjunction 
with many of the themes explored here in classic studies of the media, the 
Interaction Ritual Chains model enhances these accounts to provide a view of the 
construction of knowledge today, which provides a more realistic view of the 
interactive individual, which understands the vast amount of choice available and the 
use of choice and immediacy in diluting traditional power sources and which 
appreciates the renewed impact of symbolic force on this terrain. This is a view of 
the construction of crime narratives which better understands the blurring of 



















This chapter will begin with a reflection on the purpose of the project and the 
relationship between this purpose and the chosen method. Connections between the 
theoretical framework employed and the practical methodological approach will be 
explained, ultimately arguing for case study research as in keeping with the 
conceptual aims of the thesis. The research process will then be outlined in detail, 
providing an explanation of the evolving methodological strategy, the decision-
making process around the choice of case studies, with reference to a possible fourth 
case study which was eventually excluded. The particular process of data collection 
employed will be described, including the ways in which the materials collected 
were turned into analysable data using the Foucauldian Discourse Analysis approach. 
The choice and role of discourse analysis in this project will be explained, outlining 
Foucauldian Discourse Analysis as an applied method, including how it has been 
operationalized across different communicative genres and empirical examples and a 
justification as to why this had been employed as an appropriate method for 
undertaking research which includes a focus on social media. There will be a 
discussion of the ways in which other scholars have attempted to research the social 
media environment and analysis of their particular methodological strategies, with an 
argument for this approach as expanding upon this work. Finally, the process of data 
analysis will be described and a critical reflection on the methodological approach 










2. Choosing to Use Case Study Research 
	  
 
In moving towards a coherent and sufficiently rigorous research approach by which I 
might examine ‘The Political Communication of Crime’, I began to identify an 
appropriate method by refocusing on the most crucial issues at the heart of this 
inquiry. Namely, that this project should aim to better understand the dystopia of 
criminological literature in which evidence-based criminal justice research is 
somehow transformed by government to become reactionary and ill-conceived law 
and order policymaking. Furthermore, that it should aim to propose an alternative 
and more plausible academic account of the politics of law and order by developing a 
contemporary picture of the construction of crime narratives which is attuned to 
political realities and an evolving media landscape; and that it should reframe our 
view of the ‘Political Communication of Crime’ from being perceived as a top-down 
manipulation of the masses by a political elite, instead viewing this as the product of 
the blurring of boundaries between the reception and generation of information. As 
such, given the expansive nature of this research problem, it was evident that any 
such attempt at examining these issues would require a broad gaze and one which 
would be usefully positioned to appreciate not just the highly visible public political 
communications surrounding crime, but also the more intangible communication 
structures present in these interactions.  
Bearing in mind the practical limits of the research project, it was decided that it 
would be most appropriate and productive to explore this area through an 
examination of certain distinct instances or episodes of political communication, 
which might demonstrate the now fluid and multi-layered construction of crime 
narratives today. This approach borrows from the conjunctural analysis ethos 
discussed in Chapter 3, by which we begin with a specific issue, an area of inquiry, 
and approach the research by “trying to identify the multiple forces, tendencies, 
pressures in play in a historical moment and to identify how the balance of forces is 
being worked on, shaped, directed in the search for a ‘solution’ and a ‘way forward” 
(Clarke 2008: 125). This approach seems also to fit well with the theoretical 
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approaches that have been adopted and developed in this thesis, in particular the 
Interaction Ritual Chains (2004) model provides a view of these communication 
processes as in constant flux, seeming to be shaped by multiple forces rather than a 
single all-powerful master. In essence, this is to favour a broadly interactionist view 
of how the political communication of crime is carried on over many of the less 
contextually aware critical approaches that have regularly been applied to this 
research problem. However, this theoretical grounding has also been chosen 
primarily to serve the analytic task at hand. The interactionist methodological 
approach is indeed one of microanalysis and the focus on micro-situational moments 
of intersubjectivity espoused by Interaction Ritual Chains (2004) derives from 
Collins’s belief that detailed micro-analysis “reveals the empirical realities of social 
structures as patterns of repetitive micro-interaction [and] thus gives us a picture of 
the complex levels of abstraction involved in causal explanations” (Collins 1981: 
985). Although they have diverse theoretical vocabularies, several of the most 
influential works exploring the role of the media in the construction of crime 
narratives share a similar methodological commitment. Cohen’s Folk Devils & 
Moral Panics (1972) employs case study analysis at a time of extraordinary unrest 
and media-driven social turmoil to unveil the power of these forces. Similarly, Hall 
et al.’s Policing the Crisis (1979) takes a case study analysis of the Handsworth 
mugging case in Birmingham in 1973 as fertile material with which the authors can 
observe the microsociological detail of the case and extrapolate to illuminate our 
understanding of the role of the media more generally; “The Handsworth case, then, 
crystallises the operation of the media, so that in one moment we can observe the 
shape of a whole news process” (Hall et al 1978: 82). In this instance, the case study 
was focused on an out of the ordinary event, rather than the everyday working 
newsroom, in order to move beyond definitions of everyday newsworthiness towards 
an understanding of the ideological extremes of media coverage and as a result, to 
uncover how the media can position itself and employ its powerful tools in relation 
to the ideological construction of crime and punishment; “these ideologies are 
present only when they are realised, objectivated, materialized in concrete instances, 
actions or forms, through concrete practices” (Hall et al 1978: 83). The Policing the 
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Crisis (1978) approach, then, makes the argument for aiming to observe these 
ideological processes when they are stretched, tested and in the process unveiled.  
 As such, in aiming to most effectively evaluate the varied elements at play in 
today’s political construction of crime narratives, the use of case studies seemed to 
offer an approach which could facilitate the assessment of the central research 
problems by capturing a broad enough field of analysis. Furthermore, as is evident in 
works such as Policing the Crisis (1978) and Folk Devils & Moral Panics (1972) the 
case study approach seemed to allow for analysis based on rich data ranging from 
‘microsituational moments of intersubjectivity’ to the more visible political and 
media sources at play. Finally, this approach seemed to intrinsically fit with a form 
of ideological analysis which favours moments of crisis, of panic, of extraordinary 
activity, for their rich data generation as well as their ability to unveil the outer 
limits, the extremes of capacity and the underlying potential of media structures in 
particular.  
 During my research period, I undertook a case study on the 2010 UK General 
Election. This provided a fertile research field wherein I might observe the political 
communication of crime in action and examine in particular the role of the media and 
the public in this evolving landscape. While relatively unpredictable in terms of the 
day-to-day stories that would unfold, the date of this event was certain and as such 
allowed me a useful period of preparation time. I found that this allowed me to 
prepare to gather data and to organize how I might remain adaptive during these 
largely unpredictable studies. Furthermore, with the established research aims in 
mind, I decided to conduct two further case studies, namely on the UK Phone 
Hacking Scandal of July 2011 and the England riots of August 2011. This research 
was relatively adaptive to the unfolding of events but did not benefit from a similar 
preparation period. However, I was able to follow the outline I had already 
established in gathering data on the election case studies, with the added benefit of 
an opportunity in which I might capture this particular landscape at unique moments 
of tension, at times which might further unveil the various structures and power 
relationships at play. Here the case study approach proved to be a versatile method 
with which I could capture various forms of data without any limiting time or access 
restrictions, which allowed me to be truly adaptive and aim to answer the research 
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problem as effectively as possible with this rich, but unpredictable data source. It 
allowed me to gather a breadth of data and follow the events as they unravelled and 
this approach facilitated a gathering of data which might complement my theoretical 
aims, as influenced by such works as Policing the Crisis (1979) and Folk Devils and 
Moral Panics (1972). 
 In choosing to study data gathered by case study during specific moments of 
focused attention, of inflated production of crime communication I essentially 
implied a preference not to study ‘The Political Communication of Crime’ by 
focusing on the everyday, the newsroom ethnography, the following of a bill through 
Parliament, the elite interview which might have gleaned some information on the 
everyday construction of crime narratives, the political cultures at play. Firstly, I 
chose this approach because as Policing the Crisis (1979) demonstrates clearly, the 
extraordinary event tells us something particular about the ideological boundaries of 
this sphere. It illustrates what can happen when boundaries are stretched, and, as we 
will see, it can unveil the less apparent dynamics between power-holders and the 
most prominent sources of crime knowledge, by indicating the terms in which 
controversial topics may be debated at the absolute periphery rather than in the 
unnoticed everyday. A large part of this project focuses on the public consumption 
and regeneration of knowledge, which again is at its most potent in times of outcry 
and at the public opportunity to express themselves through democratic elections.  
Indeed, a Durkheimian reading of these moments would view the symbolic force and 
activity around such events as carrying a distinct importance: 
 
We have only to notice what happens… when some moral scandal has just occurred. 
Men stop each other on the street, they visit each other, they seek to come together to 
talk of the event and to wax indignant in common. From all the similar impressions 
which are exchanged, and the anger that is expressed, there emerges a unique 
emotion, more or less determinate according to the circumstances, which emanates 
from no specific person, but from everyone. This is the public wrath. 
(Durkheim 1893: The Division of Labour)   
 
 
Similarly, Fine’s view of ‘scandal’ sees extraordinary moments of public attention to 
an issue as having an instrumental role in the construction of crime narratives: “The 
depiction of the scandal comes to symbolize the problem for the public and thus, the 
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response to the scandal shapes the response to the social problem” (Fine 1997: 297).  
Indeed, there are vast bodies of research which seek to measure and understand 
public opinions on criminal justice, but there is something particularly potent about 
the public reaction to a panic, a scandal, an election, that the vocalization, the 
moment for outcry can illuminate the structures and the boundaries at play, but can 
also crystallize into action, can take on a new significance. This approach argues for 
the public opinion ‘outlier’ to take on a more central role. Therefore, if we want to 
understand more than the everyday; the mapping of structures, a true understanding 
of power and its potential here and the virile nature of crime in society, then an 
appreciation of extremes is essential. 
 Secondly, this project is focused on gaining an understanding of today’s 
hyper-modern communication structures and their potential; this is an account which 
could not view, for example, a newsroom ethnography as telling us all that we might 
need to know about where the power to construct narratives lies. It was certainly the 
case that in Ericson et al.’s (1987, 1989, 1991) work the newsroom ethnography 
greatly extended academic study of the media by moving our analysis away from the 
page and into the broader news creation environment. Today’s media and crime 
research must move beyond the newsroom again and into the more intangible world 
of present day media, which is why a case study approach is useful in its breadth and 
its flexibility, bringing us closer to an accurate encapsulation of the many forms of 
media we utilize today. Similarly, it would not have been desirable to have focused 
on the accounts of elites, given that the aim of this research was to understand how 
the construction of crime narratives no longer rests entirely within the grasp of 
certain traditionally powerful groups.  
Yin’s (1994) work on the case study as a compelling social science resource suggests 
that case studies should be considered as the preferred strategy “when ‘how’ or 
‘why’ questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, 
and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context” 
(Yin 1994: 1). While the case study seemed to appeal naturally within the constraints 
of my particular research circumstances, these criteria also provide a compelling 
argument for this approach in that the intangible and contemporary nature of new 
media and omnipresent communication structures mean that there is no unfamiliar or 
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intriguing group or site to access and illuminate in this case, and that the analysis 
must instead focus on an issue which is widely encountered every day.  
Furthermore, with the sprawling and expansive nature of the events studied, 
unravelling in real time and in unpredictable directions, again, the case study 
approach seemed to have the capacity to contain these events and provide a flexible 
framework for gathering data and for analysis. The case study is particularly suited to 
the study of media events because of their episodic and time-bound nature. They 
provide us with a way of tracking something that has a specific trajectory and life-
cycle. In this sense the case-study is a particularly naturalistic method. 
Platt’s (1992) work on the case study aims to reframe traditional hierarchies of 
research strategy, moving away from a view that case studies could only be 
considered appropriate as an exploratory tool, suggesting that we can use the case 
study for exploratory, descriptive or explanatory purposes. However, Yin (1994) 
suggests that while it is useful to redefine the case study in this way, that we ought 
not to limit the potential of  case study research by delineating approaches so strictly, 
and  that instead we ought to view each approach as potentially distinct but not 
mutually exclusive. Yin (1994) also provides a detailed counterargument to 
traditional prejudices against the case study as a research strategy. He touches on the 
concerns commonly held that the case study can seem to lack rigour and is not well 
known for providing unambiguous evidence and notes that his work has endeavoured 
to delineate a thorough and constructive methodological process, with the aim of 
enhancing the legitimacy of case study findings. He suggests that this might reframe 
the case study as prone to a similar level of bias or uncertainty as is commonly found 
in other qualitative methods, rather than seeming to be somehow especially 
unreliable and unwieldy. These involve a thorough research design process, which 
can involve the integration of theoretical models as well as a period of preparation 
for data collection. Of common concerns frequently levelled at case study research, 
Yin (1994: 10) also suggests that scientific generalization from a single specific case 
can be treated with some scepticism. The case study approach does seem to operate 
without various standard research practices such as “multiple sets of experiments, 
which have replicated the same phenomenon under different conditions” (Yin 1994: 
10). Yin’s answer is that the case study is not a tool to be used in pursuit of 
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‘particularizing’; “the case study, like the experiment, does not represent a ‘sample’, 
and the investigator’s goal is to expand and generalize theories (analytic 
generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization)” (Yin 
1994: 10). Stake (1994) argues that case studies ought to be valued not only because 
they are intrinsically appealing in their “down-to-earth and attention-holding” (1978: 
1) nature, but because analytically they provide a unique form of ‘naturalistic 
generalization’ which is scientifically valid in that it is “arrived at by recognizing the 
similarities of objects and issues in and out of context and by sensing the natural 
covariations of happenings. To generalize this way is to be both intuitive and 
empirical, and not idiotic” (Stake 1994: 4). As such, these perspectives on the 
analytical force of case study research help to demonstrate the value of the general 
approach here, while validating the project as one which is methodologically robust 
and which can also provide conclusions with the requisite level of weight. 
Finally, Yin addresses the complaint that case studies can take too long and can 
“result in massive, unreadable documents” (Yin 1994: 10) by suggesting that the 
researcher ought to explore alternative and creative ways of reporting the case study, 
bearing in mind the unparalleled ability to orient the case study report to an 
audience’s needs through structures which he defines as ‘linear-analytic, 
comparative, chronological, theory-building and unsequenced’ (Yin 1994: 138). 
Furthermore, Yin’s view of the case study is that it need not extend unnecessarily in 
that case-studies do not depend on data from participant-observation ethnographies 
which require undefined time in the ‘field. In this case, the data are more 
controllable. It should be acknowledged that at times, the case study can become 
unwieldy if it is focused on a sprawling event, and this poses challenges when this 
method is applied to an event of a long duration or which involves diverse 
participants, such as the Phone Hacking Scandal, which through the Leveson Inquiry 
has repercussion which still unfold daily. However, in essence Yin’s approach is 
correct in that the researcher has the power to rein in the study rather than being 
dictated by the participants or ‘the field’ and as such, the case study approach can be 
usefully contained within specific time constraints. 
Yin defines the main approaches to data collection in case study research as 
‘question-asking, listening, adaptiveness and flexibility, a grasp of the issues being 
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studied and a lack of bias’ (1994: 58). When discussing adaptiveness and flexibility, 
Yin argues that the investigator “must remember the original purpose of the 
investigation but then must be willing to change procedures or plans if unanticipated 
events occur” (Yin 1994: 57). This ethos became central to my research when the 
unexpected but significant events of the Phone Hacking Scandal and the Riots 
occurred in July and August 2011. Their obvious relevance to my study, their 
generation of various kinds of useful data during a moment of extremes and their at 
least superficial similarities to the scandals and panics documented in works such as 
Policing the Crisis (1979) and Folk Devils and Moral Panics (1972) presented an 
excellent and timely opportunity to research the nexus of politics, crime and the 
media in new and additional directions, For this reason I proceeded to undertake 
these further two rather less foreseeable case studies, with two already having been 
completed. As such, having previously collected data and conducted a full case study 
for the UK General Election in 2010 I was able to reflect on which sources had 
produced the most useful information and equally, which data would be 
disproportionately time consuming in relation to their potential utility. This saved a 
great deal of time and allowed for me to collect data efficiently and immediately. In 
essence, this approach followed Yin’s ‘assets of a case study researcher’, through 
listening and striving to have a grasp of the issues, which would allow the study to 
unfold most productively. In this research approach, the lack of bias must be self-
imposed as it is not structurally mandated by the rigour of a step by step procedure as 
is common in many established forms of research, and yet this is a great benefit of 
the case study in that it allows for original data to be captured, such is the immediate 
nature of that which cannot be predicted. 
Planning my research approach began with a consideration of the many influential 
works which had conducted similar explorations into the broader construction of 
crime, particularly those which focused on moving beyond textual content analysis. I 
have discussed in Chapter 3 the most prominent works such as Cohen’s Folk Devils 
and Moral Panics (1972), Hall et al.’s Policing the Crisis  (1978), as well as Ericson, 
Baranek and Chan’s Visualizing Deviance (1987), Negotiating Control (1989) and 
Representing Order (1991), which have prominently contributed to our knowledge 
on this area. As such, it seemed natural to move forward with research based on 
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some of the approaches as espoused within these works. For instance, the 
Handsworth mugging case study of Policing the Crisis (1979) looked at how the law 
and order ideology of the time, a prominent moment of Conservative backlash 
against ‘soft’ law and order, was constructed. The authors focused on the social 
forces at play in that particular moment in order to observe the shape of the whole 
process. Similarly, Folk Devils and Moral Panics (1972) considered the ‘creation of 
the Mods and Rockers’ through a research approach which specifically rejected the 
task of asking why certain groups had become involved in these subcultures (and 
why some hadn’t), but instead “paid attention less attention to the actors than to the 
audience” (Cohen 1972: 27). These works saw something crucial in the reaction to 
the particular crime events in question, something which tapped into broad questions 
of the role of the media and of politics and public reaction in having an instrumental 
effect on criminal activity as well as our understanding of crime. Crucially, both 
works also saw the case study as the method which could provide the fullest possible 
picture of the reaction. Essentially, a reaction will always be sprawling and will 
manifest itself both internally, through intangible Interaction Ritual Chains (2004) 
and publicly, through symbolically charged gestures and performances. The 
possibility of capturing some of these forms of reaction, was therefore at the heart of 
my inquiry. 
In following Yin’s more rigorous case study research design template, five 
components are required, including “a study’s questions, its propositions, its units of 
analysis, the logic linking the data to the propositions and the criteria for interpreting 
the findings” (1994: 20). The study questions have been narrowly defined already as 
an examination of the evolution of the construction of crime in today’s hyper-
technological media sphere, with the aim of reframing accounts within a context of 
the blurring of reception and generation of information. Put in the form of 
methodological convention the central research question with which I am concerned 
is: “How does the political communication of crime take place within today’s 
evolving media sphere and what implications does this have for our understanding of 
crime in society?”  
The propositions or hypotheses at this stage are that the conditions within which 
political communication occurs have evolved dramatically and in a manner which 
	  98 
gives cause to reassess the supposed inevitable dystopias outlined in various recent, 
notable criminological works (Garland 2001, Simon 2006). Furthermore, the 
proposition is that the impact of political narratives on criminal justice outcomes is 
nonetheless so powerful that the political realm requires considerable further and 
detailed attention, and that one way to examine the significance of energetic events 
that preoccupy media and public alike from time to time is by employing an 
interactionist and neo-Durkheimian model such as has been developed by Collins in 
Interaction Ritual Chains (2004). The main subject of these propositions is the 
media-influenced realm of political communication, in which crime narratives are 
developed and delivered. As such, the units of analysis, here the 2010 UK General 
Election, the Phone Hacking Scandal and the English Riots of 2011, were chosen as 
appropriate and timely topics through which to examine the propositions. In 
researching such a contested realm, I felt from the outset that any approach to 
analysis of data here ought to be chosen with an awareness of context in mind. As 
such, I have opted to utilise discourse analysis as the central methodological 
approach and will consider its application further here.  
 
 
3. The Research Process 
 
As I have discussed, one of the key aims of this research was to capture the 
construction of crime in an evolving media landscape. As such, the research strategy 
was specifically designed to enable the observation of a relatively novel and 
expansive field of data. I have discussed the benefits of the case study method in 
allowing the researcher to accommodate fluidity in the piece and in enhancing 
control over the boundaries within which data may be collected, an element which 
was crucial in aiming to capture the particular data required to reflect on the present 
day media construction of crime. In this section I will outline exactly how I gathered 
analysable data, how I worked to infuse rigour into a relatively vast, dynamic field, 
and how this reflexive and evolving process was managed and finely tuned as the 
research progressed. I will begin by describing the planning processes for the three 
case studies in turn, focusing on lessons learned from each moving into the next. 
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3.1 Case Study 1: Planning 
 
3.1.1 The start of the research process 
 
The 2010 UK General Election campaign period began officially on the 6th April 
2010 when Parliament was dissolved. This moment signified a natural starting point 
for my research and previous media speculation surrounding this event had provided 
some sense that the campaign would begin around this date, which allowed time to 
first decide to carry out research in this way and then to conduct initial project 
planning. Due to the particular focus on political communication in this project, I had 
resolved from the outset to capture this kind of crime-related speech and as such a 
general election had always seemed to provide a timely, rich opportunity to gather 
data. Therefore, both the focus and the specified time period for this initial case study 
were relatively well-defined, allowing a good amount of time to put in place a 
conceptual framework, to familiarize myself with the method and to clearly specify 
data collection approaches. 
 
3.1.2 Data-gathering preparations 
 
I began by aiming to appreciate the case study as an applied method and sought 
guidance from established sources on preparing to conduct this form of research. 
Punch (1998) emphasizes that in preparation for this process, the researcher should 
firstly bear in mind that “the general objective is to develop as full an understanding 
of that case as possible” (1998: 150). This approach necessitates a broad gaze, 
beyond the scope of other forms of qualitative research. Indeed, it is stressed that the 
researcher must aim “to understand the case in depth, and in its natural setting, 
recognizing its complexity and its context” (Punch 1998: 150), thus, adopting a 
‘holistic’ approach, in which the researcher aims to view the elements of the case in 
confluence with the case as a whole. Similarly, Goode and Hatt (1952) underlined 
the importance of the case study as a strategy designed to appreciate a breadth of 
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material, noting that “the case study then is not a specific technique; it is a way of 
organizing social data so as to preserve the unitary character of the social object 
being studied” (Goode and Hatt 1952: 331). Preparation, then, must essentially begin 
by putting in place a framework by which we capture a broad, detailed picture of the 
case at hand. 
The first case study undertaken here was of the 2010 UK General Election campaign 
as a whole, with specific priorities to capture any notable crime-related events and 
failing this, to map the ways in which today’s media landscape may process or 
reframe these moments. Previous UK General Elections had involved certain 
political discussion of ‘law and order’, policing and criminal justice, and the ‘crime 
problem’, but it was interesting to explore whether the actors involved in 
constructing the campaigns continued to share criminologists’ fascination with such 
topics or whether these had now been displaced by other concerns such as 
‘immigration’ and management of the economy. These elements provided a focus 
within the broad case study landscape which would facilitate concentrated data 
collection and would complement the already established conceptual aims of the 
project, thus embracing Stake’s (1988) classic definition of the case study as “a study 
of a bounded system, emphasizing the unity and wholeness of that system, but 
confining the attention to those aspects that are relevant to the research problem at 
the time” (Stake 1988: 258). The unpredictability of future events in a chaotic, 
politicized moment meant that I could not guarantee large-scale discussion 
surrounding crime and indeed this was largely the outcome of this election. As a 
result and in concurrence with a desire to conduct a case study which would embrace 
the holistic aims of the method, I resolved initially to adopt a data collection 
approach that could capture the media in its functioning form at this time of intense 
coverage and so put in place a plan to cover a broad range of popular news sources. 
In Yin’s (1994) classic manual on case study research, he directs that in preparation 
for a case study, a key instruction to embrace is that “once in the field, each case 
study fieldworker is an independent investigator and cannot rely on a rigid formula 
to guide his or her behavior” (1994: 59). Certainly this ethos allowed me to adopt an 
initially quite broad approach, embracing the holistic intent of the method and the 
frequently cited directive to modify while in the field. This would form the basis of 
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my initial case study approach, along with an appreciation of established case study 
design and field procedures. 
Research design in case studies forms the basis of “an action plan for getting from 
here to there, where here may be defined as the initial set of questions to be 
answered, and there is some set of conclusions (answers) about these questions” (Yin 
1994: 19). Thus, with established aims deriving from my conceptual work, the 
research design consisted of a ‘blueprint’, as typically employed in case study 
research (Yin 1994: 20). Crucially, while the research eventually evolved to include 
multiple cases, planning at this stage began with a blueprint formed under ‘single-
case design’ (1994: 38), for the simple reason that I had not yet anticipated that 
further case studies would be a certainty in this research. Still, ‘single-case design’ 
approaches were absolutely viable in that these distinct case studies constituted three 
separate instances of the ‘revelatory case’, rather than ‘multiple-case’ research, i.e., 
that each of the cases constituted “a situation previously inaccessible to scientific 
observation… therefore worth conducting because the descriptive information alone 
will be revelatory” (1994: 41), as opposed to multiple cases planned and replicated 
by the researcher, analogous to replication employed in multiple experiments. This 
kind of case study work is regularly employed in clinical psychology, where the case 
demonstrates a rare or unique occurrence (Yin 1970, 1978). 
As such, my single-case research design evolved on the basis of these works. As a 
leading researcher in the area of case studies, Yin’s (2011) more recent work has 
aimed to clarify the distinct difference between case study research design and other 
empirical research. He argues that research design for the case study has long been 
mis-categorized as a ‘subset’ of experimental research design, that which can follow 
a general, predetermined outline and which can draw from similar works (2011: 25). 
Most crucially, single-case research design allows that the blueprint for data 
collection be focused on capturing this revelatory material, that is, data which is 





3.1.3 Forming a malleable research plan; what to prioritise in data 
collection? 
 
One of the most crucial elements of planning this case study, in creating my specific 
‘blueprint’, was to choose particular media sources to follow and to put a systematic 
structure in place by which I might navigate this hyperactive media landscape. Using 
the case study approach, and deploying discourse analysis as an analytical 
framework, allowed me to move beyond text-based media sources and to prioritise a 
range of news media, thus reflecting the diversity of the current field. Marshall and 
Rossman (1989) define the potential sources of evidence in case study research as 
vast and varied; documentation, observations, archival records, films, photographs, 
videotapes, psychological testing, proxemics, kinesics, ‘street’ ethnography, life 
histories, interviews to name a few. Yin stresses that in the case study approach, 
“most of the better case studies rely on a wide variety of sources” (1994: 91). This 
helps to infuse ‘triangulation’ into the project and “allows the investigator to address 
a broader range of historical, attitudinal and behavioral issues” (1994: 90). Perhaps 
most compelling is the potential for multiple sources to triangulate and highlight the 
“development of converging lines of inquiry… following a corroboratory mode” 
(1994: 90). 
As such, I put together a list of media sources on multiple platforms to consider, with 
the intention that these could be referred to in cases of intense interest, rather than 
collected fastidiously and with exact similarity every day. This was a key decision of 
the research process and one which complemented the case study data collection 
directives; that is, as opposed to the content analysis approach often utilised in the 
study of newspaper output, this project would consider the media beyond the 
traditional print press and as such required a more flexible approach to data 
collection. This study would therefore actively move away from the method 
employed in content analysis, of collecting every piece of data every day over a 
limited time period and a limited number of sources. Instead, the particular aims of 
this project would require that as a researcher I was able to capture crime moments, 
their inception, their unfolding and the particular media sources which would play a 
role in shaping them and delivering them to the public. Furthermore, it was crucial 
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that in accordance with previous discussion, that I should be able to follow the 
movement of public debate beyond traditional, established media outlets, so that I 
might observe how crime ideas are further processed and reframed in the public 
realm today. Therefore, I aimed for as much potential triangulation as possible and 
collected data on a deliberately broad range of key media outlets which operated 






• The Guardian 
• The Observer 
• The Times 
• The Telegraph 
• The Financial Times 
• The Independent 
• The Sun 
• The Daily Mail 
• The Daily Mirror 
• The Metro 
• News of the World 
 
Television News and News Programming 
 
• BBC News bulletins  
• ITV News 
• Channel 4 News 
• Channel 5 News 
• BBC News 24 
• Sky News 
• Newsnight 
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• Newsnight Scotland 
• Question Time 
• This Week 




• The Today Programme 
• Jeremy Vine 
 
New Media Outlets and Social Media 
 
• BBC News online 
• The Guardian website 
• YouTube 
• The Huffington Post 




Other Election Materials 
 
• Party Political Broadcasts 
• Manifestoes  




With this large number of extremely active, often overlapping sources, representing 
the now expansive media landscape currently in play during elections, I was required 
to prioritise how exactly I collected data in order to capture a systematic picture of 
activity and to make the project practically workable. I began by implementing a 
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temporal framework into my data collection ‘blueprint’ by which I may follow the 
unfolding of events. This helped provide a number of ‘check-in points’ that would 
keep me in touch with active news moments. 
 
For instance, on a typical day without a particularly notable event (as defined by my 




6.00 – 9.00am and iPlayer: The Today Programme 
Online news: BBC, The Guardian, Twitter  
Rolling 24 hour news: BBC, Sky TV 
 
AFTERNOON 
12.00 Jeremy Vine Radio 2 




6.00 BBC News Bulletin 
7.00 Channel 4 News 
Online news 
 
This provided a good range of easily available news coverage and acted as a basic 
framework around which I might direct my data collection. This approach was self-
designed, but was based on valid case study research practices; of creating an 
approach which would allow for broad capture, but which could be usefully 






3.1.4 How the data was collected 
 
In conducting a case study, the approach to gathering materials involves creating a 
comprehensive database with the key aim of maintaining a chain of evidence (Yin 
1994: 94 – 99). The database will ordinarily be organized around detailed case study 
notes, which are traditionally hand-written. Both Yin and Patton (1980: 303) note 
that case study notes need not be comprehensive, due to the nature of collecting data 
in this manner;  
 
they may be assembled in the form of a diary, on index cards, or in some less 
organized fashion… any classificatory system will do… the identification of the 
notes as part of the case study database does not mean, however, that the investigator 
needs to spend excessive amounts of time in… making extensive editorial changes to 
make the notes presentable… any such editing effort should be directed at the case 
study report itself, not at the notes (Yin 1994: 96) 
 
Indeed, the breadth of data involved in a case study may reasonably result in a large 
number of case study notes. Comparable with an ethnographer’s notes in a field 
notebook or the coding of interview transcripts, the key purpose of these notes is for 
the researcher to note and begin to make sense of the data, as well as to actively 
maintain a chain of evidence while in the field. Indeed, practical techniques of 
coping with large volumes of data are paramount in effectively conducting a sound 
case study with multiple streams of researchable information. 
Therefore, while collecting data, I would organize potential chains of evidence by 
taking notes on the progress of the campaign, any particular crime coverage and any 
noteworthy moments which seemed to reveal the power structures at play in the 
media. On some days nothing of note happened, but unlike a content analysis where 
the data from these days would be documented and analysed, the case study 
approach allowed me to use these days as signifiers for bigger events, in that I could 
follow building stories and prepare to gather detailed data. For instance, I used this 
approach to actively prepare to document in detail high profile events such as the 
three planned Leaders’ Debates and in these instances, was able to collect much 
more detailed data that I would later apply to Foucauldian Discourse Analysis, due to 
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the richly textual and subtextual elements available here. Using this approach I was 
able to follow these events in detail: 
 
[List taken from field notes] 
 
6th April: dissolution of Parliament and campaign begins 
 
8th April: Ashes to Ashes poster 
 
9th April: MP Twitter scandal 
 
12th April: Labour Party manifesto 
 
13th April: Conservative and Lib Dem manifesto 
 
15th April: First Leader’s debate 
 
16th April: Cleggmania 
 
20th April: Daily Politics: Crime Debate 
 
21st April: Nick Clegg’s Fault hashtag 
 
22nd April: 2nd debate 
 
28th April: Gillian Duffy incident 
 
29th April: Third leader’s debate 
 
30th April: Tony Blair joins campaign trail 
 
1st May: The Guardian supports Lib Dems 
 
2nd May: Sunday Telegraph supports Conservatives 
 
5th May: 24 hour campaigning schedule 
 
6th May: Election 
 
7th May: Hung Parliament 
 
8th May: Sack Kay Burley hashtag 
 




On these high profile days, in which moments of intense action were evident, I 
would enhance my schedule as follows: 
 
MORNING 
Purchase of a range of print press newspapers 
Today Programme 
Online news 
24 hour news 
The Daily Politics 
 
AFTERNOON 





6 o’clock and 7 o’clock news 
Newsnight 
Question Time (Thursdays only) 
 
I kept annotated diaries of activity and having achieved a firm grasp of the rhythm of 
these news cycles, I was able to easily mobilize around emerging data. I gathered 
other materials according to Yin’s categories of case study evidence; notes, 
documents, such as print news, flyers and manifestos and tabular materials such as 
surveys and quantitative data released during the election. I also collected pictures of 
posters and even took photos of polling booths on election day, which ultimately 
revealed very little, but were conducted with the aim of reaching as broadly as 
possible to capture through as many data sources as possible, the breadth of activity 
in this election. See below, for instance, a range of print newspapers from Thursday 







3.1.5 Data Collection for Discourse Analysis 
 
Within the case study research, I resolved to focus on high profile moments of 
political speech and consider them through the lens of discourse analysis, in order to 
draw out some detailed analysis of ‘political communication’. I have discussed the 
nature of discourse analysis, the particular mode adopted and its benefits below, but 
generally, when conducting this initial case study, it became clear that certain 
moments of intense public spectacle would provide ample opportunity to consider 
the detail and effects of moments of political communication of crime. In this case 
study I took detailed notes and made transcripts of the Leaders’ Debates and a Daily 
Politics ‘crime debate’. Notes were made in a notepad, transcription was done on 
Microsoft Word. These both provided heated, high profile moments of 
communication of crime issues in the public gaze and produced a rich body of data 
for analysis. I was able to prepare to collect this data because of the highly publicized 
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scheduling of these events and was able to make transcripts through repeated 
viewings of recordings available via the iPlayer and itvplayer, which gave me a 
limited period of 1 month to do so.  
 Data collection for discourse analysis first requires a sense of the purpose of 
this approach, that is, a “view of language [that] looks above its words, sentences and 
linguistic features and focuses attention on the way language is used, what it is used 
for, and the social context in which it is used” (Punch 1998: 226). Therefore, in 
transcribing data for discourse analysis, the researcher must make notes on the words 
used and the contexts of their use in as much detail as possible, in order to facilitate 
the most illuminating and informative analysis feasible. Gee et al. (1992) note that it 
is impossible to conduct pure discourse analysis without adopting a particular 
approach;  
 
Discourse analysis is not a unified body of theory, method and practice. Rather, it is 
conducted within various disciplines, with different research traditions, and with no 
overarching unifying theory common to all types, being heterogeneous. 
(Gee et al. 1992, in Punch 1998: 226) 
 
One key approach to discourse analysis, as developed by Foucault and adopted here, 
identifies three features; 
 
First, discourse is social, which indicates that words and their meanings depend on 
where they are used, by whom and to whom. Consequently their meaning can vary 
according to social and institutional settings and there is, therefore, no such thing as a 
universal discourse.  
Second, there can be different discourses which may be in conflict with one another. 
Third, as well as being in conflict, discourses may be viewed as being arranged in 
hierarchy. 
(Jupp 1996: 305) 
 
I will discuss the adoption of Foucauldian discourse analysis in some detail below, 
however, for the purposes of data collection, it should be noted that such an approach 
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determines that the researcher must take into consideration the ‘social and 
institutional setting’, the power dynamics at play, conflicts, hierarchies. In many 
ways, this analytical framework provided a rich lens through which to observe this 
political landscape, one which was rich in complex, subtextual power dynamics. 
Therefore, the data collection process aimed to capture these element. Transcripts 
were made with detailed notations on who the participants were, their particular 
political status, their relationship with one another and their particular political 
history. Transcripts of debates also included audience responses, visible emotions, 
interjections by the moderator and as far as possible, subtextual elements such as 
body language, stuttering, pausing. 
 
3.1.6 Case Study 1: reflecting on the research process 
 
Following data collection on the 2010 election, I organized my findings for analysis 
and reflected on the process, particularly as I began to consider conducting a further 
case study on a related subject. I certainly emerged with a broad range of data 
providing a layered picture of the election campaign, through a variety of sources. 
My malleable case study ‘blueprint’ had created a routine by which I might be able 
to stay abreast of potentially crucial events in a manageable way. This allowed me to 
gather more detailed data on high profile issues and identify moments to hone in on 
political communication such as the Leaders’ debates and crime debates. I was able, 
through this process, to create a body of data which could provide case study 
findings as well as more detailed discourse analysis, which ultimately fulfilled my 
conceptual aims, to better appreciate the evolving political landscape within which 
crime communication takes place.   
 Moving into another case study, I resolved to retain this approach with some 
modifications. From carrying out this first case study, I had identified news sources 
which were the most useful in highlighting emerging news moments and was able to 
elevate those in my next ‘blueprint’ and move away from such a rigidly complete 
picture, particularly in the act of following the emergence of news stories. An 
appreciation of methodological texts in the area was certainly enhanced by my 
experience with this first case study, ultimately reinforcing the idea that this 
	  112 
approach to research must not be viewed in the same way as content analysis, indeed 
it is stymied when an overly rigorous approach is taken. The key points of focus in a 
case study should be facilitating a coverage of important events, allowing them to 
naturally rise to prominence in the news cycle and observing this at a fast-pace. I 
appreciated in the aftermath of the election that an important part of case study 
research is the assessment and where necessary the rejection of data. As such, 
moving into the next case study I aimed to streamline this approach, with greater 
efficiency in mind.  
 
3.2 Case Study 2: Planning 
 
3.2.1 The start of the research process 
 
On the 4th July 2011, the Guardian newspaper published details of the hacking of 
murdered schoolgirl Milly Dowler’s phone (O’Carroll, 24 June 2014 ‘Phone-hacking 
scandal: timeline’, The Guardian), an event which prompted enormous public 
outrage and widespread media coverage. In the week that followed, a number of high 
profile events, including the closing of News of the World and the announcement of 
a public inquiry by the Culture, Media & Sport Select Committee seemed to suggest 
that this period would signify an important moment in the evolution of the modern 
media landscape. Almost as soon as these events erupted, it seemed clear that the 
joint investigation by the Guardian and the New York Times and the public 
excavation of fact to follow, would unearth unprecedented data on the relationship 
between Britain’s high ranking politicians, the police and powerful members of the 
UK media. From the outset, these events seemed to present an opportunity to gather 
a wide variety of data, as in my previous case study, and to tell us something unique 
about the way that crime narratives are regularly constructed. The time difference 
between the end of the election and the beginning of these events, May 2010 to July 
2011, was over a year and as such, I had enough time to organize my findings, 
conduct rigorous data analysis and to reflect on the opportunities afforded by this 
approach. One of the significant benefits of having conducted a case study already 
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was that I was well prepared to begin gathering data in the phone hacking scandal as 
soon as I identified its potential. 
 
3.2.2 Data-gathering preparations 
 
In beginning to gather data on these quickly unfolding events, I put in place a data 
collection blueprint very similar to that which had been employed in the 2010 
election, this time honing the structure so as to prioritise an ability to quickly follow 
unfolding stories. I took notes on unfolding events as before and followed a now-
streamlined daily news blueprint: 
 
MORNING 
6.00 – 9.00am and iPlayer: The Today Programme 
Online news: BBC, The Guardian, Twitter  
 
AFTERNOON 




6.00 BBC News Bulletin 
7.00 Channel 4 News 
Online news 
 
Case Study-appropriate data was widely released from a number of sources 
throughout these events, including the New York Times and Guardian special 
investigation into phone hacking, a coordinated release of documents on access of 
the press to politicians from the government in a bid to regain a sense of trust and 
transparency and finally, the public hearings conducted a part of the Culture, Media 
& Sport Committee, which were televised live, were covered widely in the press and 
were released as transcripts through the government website.  
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3.2.3 Data Collection for Discourse Analysis 
 
The main focus for discourse analysis in this case study was the transcripts on the 
Culture, Media & Sport Select Committee hearings which took place in central 
London, with Rupert and James Murdoch, as well as the separate hearing hosted later 
that day with Rebekah Brooks. Having honed my approach from conducting 
discourse analysis on the 2010 Leaders’ Debates, I followed these events using as 
efficient an approach as possible. I watched each of the hearings live, taking notes on 
first viewing of instances of interest, points which fed directly into my conceptual 
discussion on the construction of crime and anything which more generally 
referenced the inner workings of the media world. While watching the events unfold 
live on BBC News 24, I followed the discussion of social media, staying aware of 
prominent commentators and hashtags. In the following days, after organizing my 
notes, I was able to go back through the data, by way of YouTube videos which had 
captured the entirety of the events for posterity, along with a transcript of each 
committee as provided by the government website. The notes I had taken on first 
instance allowed me to feel confident about the veracity of this second-hand 
transcription. As such, this provided a useful tool, by which I was able to go through 
the words spoken, the body language demonstrated, the nonverbal power relations on 
display and adequately apply this data to discourse analysis. 
 
3.2.4 Case Study 2: reflecting on the research process 
 
Conducting this case study and gathering further data for discourse analysis was 
certainly made much easier by being able to adopt an already-tested framework and 
having reflected on good practice. I was able to streamline my process for gathering 
data, was able to quickly mobilise around unfolding events. Possibly the biggest 
difference in this case study was that, having conducted data analysis of the 2010 
election, I felt confident in gathering fewer tangible materials and instead prioritizing 
as clear a picture as possible of the news process. Indeed, all of the data in this 
particular case study emerged from news presented online or through television, 
while reflecting on the demise of the print press, the print press outlets themselves 
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presented quite biased offerings from newspapers owned by NewsCorp in particular. 
I found that while the 2010 process of gathering physical election materials and print 
editions of newspapers was certainly in the spirit of the case study approach, to cast a 
broad net, that ultimately, data which had provided more material on the news 
process was more beneficial in analysis. As such, when I gathered data under a time 
pressure in this case study, I largely utilised the wealth of materials available to me 
online. Without election materials, this limited the kind of physical data I could 
collect. Still, having conducted analysis already, I felt confident that the range of 
materials I sought to gather during the phone hacking scandal had provided me with 
a similar level of rigour and a broad picture of the events captured within the case 
study period. 
 
3.3 Case Study 3: Planning 
 
3.3.1 The start of the research process 
 
Only a month after the phone hacking scandal, on 4th August 2011, the shooting of 
Mark Duggan by a police officer sparked a week of civil unrest. I have covered the 
chronology of these events in a great deal of detail in the chapter to follow, however, 
at this stage, it should be noted that this was the point at which I began gathering 
data. The beginning of widespread rioting across London and certain cities in 
England provoked an immediate sense that something noteworthy in the construction 
of crime was occurring and that this was an event which could easily form a third 
case study. Indeed, the subsequent media coverage seemed to frame these events as a 
classic-type moral panic and was accompanied with several high profile political 
statements on crime, which I recognized, following my previous case studies, as 
moments which could form an important, complementary part of my data. This was 
certainly a series of events which began and escalated quickly, but having previously 
conducted two case studies, having recently honed the case study blueprint I had 
created to capture the evolution of news events, I felt capable of quickly mobilizing 
around data collection again. In many ways this was a notable strength of the case 
study approach. This is a method which does not require lengthy, formal planning 
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processes and the priority of the researcher is to follow unfolding news stories, to put 
together an accurate, nuanced, detailed account of events from within the case study 
period. This meant that in the case of the phone hacking scandal and the riots, I was 
fortunate to be able to research revelatory, unique events which could not have been 
otherwise captured. 
 
3.3.2 Data-gathering preparations 
 
This data collection period followed the same framework as the phone hacking 
scandal, now mobilized in pursuit of covering unfolding crime events and political 
reaction, rather than media-driven news revelations occurring on a more controlled 
news cycle to an extent. This meant that the unfolding of events was slightly more 
unpredictable, but with a firm, effective blueprint in place, I was able to capture the 
detail required. I continued to make case study notes, following the events through 
the news media framework I had honed in the previous case study:  
 
MORNING 
6.00 – 9.00am and iPlayer: The Today Programme 
Online news: BBC, The Guardian, Twitter  
 
AFTERNOON 




6.00 BBC News Bulletin 
7.00 Channel 4 News 
 
Discussions of the riots were particularly notable on late night platforms such as 
Newsnight, with historian David Starkey’s comments on the edition of Friday 12th 
August 2011 providing a particular focal point for discussion, his notorious assertion 
that ‘the whites have become black’ seemed to capture headlines and drive the 
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debate towards generational and race issues. Another notable news source in these 
events was the Guardian newspaper, in which Justice Secretary Kenneth Clarke 
utilised the ‘Comment is Free’ section to make bold statements about ‘feral rioters’ 
(Clarke 5th Sept 2011 ‘Punish the feral rioters, but address our social deficit too’ The 
Guardian). 
 As such, the framework I had established allowed me to home in on crucial 
news sources which could not have been anticipated in a more formal print only 
content analysis. I was able to utilise the flexibility of the method to pick up the case 
study immediately, to note down moments of importance regarding the construction 
of crime and the shifting media landscape. Finally, as in the previous examples, I 
was able to direct focus towards the outlets which were part of the unravelling of the 
crime narratives.  
 
3.3.3 Note: Social Media 
 
Given the focus on an evolving media landscape in this research, forms of social 
media were indeed included in the collection of data where possible. These were 
limited to information relayed on Facebook, Twitter and comments sections of online 
news outlets and did not extend to lesser used forums such as Instagram or Tumblr. 
This distinction was made in the same manner which had dictated the inclusion of 
particular print news outlets; if the social media outlet played a material role in the 
evolution of the crime issue then it was included as a part of the research. It would 
have been counter-intuitive to define at the outset that I would focus on certain social 
media outlets above others and stick overly rigidly to these depending on usage or a 
quantifiable measure of reach. As I had noted throughout my previous case studies, 
the employment of certain forms of social media had varied and had become an 
essential part of the crime narrative according to the kind of messaging that would 
take place in each; with Twitter’s format encouraging the instant relaying of 
information as it happened and connecting with large audiences and Facebook 
allowing longer form discussions to closed peer-to-peer groups. Beyond these 
formats, where other crucial forms of social media played an active part in the 
construction of crime, such as BlackBerry Messenger (BBM) messages, these were 
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included where possible. The use of BBM was integral to the study of the riots and if 
it had been excluded at the outset this would have provided a significant limitation to 
the study. As we will see in the Riots chapter, the BBM function of sending mass 
messages to large, but defined groups had facilitated fast-moving gatherings around 
parts of London. Its focussed use in certain demographics enabled these messages to 
spread widely among young men in the area and became an integral part of the 
‘communication of crime’ in this study. 
Regarding collection of data, in the period in which this research took place, up to 
August 2011, very few resources for the widespread gathering or collating of social 
media messages were available or had even been conceived of. Indeed, as I have 
noted in the chapter on the Riots, these events actually prompted moves towards 
aiming to develop an applicable method which could take on such a project. With the 
scope of this project already broad by necessity, it was impossible for me to also 
develop a new method in this time, by which I might single-handedly and rigorously 
capture a totality of public expression around given crime moments. Indeed, as the 
large team involved in ‘Reading the Riots’ found, this required a significant amount 
of innovation by a large team of quantitative researchers. I proceeded, then, by 
capturing social media data as I had done with all of the data in my case study 
research, by noting which elements were crucial in the development of crime 



















Largely, however, social media output was thoroughly integrated into news coverage 
of items, which allowed me to gain a broad sense of the field beyond these popular 
political Twitter accounts. This demonstrated what an integral part of the coverage of 
the riots social media had played. While I did not take on the quite different project 
of capturing social media output in its entirety, I did, by necessity and following the 
tenets of successful case study research, integrate social media output into my data 
collection in the same way as I had done with newspaper output. 
 
On reflection, I believe that this approach not only complemented the established 
method I had embarked upon in this project, but that a case study analysis of social 
media can provide a perspective which is inherently useful. As we have seen since 
the riots, there have been several attempts to harness messages on social media 
forums such as Twitter, in order to quantify a picture of public expression. Certainly, 
this complex process may well provide a picture of the entirety of public output 
around an issue, but in many ways fails to capture the distinctive role of social media 
in public and political discourse. Taking Twitter as an example, to quantify the 
number of occasions in which a hashtag is employed or in which a single person 
comments on an issue tells us very little about impact, because frequency of 
commenting is less important on Twitter than who sees these comments, how far 
they are followed, viewed, retweeted and quoted in established news outlets. 
Similarly, in reporting the number of instances of mentions on Facebook, ignores the 





3.3.4 Data Collection for Discourse Analysis 
 
Parker (1999) suggests that Foucauldian Discourse Analysis can be carried out 
“wherever there is meaning” (1999: 1), while Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) argue 
more specifically that the key factors determining choice of material in data 
collection for this kind of discourse analysis are: 
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The research question, the researcher’s knowledge as to the relevant material within 
the social domain or institution of interest, and whether, and how, one can gain 
access to it (2002: 78) 
 
Parker’s intent was to communicate that this form does not necessarily require that 
we analyse words, that we should consider “all tissues of meaning as texts” (Parker 
1992: 7). Willig’s key text on Foucauldian Discourse Analysis states simply that “the 
selection of suitable texts for analysis is informed by the research question” (Willig 
2008: 114) Still, for the purposes of data collection, the guiding factor should be to 
home in on something which is both infused with some textual or subtextual 
discourse and which is tangibly analysable.  
 
The following is a list of data that was collected and analysed in the case of the riots: 
 
• Theresa May speech ‘London Rioters will be brought to justice’, 8th August 
2011 
• David Cameron speech, ‘Criminality Pure and Simple’, 9th August 2011 
• Boris Johnson speech, Clapham Junction, 9th August 2011 
• Ed Miliband statement, House of Commons, 11th August 2011 and statement 
12th August 2011 
• David Cameron statement, House of Commons, 11th August 2011 
• Ken Clarke, ‘Punish the feral rioters’, The Guardian, 5th September 2011). 
 
In this case study and in all previous case studies, these materials were turned into 
analysable data in that I acquired a full transcript of each specific speech or debate 
and ensured that I had witnessed the event myself as they unfolded or in full online 
or through a TV source. As mentioned earlier, with a rigorous and fast-moving 
media source framework in place, I was often able to witness crucial events in real 
time and take notes on the moments as they unfolded. As such for each part of 
discourse analysis I had both a full transcript and personal notes. To turn these into 
analysable data required both a full account of the words spoken and the notes I had 
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taken. I will provide an example of Foucaldian Discourse Analysis in action in 
section 5. However, it should be noted that the preparation process included 
capturing the event in full using a transcript and notes, which made the data 
analysable. Discourse Analysis requires both an account of the words spoken and the 
subtext, which can, as I will detail, be considered somewhat subjective. However, for 




3.4 The Evolution of a Methodological Strategy 
 
As I have described, the methodological strategy employed here was one which was 
grounded in quite standard approaches to case study research and discourse analysis 
and which naturally evolved over the course of the research. As mentioned, the case 
study on the 2010 UK General Election served as the starting point, allowing me to 
plan a methodological approach, to familiarise myself with data collection for case 
study research and discourse analysis. The strategy at the outset had been to embrace 
the breadth and flexibility of the case study method and as we will see, this produced 
data which gave not only a sense of the events, but allowed me to hone in on crucial 
moments of crime communication. The key developments in the methodological 
strategy centred around honing the approach to allow for greater depth of analysis in 
crucial moments. My previous discussions of the case study method have highlighted 
the importance that established works in this area place on the researcher as 
malleable and as constantly reviewing the frameworks in place to enable greater 
efficiency. As such, I have detailed the ways in which I began to focus on particular 
media outlets as the research progressed. I also embraced the upsurge in social media 
as a source and aimed to include key examples wherever possible, again taking 
advantage of the case study method to focus on important emerging data rather than 
previously rigidly defined sources. As I have described, there was at all times a 
methodological strategy in place which did adhere to an established framework, one 




3.5 The Choice of Case Studies 
 
The 2010 election case study was a vital first step in this project. From a practical 
perspective, it was the only case study that I could plan in advance and so it acted as 
a pilot, allowing me to set out a framework for capturing crime events in a rapidly 
evolving, vast media landscape. It allowed me to hone in on the key aims to actively 
pursue in conducting this research; of focusing on crime and its communication, as 
well as aiming to observe the media landscape at its extremes. These were dual, 
contingent aims which would allow me to draw broader conclusions about the 
potential future of the construction of crime narratives and to reflect on the structures 
within which this activity regularly occurs. It also gave me the chance to run the 
research, reflect on data collection approaches, to consider the parameters of the case 
study method and to ensure that I gathered analysable data for discourse analysis 
within the unfolding events. This case study provided focus, confirmed my aims and 
prepared me practically to be able to capture further data should the occasion occur 
within a researchable time frame. 
 
Conceptually, the 2010 election fit with my established challenges to the penal 
populism and Neoliberal politics discussions in criminological literature. Having 
challenged tendencies in this work towards dystopianism, I was given the 
opportunity here to actively consider whether the certainty of the ‘law and order 
merry go round’ was assured or whether, as I had suggested, the evolving media 
landscape might allow a more democratic voice to challenge this inevitability. The 
focus therefore was ‘crime’, or law and order politics, as covered in the election, but 
also the conditions of crime construction. As such electoral politics provided a 
natural moment of interest, a rich field within which I might map this realm and 
capture functioning media structures beyond explicit references to crime. Indeed, as 
the election campaign evolved and it became clear that crime would not feature as a 
prominent theme, the consideration of broader forces became even more crucial. 
This solidified for me the sense that in researching further events I should not limit 
my gaze to ‘crime’ only, but should wholeheartedly map the environment within 
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which crime construction occurs, with the hope that this might explain omissions or 
provide detail behind the shift away from the inevitability of established populist 
trends.  
 
Following from this case study, I felt certain moving forward that to map the media 
landscape in detail would constitute an important part of my research and would 
benefit my conceptual discussion more than a stubbornly narrow focus on ‘crimes’, 
the commission of criminal acts only. This approach reflected my initial desire to 
move beyond immoveable, predetermined research, believing that honing in on 
events occurring within a narrow definition of ‘crime’ would provide the wrong 
focus; on events rather than processes. As such, when the phone hacking scandal 
occurred, I quickly realised that this period seemed to provide an unparalleled 
unveiling of the power structures and inner workings at the heart of UK media. It 
seemed clear to me that this public inquiry along with the committees and news 
coverage surrounding these events would provide data which would gradually reveal 
unique information about the realm within which crime is constructed. I began to see 
data emerge around the links between powerful media elites and high ranking 
criminal justice policy decision-makers. This case study presented parallels with the 
2010 UK General Election in that not only did it cover rich ‘crime’ issues in the 
political realm, touching on classic criminological themes like Christie’s ‘Ideal 
Victim’ (1986), but that it seemed also to reveal something unique about the realm 
within which crime is constructed. The phone hacking scandal was certainly a 
scandal about a crime, but essentially the richest data was derived from the 
information concerning the media. This case study provided unique, vivid, detailed 
new data on the particular power structures at play in the upper echelons of media 
power in the UK. My desire to capture this data was legitimized by a rich body of 
evidence and original findings on the particular power of elements of the UK press, 
their unfettered access to Justice Ministers and 10 Downing Street, their perceived 
desire to wield this power in the construction of a victim-oriented, populist crime 
narrative and their ability to directly influence criminal justice policy. This case 
study was essential in mapping influence in crucial criminal justice policy 
	  124 
movements and complemented my conceptual aim of providing additional detail to 
the ‘second-order consensus’ on crime in politics. 
 
The three case studies in this research project evolved naturally, but in many ways 
they span a fortunate breadth of fieldwork. In focusing on an election, a scandal and 
as I will discuss, a moral panic, I have aimed to capture events which demonstrate 
not only the construction of crime in action, but indeed the very element of action. In 
keeping with the methodological approach of Policing the Crisis (1979) I have aimed 
to observe society’s structures at its extremes, an approach which facilitates the 
ability to see potential, to observe a web of influence flexing its muscles and working 
at maximum capacity. This allows us to infer a great deal, to map out the whole 
realm and to visualize future potential.  
 
The rich data provided by the phone hacking scandal and the election had suggested 
that this approach was one which was viable and fruitful and having conducted two 
full case studies, with detailed discourse analysis on key political speeches within, I 
felt capable and eager to begin collecting data on the Riots of August 2011 almost as 
soon as they began. This sprawling series of events took place in quick succession, 
consisting of bursts of rioting, panicked media coverage and iconic political 
speeches. The practice of conducting data collection in this way had been firmly 
established so I was able to move as quickly as the events unfolded and to prioritize 
coverage effectively. When the riots began I had a sense from my data analysis of 
previous case studies that again, my key conceptual aims would be served here; to 
observe the construction of ‘crime’ and to map the landscape within which this 
occurs. The riots indeed provided essential data demonstrating a form of moral panic 
in full force in the now updated, hyperactive media landscape.  
 
The three case studies complemented each other in a number of ways. We saw crime 
constructed in the fertile political realm of an election, constructed with purpose, we 
saw crime as a vehicle for scandal, as a revelatory tool and we saw a classic crime 
outburst, misunderstood, translated, reclaimed, reconstructed, we saw it travel 
through every corner of the now sprawling media landscape. Furthermore, with these 
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three case studies we saw that landscape functioning in its fullest forms, in the now 
hyperactive 24 hour political news cycle, erupting from the inside from a scandal that 
exposed its guts and grappling with crime in a familiar but intensely modernized 
process. Through these three case studies we saw crime as it exists today, both as a 
criminal act and as an entirely separate construct. Crucially, in moving forward with 
analysis, a focus not just on crime but on media structures meant that we saw how 
this construction happened. I carefully chose to observe here an election, a scandal 
and a moral panic and found them essential and complementary.  
 
 
3.6 A Fourth Case Study 
 
A fourth case study was undertaken as part of this research, covering the period of 
the Scottish Parliamentary election campaign of April and May 2011. Given the 
relative advantage of both elections occurring during the research period, I had 
initially felt that to capture each using case study research would provide an 
opportunity to provide depth and to compare these periods. Also, having no prior 
indication that the research period would include such unique and momentous 
incidents like the Phone Hacking Scandal and the Riots, I felt that the best possible 
approach that I could plan would be to conduct detailed case study analysis of both 
of these elections. As such, I gathered data in a very similar manner to the UK 
General Election, focusing on a similar pattern of media sources and using the same 
approach of notation, following media and crime events. As I began to gather data on 
the Scottish Parliamentary election, I became aware that the Scottish media 
landscape at that time was far less developed and instantaneous than that of the 
London-based media driving the UK General Election coverage.  
In April/ May 2011 there was a much smaller base of media outlets who were 
specifically interested in this election; the 24 hour news channels did not cover the 
election in constant detail as they had done in the UK election, the social media 
landscape was not so prominently known for political commentary, or indeed wasn’t 
active in the Scottish context. While I did investigate the social media presence at 
that time, in 2011 largely this was being utilised for official statements by parties or 
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by interest groups and failed to really encourage a dialogue with the public in the 
way that, for instance, we have seen in the Independence Referendum of 2014. The 
Scottish newspapers, including; The Herald, The Scotsman, The Daily Record, The 
Evening Times, The Edinburgh Evening News, The Press & Journal, The Scottish 
Sun, The Scottish Daily Mail, provided some commentary on the election, yet in 
truth, the failure of Iain Gray’s Labour party to gather around a captivating electoral 
campaign meant little press coverage. Crucially there was very little discussion of 
law and order issues in this campaign, most of the focus around Justice Secretary 
Kenny MacAskill had centred on his decision to release Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, 
known as ‘the Lockerbie bomber’ and so there was little challenge on issues such as 
the reduction of prison sentences in favour of the ‘community payback’ policy. In the 
last week of the campaign, the Labour party circulated a petition against knife 
violence, which seemed to represent a last minute effort to employ populist justice 
issues as a vote winner, however, with the relative lack of fanfare and time to build 
this narrative, this went largely unnoticed. The SNP landslide victory of the 2011 
Scottish Parliamentary election seemed to represent a failure on the part of 
opposition parties to really engage in a captivating electoral campaign and this was 
reflected in the research. Indeed, early analysis of this data suggested that with an 
underdeveloped media landscape and a largely uneventful campaign there wasn’t 
essentially enough to observe so that I may reasonably draw comparisons. When 
compared with the rich data gathered on the three other occasions, I felt that this case 
study was insufficient. Essentially the research here, when comparing the UK and 
Scotland, would have to reflect on differences in jurisdictions, yet there was not 
enough data to allow me to fully undertake this analysis. This research would 
certainly be more fruitfully conducted in the post-referendum period. 
 
 
4. Discourse Analysis and Documentary Evidence 
  
Discourse analysis, at its most distilled, is “an approach to the analysis of language 
that looks at patterns of language across texts as well as the social and cultural 
contexts in which the texts occur” (Paltridge 2006: 1). In its essence and origin a 
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practice of sociolinguistics, discourse analysis espouses a textually-oriented 
approach which concentrates on minute linguistic formation. However, this ethos of 
facilitating a consideration of language beyond the text has led to the development of 
“more socially-oriented views of discourse analysis which consider what the text is 
doing in the social and cultural setting in which it occurs” (Paltridge 2006: 1). This 
approach has been wholeheartedly adopted within social psychology, where it has 
been practiced and nurtured and enjoys widespread applicability. It is also now 
commonly used across the social sciences, in order to study language use in detail 
and draw attention to meaning, power, and the constitution of categories, 
terminology and power relationships. 
The development of discourse analysis as a linguistic approach was prompted by 
Zellig Harris’s assertion that “connected discourse occurs within a particular 
situation” (Harris 1952: 3). Harris emphasized the importance of examining language 
beyond the sentence, as well as the interaction between linguistic and non-linguistic 
behaviour. He argued that there are typical uses of language in situations, which not 
only share meaning, but have “characteristic linguistic features associated with 
them” (Paltridge 2006: 2). As a result, the central concern of discourse analysis as a 
textually-oriented approach is what exactly these meanings are and how they are 
realized in language (Paltridge 2006: 3).   
 Potter and Wetherell (1987) describe the key approaches to unearthing such 
meaning and the major components of discourse analysis as ‘Function, Construction 
and Variation’ (Potter and Wetherell 1987: 198). Employing a focus on ‘function’ is 
said to involve the analyst actively reading the context rather than conducting a 
simple categorization of speech. Drew (1986) suggests that understanding ‘function’ 
in this way is crucial, particularly in the case of requests, where people tend to 
anticipate undesirable acts like rejection before they happen. For example, as Brown 
and Levinson (1978) note, when someone makes a request they are often rather 
indirect, couching the request as an abstract question. Intuitively, we know from 
experience and consideration of the context that the true function of this sentence is 
to request something, but it is to the speaker’s advantage to choose this indirect 
approach, as this will lessen the impact of the rejection. ‘Functions’ in discourse 
analysis are, according to Potter and Wetherell (1987: 199), rarely limited to doing 
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things such as ordering, requesting, persuading and accusing, but can also be more 
‘global’, in that they may be used to present the speaker in a favourable light and as 
we might expect, “global self-presentations can be achieved with particular kinds of 
formulations which emphasize either good or bad features” (Potter and Wetherell 
1987:199). Somewhat similarly, ‘variation’ in discourse analysis refers to a case by 
case varying of the person’s function, depending on the feelings of the speaker to the 
recipient. An awareness of at least the potential for this kind of variation adds an 
interesting point of analysis when considering language and indeed, when studying 
the broader meaning of political speeches; that we must acknowledge the audience 
and be aware of the potential malleability of the words spoken or written in 
alternative contexts, particularly when the person is giving opinion or a fact which 
may be flexibly presented.  
Observing ‘construction’ in language is an important tenet of discourse analysis, and 
perhaps the element which lends itself best to the broad socially-minded approach 
which is favoured by social psychology and which fits with the research approach I 
intended to utilise in my case studies. The focus on ‘construction’ reminds the 
discourse analyst that ‘functions’ are built from pre-existing resources, that active 
selection takes place and that accounts are potent and consequential (Potter and 
Wetherell 1987: 199). Indeed, the inclusion of ‘construction’ in the building-blocks 
of discourse analysis most significantly moves the practice away from minute 
linguistic detail towards a broader consideration of society and add an element of 
practical utility for a case study approach which requires analysis of the construction 
of words. The practicalities of observing ‘construction’ are far less easily describable 
or instructive than in the case of ‘function’ and ‘variation’, however, Potter and 
Wetherell (1987) suggest: 
 
It may be that the person providing the account is not consciously constructing, but a 
construction emerges as they merely try to make sense of a phenomenon or engage in 
unselfconscious social activities like blaming or justifying… the person may be just 
‘doing what comes naturally’ rather than intentionally deciding this rather than that 
form of language will be appropriate… [However] all language, even language 
which passes as simple description, is constructive and consequential for the 
discourse analyst (Potter and Wetherell 1987: 200). 
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The element of ‘construction’ seems more of a suggested lens of analysis, rather than 
a technique for interpretation, which feels relatively intangible in the sociolinguistic 
context, but is actually the crucial element which differentiates discourse analysis 
from content or conversation analysis and which also renders this approach 
extremely useful within my research. 
Due to its broad scope, discourse analysis can be applied to “all forms of spoken 
interaction, formal and informal, and written texts of all kinds” (Potter and Wetherell 
1987: 201). As such, it provides a broader applicability than content analysis and 
conversation analysis, in that they only apply to the written and spoken word 
respectively, with neither reaching beyond these boundaries. Indeed, the fact that 
discourse analysis emphasizes the structure, variability and function of the language 
used, allows the focus to remain with meaning, rather than format. In assessing social 
psychology’s tendency to utilise discourse analysis over conversation analysis, 
Wooffitt (2005) cites the unique approach of analyzing the interpersonal and social 
functions of ‘linguistic repertoires’ and the ability to use a broader range of data such 
as interviews and media, emphasizing again the scope available. Once again, this 
appears to merge with my research aims, of analyzing a range of data in order to 
understand the broader political narrative landscape.  
 Discourse analysis-informed research began prominently in 1984 with Gilbert 
and Mulkay’s case study of two rival groups of biochemists, entitled ‘Opening 
Pandora’s Box’. Gilbert and Mulkay were particularly interested in the construction 
of scientific knowledge in controversial situations and so collected accounts of the 
biochemists’ practices by reviewing both technical reports and interview statements. 
Along with this discourse analysis-based approach, Gilbert and Mulkay introduced 
the method of identifying ‘interpretive repertoires’ in which the researchers would 
search for and highlight “different ways attitudes were constructed and the functions 
served” (Potter and Wetherell 1987: 201). For example, Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) 
noticed not only an empiricist repertoire, which consisted of an impersonal, data-
driven account but also a contingent repertoire, which made reference to dramatic 
revelations, personal motives, and was used in informal settings. Crucially, the 
empiricist repertoire was used by both groups of biochemists in emphasizing truth, 
whereas the contingent repertoire was consistently employed in accounting for error. 
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This development beyond the ‘function, construction and variation’ signifiers in 
discourse analysis, constructed an approach by which assumptions and conclusions 
could more readily be drawn, hence, opening a ‘Pandora’s Box’ of discourse-focused 
research. Building on this prominent development, two major versions of discourse 
analysis as a practice have emerged within social psychology which identify 
specifically with different intellectual traditions (Willig 2001: 95).  I will discuss 
these briefly here and consider how I will opt to utilise discourse analysis in this 
project.  
 
‘Discursive psychology’ is inspired by ethnomethodology and specifically “studies 
what people do with language and emphasizes the performative qualities of 
discourse” (Willig 2001: 95). Discursive psychology as a body of research is 
primarily concerned with the study of memory and identity, with a focus on 
understanding these through “naturally occurring talk and text, and the functions and 
consequences of such references” (Willig 2001: 96). This approach aims to develop 
discourse analysis beyond a methodology, into a substantial body of work which 
advances the study of memory and identity by taking seriously the 
“conceptualization of language as constructive and functional” (Willig 2001: 98). 
However, its strength as a working methodology should not be overlooked, I would 
suggest that the development here of the initial sociolinguistic principles of discourse 
analysis into this established school of thought has also provided us with a more 
advanced and easily reproducible blueprint for social scientific research within this 
intellectual tradition.  
While sociolinguistic discourse analysis understands construction of sentences from 
a particular perspective, the translation of these principles into ‘discursive 
psychology’ provides us with a much more robust methodological approach. For 
example, Willig’s ‘Introducing Qualitative Research in Psychology’ (2001) outlines 
practical and instructive  ‘Procedural guidelines for the analysis of discourse’ (Willig 
2001: 99). We are informed that before analysis we must read the text once as a 
neutral reader in order to “experience as a reader some of the discursive effects of the 
text” (Willig 2001: 99). Coding instructions are given, that “it is important to make 
sure that all material that is potentially relevant is included. This means that even 
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instances that are indirectly or only vaguely related to the research question should 
be identified” (Willig 2001: 100). In Discursive Psychology, analysis draws heavily 
on Gilbert and Mulkay’s (1984) ‘interpretive repertoires’, suggesting that the 
researcher should pay close attention to how versions of events are constructed in 
alternative, often contradictory ways. Practical research advice is given, that the 
researcher must observe the interviewer and the interviewee’s contributions (if the 
research is conducted by interview) and ensure that “analytic focus is upon 
variability across contexts and the action orientation of talk” (Willig 2001: 101). 
Discursive psychology is, in essence, discourse analysis as influenced by 
ethnomethodology, in action.  
 If discursive psychology could be viewed as discourse analysis in action, its 
alternative incarnation develops the more critical and structural elements at play to 
enhance our theoretical understanding of power in discourse. ‘Foucauldian discourse 
analysis’ draws on the work of Michel Foucault and subsequent post-structuralism , 
to explore how “discourses facilitate and limit, enable and constrain what can be 
said, by whom, where and when” (Parker 1992: 112). Willig (2001) defines the 
difference between the two approaches as: 
 
while discursive psychology is primarily concerned with how people use discursive 
resources in order to achieve interpersonal objectives in social interaction, 
Foucauldian discourse analysis focuses on what kind of objects and subjects are 
constructed through discourses (Willig 2001: 96). 
 
Indeed, the focus of this Foucauldian approach is the role of discourse in social life 
and accordingly, a crucial tenet of such research is that “discourses offer subject 
positions, which, when taken up, have implications for subjectivity and experience” 
(Willig 2001: 113). In terms of personal discourses, this approach attempts to 
understand how these ‘subject positions’ influence our views of society and 
psychology, while more broadly, the Foucauldian version of discourse analysis “is 
also concerned with the role of discourse in wider social processes of legitimation 
and power… [and] pays attention to the relationship between discourses and 
institutions” (Willig 2001: 113).  
 Notably, Parker (1992: 1) states that Foucauldian discourse analysis can be 
carried out “wherever there is meaning”, thus broadening the field of analysis 
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beyond words, to any symbolic systems, and suggesting that we “consider all tissues 
of meaning as texts” (Parker 1992: 7). This research will utilise this Foucauldian 
ethos, of focusing analysis beyond words. While the discursive psychology approach 
is instructive in its advice to the researcher, ultimately discourse analysis has been 
employed here with the explicit aim of viewing the case study data from a 
supralinguistic perspective, beyond language and in appreciation of power structures. 
This will include consideration of the setting, of body language, of the power 
context. It is argued that an awareness of these schools of research in discourse 
analysis is useful in appreciating the aim of my analytical approach, by which I mean 
that the focus here is the intangible structures of crime communication and this 
Foucauldian perspective helps us to take seriously their impact in the data. Hopefully 
this will enhance my ability to derive cogent, meaningful findings from what will be 
sprawling data collection opportunities.  
 
 
5. Foucauldian Discourse Analysis  
 
In understanding the practical application of Foucauldian Discourse Analysis, we 
must first appreciate what makes this Foucault-influenced version separate from, for 
instance, Fairclough’s more commonly employed critical approach. Jorgensen and 
Phillips (2002) provide a sense of the subtle differences in the field, illustrating them 
as firstly relating to their conception of the meaning of discourse: 
 
(Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 20) 
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In this spectrum, the Foucauldian perspective of discourse is neither purely 
constituted by society, nor does it constitute society, but exists as a dialectical 
resolution between both. Foucault was concerned with the idea of discourse, widely 
popularising discourse analysis with his view that “discourses comprise bodies of 
knowledge which systematically create and reproduce particular social institutions” 
(Holloway 1997: 48). As Seale (1998: 246) notes, Foucault was concerned with the 
way that this subtle form of social control can, when delivered through discourse, 
integrate subtly into our lives. As Parker (1994) notes, discourses are defined under 
this approach as “sets of statements that construct objects and an array of subject 
positions” (Parker 1994: 245). Willig (2008) explains that ultimately, the 
Foucauldian approach sees “discourses [as] bound up with institutional practices – 
that is, with ways of organizing, regulating and administering social life. Thus, while 
discourses legitimate and reinforce existing social and institutional structures, these 
structures in turn also support and validate the discourses” (Willig 2008: 113). 
Similarly, Jorgensen and Phillips suggest that rather than being grounded in the also 
frequently employed purely critical accounts, power is the central focus of the 
Foucauldian approach, a particular conception of power that “does not belong to 
particular agents such as individuals or the state or groups with particular interests; 
rather, power is spread across different social practices” (Jorgensen and Phillips 
2002: 13). 
 
Practically, we can view this approach as essentially similar to ‘Critical Discourse 
Analysis’, the key difference being that, as mentioned above, with Foucault’s 
conception of meaning we can broaden analysis beyond texts and aim more squarely 
towards intangible, shifting power relations. “Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis 
reserves the concept of discourse for text, talk and other semiological systems (e.g. 
gestures and fashion) and keeps it distinct from other dimensions of social practice” 
(Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 18), whereas the Foucauldian method sees power as 
the active and driving force in discourse: 
 
What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it does 
not only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, 
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it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered 
as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than 
as a negative instance whose function is repression (Foucault 1980: 119) 
 
As we see in the second spectrum (below), Foucault’s approach to analysis tends 






These are subtle differences between the various key approaches in the field, but do 
give a sense of where the Foucauldian approach sits in relation to the rest. 
 
Foucauldian discourse analysis as an applied method builds on the basic tenets of the 
popular critical approach, which Willig (1999) explains as having been adopted from 
textual analysis. This approach involved eight key stages: 
 
1. Read texts and identify any recurring or linked ideas that emerge 
2. Isolate all references to the specific aspect of the texts which is of interest. 
These will be the ones necessary to answer the research questions 
3. Search for similarities and contrasts in the sections of text and group together 
appropriately so analysis can be done one discourse at a time 
4. Write down a section of text 
5. Note the explicit meaning of that piece of text 
6. Consider and note implicit or extended meanings of a section of text in 
square brackets [ ] 
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7. Relate the implicit and explicit meanings to ideologies 
8. Use theoretical framework to explore ideology 
 
The particular differences in the Foucauldian approach are set out by Willig (2001: 
119) 
 
STAGE 1: DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS 
(how is the discursive object constructed via shared meanings and lexical references) 
 
STAGE 2: DISCOURSES 
(places the object within wider discourses) 
 
STAGE 3: ACTION ORIENTATION 
(closer scrutiny of discursive contexts) 
 
STAGE 4: POSITIONINGS 
(identifying the subject positions) 
 
STAGE 5: PRACTICE 
(examining the relationship between discourse and practice) 
 
STAGE 6: SUBJECTIVITY 
(drawing links between discursive constructions and personal experiences) 
 
For instance, what follows is an example of discourse analysis from the chapter on 
the Phone Hacking Scandal, as stated in its final form, with the evidence followed by 
the conclusions drawn from discourse analysis: 
 
A particularly strained exchange between Rupert Murdoch and MP Jim Sheridan 
regarding Murdoch’s access to the Prime Minister revealed how au fait he had 
become with an unrivalled level of political access:  
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Jim Sheridan: Mr Murdoch senior...Why did you enter the back door at No. 10 when you visited the 
Prime Minister following the last general election? 
Rupert Murdoch: Because I was asked to. 
Jim Sheridan: You were asked to go in the back door of No. 10? 
Rupert Murdoch: Yes. 
Jim Sheridan: Why would that be? 
Rupert Murdoch: To avoid photographers at the front, I imagine. I don't know. I was asked; I just did 
what I was told. 
Jim Sheridan: It is strange, given that Heads of State manage to go in the front door. 
Rupert Murdoch: Yes. 
Jim Sheridan: Yet you have to go in the back door. 
Rupert Murdoch: That is the choice of the Prime Minister, or his staff or whoever does these 
things...Which visit to Downing Street are you talking about? 
Jim Sheridan: It was just following the last general election. 
Rupert Murdoch: I was invited within days to have a cup of tea and to be thanked by Mr Cameron for 
the support. No other conversation took place. It lasted minutes. 
Jim Sheridan: That is the one when you went in through the back door? 
 
Rupert Murdoch: Yes. I had been asked also by Mr Brown many times. 
Jim Sheridan: Through the back door? 
Rupert Murdoch: Yes. And my family went there many times.” 
(Uncorrected Transcript of Oral Evidence of Tuesday 19 July 2011 at Q. 211 – 220) 
 
The tone of the exchange is rather tense and infused with accusatory subtext. The implications being 
made by Jim Sheridan are that Rupert Murdoch enjoyed an astonishing level of access to the Prime 
Minister, one which exceeded that of various heads of state. The detail of Rupert Murdoch entering 
through the back door of number 10 immediately after the election was heavily focussed on in the 
subsequent media coverage and this seemed to highlight the sense that there was some sinister 
element to this relationship, and that both Rupert Murdoch and David Cameron did not want to reveal 
publicly exactly how influential this relationship was. In the subsequent verbal exchange, we find that 
Jim Sheridan repeats the detail several times, namely that Murdoch had specifically entered through 
the back door, which has the effect of emphasising his surprise that this would occur. He repeats the 
words ‘back door’ several times with the apparent aim of trying to have Rupert Murdoch address this 
detail, of trying to elicit some response on the unusual nature of this arrangement and its implications 
regarding his unfettered access. However, Murdoch’s response, in line with much of the rest of his 
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testimony, aims to project innocence by addressing only the direct questions posed rather than 
speaking to any of Sheridan’s accusatory subtext. For instance, when Sheridan asks initially ‘Why did 
you enter the back door at No. 10 when you visited the Prime Minister following the last general 
election?’ he responds ‘Because I was asked to’. This exchange provides a fascinating example of the 
power dynamics at play here, wherein Sheridan really wants Murdoch to answer why he had entered 
through the back door rather than the front door, he really wants some elaboration on why this unusual 
arrangement took place and essentially what he wants to know is what the nature of this relationship 
is, what it means to be entering through the back door at number 10. The answer given is wholly 
unsatisfying because of the vast implications intertwined with this question and while Murdoch 
appears to answer honestly, his answer betrays a general unwillingness to engage, almost a 
belligerence. The root of Sheridan’s accusatory tone is that in essence by asking this question and by 
repeating it several times he is suggesting that Murdoch’s access and power is in some way underhand 
or undemocratic. As a result, when Murdoch refuses to engage with the true spirit of the question his 
response is jarring rather than honest and belies a discomfort with the inferences being made. As we 
see from the exchange, this dynamic continues, with Sheridan mentioning the back door again and 
again and yet never explicitly verbalising the implied accusations. Murdoch is able to deflect by 
mentioning innocuous details and yet the outcome is still a sense that there is something underhand at 
play here. Despite the fact that Murdoch suggests that his meeting with Cameron lasted only minutes, 
this fails to address the implication that he enjoyed an incomparable influence, one which is 
concerning enough to need to be hidden from the public. 
 
STAGE 1: DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS 
(how is the discursive object constructed via shared meanings and lexical references) 
 
‘Discursive constructions’ allows us to probe the language used for implied meaning, 
which is particularly useful in this case, in which so much is inferred by the line of 
questioning, the back and forth on paper appears innocuous and yet, considered as a 
whole we see testing and reluctance. For instance ‘in the back door’, taken as a stand 
alone statement does not infer further meaning, yet in this context our appreciation of 
the shared meaning and lexical references allows us to highlight the unusual nature 
of entering ‘in the back door’ at 10 Downing Street. This implies something more, 
something notably underhand. Willig suggests that at this stage the reader focus on 
the relationship, the ‘identifiable social arrangement’ (Willig 2001: 119). Here, the 
social arrangement between Murdoch and Sheridan tells us a great deal about the 
suspicion inferred in the questioning about the back door. 
 
STAGE 2: DISCOURSES 
(places the object within wider discourses) 
 
What kind of social relationship is this, for instance is this an interview and a such 
how do we contextualize the words accordingly? Here, situating this discourse 
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among an understanding that this is a Committee Hearing taking place at a time of 
enormous moral outrage, tells us about the anger underpinning the formalities of the 
setting. 
 
STAGE 3: ACTION ORIENTATION 
(closer scrutiny of discursive contexts) 
 
How do the speakers interact with one another and how does this affect the building 
of the dialogue, how does this affect the meaning inherent? This allows us to hone in 
on the exchange and see it as of equal importance to the standalone statements. Here 
we see the active reorientation present in the discourse analysis approach, where we 
move beyond words towards the primacy of the interaction. 
 
STAGE 4: POSITIONINGS 
(identifying the subject positions) 
 
What are the subject positions of those involved in this social interaction? Crucially 
this allows us to reflect on the weight of Rupert Murdoch and his place in society 
when we view these words. Understanding his notoriety versus the relative underdog 
position, or the less charged nature of Jim Sheridan in this exchange, helps us to 
really appreciate the weight of his careful statements. We can see Murdoch’s 
answers as enormously weighted by the awareness of his notoriety in society. 
Jim Sheridan: Through the back door? 
Rupert Murdoch: Yes. And my family went there many times. 
Murdoch invokes his family and makes careful statements as a way to technically 
answer the questions and yet his words are infused with further meaning. On paper 
we might see these answers as innocuous. However, this can be viewed as 
obfuscation when we understand how much more important it is to us that Murdoch 
himself enters through the back door, with his family or not. Perhaps obfuscation is 
even too strong, he is employing his right to answer questions very technically and 
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STAGE 5: PRACTICE 
(examining the relationship between discourse and practice) 
 
Willig describes this stage as viewing how the participants act according to how we 
might expect in a given situation. She gives the example of a relationship break up, 
in which we might expect common social conventions to dictate practice and yet 
varying from this practice tells us a great deal about the discourse. Here, the rhythm 
of committee style questioning is strictly in place and Murdoch uses this to his 
advantage to remain as measured as possible and give away very little. This is a 
similar rhythm to a court room cross examination for instance. 
 
STAGE 6: SUBJECTIVITY 
(drawing links between discursive constructions and personal experiences) 
 
“This stage in the analysis is, of necessity, the most speculative” (Willig 2001: 122). 
Willig suggests that this stage can be viewed as a limitation of Foucauldian 
Discourse Analysis and yet it is unique in allowing for the lived experience of the 
analyst to carefully assess the discourse according to subjective experience. This is 
crucial at many stages of FDA and allows us to understand the discourse not as being 
words uttered as neutral evidence, but words uttered by one of the most powerful 
media magnates in the world. Subjectivity, personal experience or indeed knowledge 
of the actors is a useful tool in analysis here. 
 
Foucauldian Discourse Analysis has been employed in a number of settings, Parker 
(1999) and the Bolton Discourse Network are known for their development of work 
in this field, favouring this approach due to its ability to capture a wide range of 
materials. Similarly Arribas-Ayllon and Walkerdine (2008) use this approach widely, 
developing it in more recent years to include advanced approaches to issues of 
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Foucauldian concerns of genealogy, governmentality and subjectivity. 
Environmental research is a particular realm which has widely adopted FDA in 
recent years  (Sharp and Richardson 2001, Hajer and Versteeg 2005), with many 
researchers citing a desire to better understand the way that environmental discourse 
is constructed, with the hope that an understanding of discourse can enable policy 
change around such a loaded, political subject. We might draw some similar 
comparisons to the crime debate and as such, I would suggest that the focus on the 
subtleties of discourse provided by this approach fits well with this project. 
 
Finally, no discourse analysis was conducted on social media in this project. I have 
stated in this section and we will see in the case studies, that discourse analysis was 
reserved for certain speeches and debates in which the full picture of the 
conversation was capturable. Still, this would certainly be a logical future direction 
for research. 
 
Note: Foucauldian Discourse Analysis and Interaction Ritual Chains 
 
The choice to employ Foucauldian Discourse as an analytical framework I felt fit 
well with the wider theoretical framing of this thesis. I have suggested that discourse 
analysis is an approach which helps us better understand the potency and meaning in 
acts and inferences beyond spoken or written language and would argue that 
Collins’s Interaction Ritual Chains (2004) engages with a similar project. Indeed, the 
focus of the ritual ingredients of a ‘mutual focus of attention’ and a ‘shared mood’ 
and what Collins calls “transient emotional stimulus” (Collins 2004: 48) point us 
towards the importance of mood and emotional experience in the connections 
between members of society. Each of these approaches emphasises the unspoken and 
points us towards the weight of intangible, unmeasurable energy in leading to the 
ritual outcomes of “righteous anger for violations” (Collins 2004: 48). Case studies 
and discourse analysis are approaches which allow for increased appreciation of 
energy and action and the unwieldy, which is as we have seen, the essence of 
Interaction Ritual Chains which can ultimately tell us more about the experience of 
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engaging with crime issues, both verbally and through “entrainment in bodily micro-




6. Assessing the Methodological Approach 
 
6.1 Case Study Research 
 
I have discussed at length the particular utility of the case study approach here and 
the various intrinsic elements which drew me to adopt this method; the ability to 
capture a broadly defined event or moment, a relative lack of rigidity in defining 
what can constitute data, the capacity to begin researching quickly in unpredicted 
moments. Furthermore, the process by which this method is undertaken provides the 
researcher the opportunity to hone a framework of observation as they familiarise 
themselves with the field. I found this to be a particular advantage in mapping out 
and developing a sense of the evolving media landscape around political events; by 
the time I undertook my fourth case study on the Riots, I was able to mobilise 
quickly around a solid and honed research framework.  
 In case study literature the most common criticism levelled at the method is 
that of imprecision or a lack of objective rigour. I have noted that Yin’s key text 
(1994) on the method aims to infuse a relative level of precision into the process by 
creating rules which the researcher can follow, by encouraging a thorough research 
design, but that Yin is careful to suggest that to overstate this is to move away from 
the key benefits of this method; its relative malleability. Woodside (2010) develops 
Yin’s assertion by suggesting that we should not view case study research as lacking 
when compared to other approaches, that if we follow good practice principles as 
espoused by Yin and others that we can appreciate “the usefulness for theory 
creation, doing valid research and implementing successful practice” (Woodside 
2010: 398). Beyond Yin’s good practice approaches of thorough research design, 
that is subject to regular reassessment as the researcher becomes familiar with the 
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field, Woodside (2010) argues that practise and repetition are the key tools in 
stabilising case study research. 
 In reflecting on the case studies undertaken in this project, I would concede 
that any of the standard criticisms of the method could be levelled at these examples. 
If we look for irrefutable objectivity in case study research it can easily be found 
lacking in the best cases. Yet, without the case study approach, observation of these 
events in this way would not be possible. The observation of crime events as they 
unfold, of scandals and moral panics in particular, are extremely useful in adding to a 
body of work which is primarily concerned with such a subject matter. As the 
relevant case study texts suggest, to best capture these moments and to employ the 
approach properly, the researcher must both prioritise planning and active reflexivity 
throughout. I hope that I have demonstrated the employment of both in this project. 
Similarly, I would argue that the decision to undertake multiple case studies, rather 
than one larger study of the riots only, for example, would detract from the ability to 
make broader conclusions as well as the opportunity to improve the research model. 
Certainly it is inevitable that in the process of this research, the identification of 
potential further treatment of this data using other methods does arise, but these are 
questions for another project. The case study approach has ultimately provided a 
thorough and useful picture of the moments under analysis and has allowed me to 
hone in on data that I could not have otherwise captured. 
 
 
6.2 Discourse Analysis 
 
In keeping with the interactionist conceptual aim of moving analysis of crime 
communication moments away from macrosociological discussions towards the 
microsociological, discourse analysis provided an appropriate analytical framework 
by which I might assess this data. Willig (1999) suggests that when compared with 
content analysis, discourse analysis allows us to delve deeper, beyond observing the 
regularity in choice of words to unearth power and ideology, as Van Dijk (1996) 
suggests, to critically analyse those in positions of power, to connect the author of 
words with the ‘institutional framework’ (Wodak and Meyer 2001). This ethos fit 
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well with the aims of this project and the Foucauldian approach essentially grounded 
this research in the assertion that “power does not belong to particular agents such as 
individuals or the state or groups with particular interests; rather, power is spread 
across different social practices” (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 13). This project was 
focussed centrally on unearthing the driving forces behind the construction of crime 
narratives and in many cases we saw shifts in power from traditional institutions to 
emerging groups. This approach to discourse analysis was therefore the most 
appropriate for my research. Having considered the evolution of discourse analysis 
and the various bodies of work undertaken under this approach, it seems clear that 
each has its own distinct lineage, with Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis one 
of the most prominent in the field and social psychology’s discursive practice as the 
driving force behind development in the area. It seemed important that adopting a 
certain perspective on analysis should derive directly from the conceptual aims of the 
project and it seemed natural to me that the Foucauldian approach was the best fit. 
Certainly, I had not overwhelmingly adopted many of Foucault’s works in the 
theoretical discussion of this project, nonetheless, considering its place among the 
spectrum of established discourse analysis approaches, it fit well with the aims of the 
project.  
This approach also meant that in keeping with the case study method, I was able to 
undertake discourse analysis on speeches and debates as they occurred, rather than 
taking the more rigidly defined approach espoused by content analysis. I was unable 
to employ formal sampling approaches here for instance, instead endeavouring to 
apply discourse analysis approaches where significant moments of political 
communication emerged. This was again, a distinct advantage of the approach and 









6.3 Researching the Media 
 
The central struggles experienced with media research here, were in aiming to infuse 
objectivity into a forcefully subjective and chaotic realm, while also trying to capture 
moments in detail as they occurred and were passed by quickly. Certainly, we can 
see that at times objectivity is impossible, but I have endeavoured to embrace the 
strength of the subjectivity involved in case study and discourse analysis research in 
order to capture something quite crucial, the action at its high points rather than the 
whole field at its every possible moment. The fast-paced nature meant adapting a 
framework for data collection which I have detailed here and it also meant relying on 
many internet sources, which does come with a certain risk of fallibility. I have 
aimed at every possible juncture to only conduct discourse analysis on transcripts 
which I myself witnessed and have a body of research notes to refer to. 
I hope that I have demonstrated throughout this project that ‘the media’ today now 
constitutes a vast landscape far beyond that which we know from even very recent 
media research. Having conducted this project, I would argue that this realm must be 
treated and observed as best as possible as it naturally occurs, rather than captured in 
a manner which does not fit. A simple content analysis of written news would 
entirely miss the energy of the field. Case study analysis allowed me to capture this 
and discourse analysis took seriously the weight of the players involved, helped me 
to look beyond the text towards the energy of this rapid realm. As I have detailed in 
the media chapter, while social media was a part of this story, it by no means played 
the main and only role and as such, developing a new method by which I might 
capture the entire realm of social media was well beyond my capabilities in the time 
available. Certainly, this is a project for future research, but not one which was 
necessarily at the heart of my research. I would stress again, that interactivity was 
enabled not just by social media such as Facebook and Twitter, but by a whole 
network of ‘new media’, including 24 hour news, online news and comments 
sections. My focus here was on capturing the whole picture and so could not also 
take on the task of quantifying social media output, which would have constituted an 
entirely different project. 
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The key challenges faced in this project were clearly in aiming to capture this large 
amount of data and moving forward, further research might limit the scope further. 
Having conducted the research, I can certainly see the practical value in an approach 
which makes decisions around which selecting which media outlets to focus on 
specifically at the outset and sticks rigidly to this list. I made a decision not to limit 
my scope in this way based on the assertion that the narrative should drive the data 
collection. I feel this did allow me to bring in new media sources which I might not 
have anticipated and so did provide a fuller picture, but this certainly did add to the 
workload involved in the data collection. Selection of media texts then could be less 
fluid for easier data collection.  
It must be noted that there are also undeniably challenges in inferring meaning from 
media texts. I have mentioned the accommodation of subjectivity in the discourse 
analysis process. Still, it should be noted that many media sources here are included 
as part of the chronology or in evidence of the development of narratives and it 
should be acknowledged that these do not constitute uncontested data. Indeed, media 
texts are in many cases highly politicised, can be driven by ownership and do not 
necessarily abide by neutral news values. I hope that my discussion of media in 
chapter 3 will provide a full picture of the complexities involved in the media 
landscape, however, in this methodological context, it should be noted that there is 
an undeniable difficulty in utilising media texts in research, in that objectivity and 



















The case study method provides an approach for researching the ‘Political 
Communication of Crime’ which not only facilitates the theoretical aims of this 
project, but also best captures the data available. It allows for an exploration of the 
interactionist aims of constituting meaning as a work in progress, of the mapping of a 
realm in constant flux, while accommodating the particular kinds of event-based, 
broad-ranging data which was available during my research period. 
The UK General Election of May 2010 provided a sprawling and uniquely 
fertile environment within which I might observe political communication in action, 
with the particular activities of electoral politics prompting the consideration of new 
law and order strategies, the crystallization of party policy on these issues and a 
subsequent concerted effort to communicate these new values. While the case study 
approach seemed to fit with the aims of my project and the 2010 election provided 
data which would certainly illuminate some of the issues I had hoped to discuss, was 
a case study of the 2010 election the best possible approach to researching this 
event? 
Huckfeldt and Sprague’s discussion of the utility of electoral politics in 
observing Citizens, Politics and Social Communication (1995), suggest that research 
which aims to understand political communication must prioritize such a broad gaze: 
  
the socially contingent nature of political choice leads to a conception of 
political behaviour that is characterized by multiple levels: Individuals are to 
be understood within the larger social aggregates of which they are part, and 
aggregate behavior is to be understood as more than the simple accumulation 
of individually determined preferences. 




It follows that the case study fits particularly well with research on electoral politics 
through its capacity to observe the multi-dimensional elements at play in these 
complicated communicative interactions. Furthermore, in aiming to assess the 
Political Communication of Crime, a case study of a general election not only 
facilitates this particular broad gaze but also takes advantage of the opportunity to 
illuminate the landscape at its most extreme. As previously discussed, this allows an 
ideological analysis, as the rich data generation and extremes of capacity at the outer 
limits tends to unveil not only the everyday functioning power structures, but also the 
underlying potential. Using this approach, we can see what may ordinarily occur as 
well as what could happen in the general instance and in the extremes, we essentially 
gain a comprehensive view of the field. The 2010 General Election therefore 
presented an ideal opportunity to observe these kinds of communications and seemed 
to be best served by the case study approach, allowing access to the negotiation of 
criminal justice ideas beyond political actors, into the evolving and intangible media 
and public spheres.  
 Crucially, electoral politics have tended to feature heavily in prominent 
criminological discussions of the NeoLiberal law and order trajectory and as such, 
seemed to demand further analysis in assessing the communication of crime. As has 
been discussed in Chapter 1, Garland’s Culture of Control (2001), for instance, 
portrays electoral politics as integral to a destructive politicization of law and order, 
suggesting that “political reaction has become more pronounced as the conditions of 
political speech have changed over time” (2001: 131). This has seemingly had the 
instrumental effect of redefining crime as politically dangerous during electoral 
periods and as such frames crime as a priority issue in wooing the public vote. 
I have discussed how Downes and Morgan’s (2007) definitive account of 
elections and ‘law and order’ outlined the development of this trajectory. To recap 
briefly, this began with a 1960s rise in crime rates which was employed by the 1970s 
Conservative Party who ended the post-war consensus by laying blame for the first 
time with the opposing party, to Thatcher’s 1979 campaign which criticized Labour’s 
undermining of the ‘rule of law’ and “dispelled the last vestiges of the bipartisan 
consensus on law and order” (Downes and Morgan 2007: 204). Following this, we 
saw that a perception of the Labour Party approach of viewing social development as 
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a legitimate method of dealing with crime became a weakness, which led to the 
situation that “no party could any longer afford to cede law and order ground to the 
opposition” (Downes and Morgan 2007: 205).  The Labour Party ‘tough on crime, 
tough on the causes of crime’ slogan which followed, served to reinforce this 
‘second-order consensus’ by proving that this was also a powerful vote-winning 
strategy. Building on these events, a body of literature focusing on ‘Late Modernity’ 
views the accompanying public ‘ontological insecurity’ (Giddens 1991) and sense of 
continuous anxiety (Young 2007) as central to an account of today’s society and 
views the prevalence of a cynical and populist approach to crime in today’s electoral 
politics as integral to this demise.  
In particular, ‘Penal Populism’ as introduced in Bottoms’ ‘Philosophy and 
Politics of Sentencing’ (2005) and developed more prominently by Pratt in Penal 
Populism (2007) focused on the notion that as a result of these particular political 
developments, electoral politics had become dominated by “the pursuit of a set of 
penal policies to win votes rather than to reduce crime or promote justice” (Pratt 
2007: 3). The regular political employment of this cynical practice was explained by 
Tyler and Boeckmann’s (1997) work which proposed that “penal populism emerges 
out of concerns to restore a disintegrating moral and social cohesion… rather than a 
specific response to crime problems” (Pratt 2007: 37). Therefore not only did this 
work re-emphasize the significance of electoral politics in the construction of crime, 
but it suggested that this practice had been intrinsically linked to the perception of a 
need to heal our damaged social fabric. This work proposed that ever-escalating law 
and order grandstanding at elections had not only fed into a general rise in 
punitiveness sentiments, but that this practice was linked with electoral success 
through a perception that a strong stance on law and order would heal our ontological 
insecurity, would restore our society to a perceived golden age of moral and social 
cohesion, an essentially false but powerfully conjured image of better times. The 
penal populism argument, therefore, was that the forceful and emotional nature of 
this relationship would ensure that law and order issues would continue to remain at 
the forefront of electoral politics, feeding into an ever-escalating populist 
punitiveness which would be extremely difficult to derail, so strong was its intrinsic 
link to ontological insecurity.  
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As a result, it seemed that a case study focusing on a major UK election 
might provide an opportunity to unpack this dystopia and better understand which 
elements truly feed into this panicked construction of crime narratives during these 
heightened moments of debate and communication. The 2010 UK General Election 
provided such an opportunity to observe communication processes at work, to 
understand the role of law and order in electoral politics and as such, to try to 
identify which forces seemed to drive this unstoppable derailing of evidence-based 
criminal justice policy in favour of ‘populist punitiveness’.  
In attempting to gain a more detailed picture of these political communication 
processes, a key aim of this project had always been to better understand the blurring 
of boundaries between the reception and generation of information, to move accounts 
beyond the traditional notions of the media as the willing mouthpiece of 
manipulative politics on to a docile public. As such, with prominent shifts in the 
media sphere occurring before the 2010 General Election, it seemed that this moment 
of increased activity would also provide information on these evolving roles. Most 
prominently, a rise in the use of social media and online news had reshaped the 
media landscape, which seemed to suggest that electoral politics and the subsequent 
construction of crime narratives might also be significantly redefined. Furthermore, 
following the perceived success of the utilization of social and visual media in 
Barack Obama’s 2008 Presidential campaign, steps were taken before the election to 
establish new Presidential-style TV debates between the leaders of the three main 
parties, followed by US-style spin rooms and instant polling. These developments 
suggested that key elements of the communication structures in place in electoral 
politics were undergoing a rapid evolution and as such, further implied that a case 
study of this shifting realm would illuminate the construction of crime narratives as it 
occurs today. 
Finally, in keeping with the theoretical work already developed, the election 
seemed to provide a natural moment in which the Interaction Ritual Chains (2004) 
approach might be tested. It seemed that during an election, we might observe the 
natural escalation towards broader righteous anger as a mutual focus of attention and 
a shared mood could find empowerment from a constant flow of meaning-enriched 
symbols. Indeed, the flow of new criminal justice information created by electoral 
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politics would again provide a fertile environment of high levels of emotional 
entrainment in which to better understand this process and the power of the public 
role in the construction of crime narratives. 
 
The Case Study Data 
 
As Yin (1994) notes, many case studies utilise data gathered from a single type of 
source such as archival records, while others use multiple sources in order to achieve 
an adequate level of triangulation. This ability to derive evidence from a broad range 
of sources is a significant strength of the case study method in that it allows the 
researcher to be as adaptive as possible and is the approach that I opted to employ 
when studying the 2010 election.  
 Traditionally, case study data is taken from a variety of sources which have 
largely focused on documentary evidence. The appendix of Folk Devils and Moral 
Panics (1972) lists press cuttings, tape recordings, parish newsletters, council 
minutes and annual reports while the Policing the Crisis (1978) account of the 
‘Handsworth mugging’ focuses heavily on newspaper headlines, editorials and 
features. In both cases, the focus on particular sources of data is driven by the 
content and so the data I chose to examine in this case study took a similar approach 
of aiming to gather thorough documentary evidence, while framing this around the 
elements which were forefront in the research; acts of political communication, the 
evolving media sphere and instances of public interaction. 
 In Political Science, campaigning tends to be captured at a much more 
specific level in order to answer a number of pressing but particular questions, for 
instance ‘do campaigns stimulate voter interest and ultimately voter turnout?’ or ‘do 
campaigns persuade voters, and, if so, which voters?’ (Brady, Johnston and Sides 
2006: 13). The specificity of these questions often require more quantitative 
approaches which provide a defined answer. In this case, however, as the enquiry 
relates more to intangible, conceptual issues such as ‘ontological insecurity’, 
NeoLiberalism, populist punitiveness and is based in interactionist theoretical 
considerations, it seemed more appropriate that the case study data serve these 
questions more generally, rather than targeting survey data at a particular question. 
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 As such, the data I gathered covered quite a broad range of documentary 
evidence and was by nature of the project adaptive to the new forms of evidence 
which emerged. I focused on high profile instances of political communication, in 
particular the three televised Leaders’ Debates which were accompanied by US-style 
‘spin rooms’ and a wealth of public interactions via social media. In search of crime-
specific content, I took evidence from a law and order debate with each of the main 
party candidates for Home Secretary on the news programme, ‘The Daily Politics’. I 
aimed to cover a wide variety of television news, both in politics discussion 
programmes like ‘Newsnight’, ‘This Week’, ‘The Daily Politics’ and ‘Question 
Time’ as well as in news bulletins on the BBC, ITV, Channel 4 and Channel 5 and 
rolling 24 hour news channels, in particular BBC News 24 and Sky News. By this 
point, the amount of evidence available was already overwhelming and as such, I did 
make a concerted effort to adopt a strategy of viewing each of these outlets as 
potential sources and rather than observing and logging each systematically, to take 
the approach of following the biggest events, the dominant themes and the crime-
related events in most detail.  
 I made an effort to gather data from traditional campaign materials, such as 
flyers, manifestoes, Party Political Broadcasts and posters. Beyond television media, 
I also viewed a range of print media sources, albeit in their online versions, including 
broadsheets such as; The Guardian, The Observer, The Times, The Telegraph, 
Financial Times, The Independent and tabloids including; The Sun, The Daily Mail, 
The Daily Mirror, Metro and News of the World (then still in operation, May 2010). 
With much of the focus of this work on the role of the media, I made a point of 
immersing myself in new media, which included a broad spectrum from social media 
websites such as Twitter which proved extremely powerful during the Leaders’ 
Debates, as well as Facebook which highlighted some interesting new modes of 
interaction ritual chains. Other significant sources of new media included YouTube 
videos which became significant in the wake of various news stories due to their 
sharing capabilities, as well as exclusively online news sources such as The 
Huffington Post. At any given moment there was some new or repackaged 
information to be consumed, which meant that higher profile news stories ought to 
dominate the focus, however, I did make an effort to specifically observe how crime 
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narratives travelled through these various modes of communication and how they 
were reshaped at various points along the way. Indeed, the availability of such vast 
amounts of information for the first time at this level in UK electoral politics 
highlighted how media consumption today is now guided more than ever by 
autonomy and choice.  
 Before I conducted this case study I was aware that the analysis of 
documentary evidence would require some consideration of a particular approach to 
this work. As such, in Chapter 4 I have considered the use of discourse analysis 
rather than content analysis, in keeping with the ethos as espoused by Ericson, 
Baranek and Chan (1989), of moving beyond the text, of viewing the media 
landscape as having meaning beyond the newsroom or the single political speech. 
 
   
Chronology 
 
The Parliamentary Session that preceded the 2010 election was a time of declining 
credibility for the Labour Party and the perception of politics more generally. The 
expenses scandal which unfolded weekly in ‘The Telegraph’ served to engender 
public distaste towards politicians, while catastrophic economic conditions severely 
dented the Prime Minister (and former Chancellor’s) approval ratings. These 
conditions seemed to suggest that the 2010 election would suffer from extremely low 
turnout, which would particularly hurt Labour’s chances at success. Labour were 
severely in need of a boost, while all of the main parties desired an outlet which 
would allow them to project a sense of increased transparency, in light of the feelings 
of public suspicion prompted by the expenses scandal. As a result, for the first time 
in British history the Prime Minister agreed to take part in a televised Presidential-
style debate. Much positive feeling towards these American-style debates had been 
derived from the success of those in the Obama Presidential campaign which had 
seemed to provide an opportunity for Obama to impress the electorate by 
demonstrating his charisma and superior grasp of policy issues against his opponent 
Senator McCain. It was decided that Gordon Brown, David Cameron and Nick 
Clegg, the leaders of the three main parties, Labour, the Conservatives and the 
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Liberal Democrats respectively, would take part in three televised debates on the 
15th, 22nd and 29th of April 2010.  
 The media interest surrounding these unprecedented events was considerable. 
Speculation before and analysis afterwards was rife in the traditional press outlets, 
while new media approaches proved potent and rapidly evolved into fundamental 
elements of the campaign. For instance, on the night of the debates US-inspired 
instant polling rooms were introduced to survey opinion on the three candidates as 
the debate occurred. Borrowing again from this American model, television stations 
holding the debates set up ‘Spin Rooms’ in which politicians from the various parties 
gathered to give their particular opinion immediately after the debates had 
concluded. This had the effect of creating huge public anticipation around the 
debates and resulted in massive ratings of 9.4 million viewers on the 15th of April 
(Deans 2010, ‘Leaders’ Debate TV ratings: 9.4m viewers make clash day’s biggest 
show’, The Guardian, 16th April), 4.1 million on the 22nd (Deans 2010, ‘Election 
debate TV ratings: 4.1m watch Leaders’ tussle’, The Guardian, 23rd April) and 
finally 8.4 million on the 29th (Deans 2010, ‘Leaders’ debate draws 8.4 million 
viewers’, The Guardian, 30th April). Much was made of the increased public voice 
through social networking websites like Facebook, and in particular the immediacy 
of Twitter allowed a #leadersdebate hashtag to provide a forum for constant public 
commentary throughout the debates. The Guardian reported that: 
 
The @Tweetminster account – which describes itself as "a media utility that 
connects you to the politicians, commentators and news that shape UK 
politics" – says that in the third debate there were 154,342 tweets relating to 
various terms around the leaders' debate, coming at 26.77 tweets a second, 
spread among 33,095 people (Arthur 2010, ‘2010: The first social media 
election’, The Guardian, 3rd May). 
 
This does not account for those who were following the tweets, while not actually 
tweeting themselves. In essence, the Leaders’ Debates served as a political event 
which uniquely engaged the public in a recently unforeseen surge of interest and 
anticipation. In addition to the appropriation of new media outlets, this added to the 
mélange of commentary and served to strengthen an unfiltered public voice in the 
general debate. Indeed, the increased vigour of the public voice was often 
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demonstrated through a vocal frustration towards traditional media tactics, such as 
the overly critical coverage of Nick Clegg following his surge in popularity after the 
first debate, which was widely satirized on twitter through the #nickcleggsfault 
hashtag:  
 
By midday it was the second most-tweeted hashtag on Twitter, second only to 
Earth day; in the UK it was the top hashtag, indicating that thousands of 
tweets incorporated it every hour.... The rapid responses on Twitter indicate 
just how much shorter the feedback loop now is for the mainstream media and 
electors – and how dangerous it can be to attack politicians who are riding a 
wave of popularity (Arthur 2010, ‘Twitter says it’s all Nick Clegg’s fault in 
ironic swipe at newspapers’, The Guardian, 22nd April). 
 
Crucially, this more powerful public-oriented media and increased focus on the 
Leaders’ Debates meant that the particular style of electoral communication had been 
altered enormously, which would prove extremely significant in the delivery of 
crime narratives and conventional attempts to engage in ‘the law and order merry-go-
round’. 
 The early stages of the 2010 general election demonstrated something of an 
adjustment period for politics and new media. Initially, this more transparent 
medium opened up the parties to an increased vulnerability, with the Labour Party’s 
Stuart MacLennan being sacked from his candidacy in Moray due to a string of ill-
advised twitter comments and the Conservative candidate for Ayrshire North and 
Arran, Philip Lardner, suspended for inappropriate comments made on his website. 
These teething problems served to highlight the potency of social media in election 
campaigns and re-framed our traditional news outlets within a powerfully 
technological and fiercely instantaneous mediated landscape. High profile events 
seemed to be processed through an interconnected mesh of traditional print press 
outlets, 24 hour news television and radio, event-style televised debates, an 
increasingly broad and legitimatised range of internet sources and new social media 
which was in a state of constant adaptive flux and which also unified to provide the 
most unforgiving 24 hour news cycle our politicians have ever been forced to 
negotiate. The naivety and lack of awareness towards the power of this new 
landscape was constantly demonstrated by politicians who made gaffes by 
misunderstanding the now heightened level of scrutiny which they would inevitably 
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endure; a chaotic misdirection of party funds to old-fashioned campaigning tools like 
posters which eventually found more fame as internet spoofs.  
Indeed, at the beginning of the campaign most politicians and their party 
coordinators seemed to have underestimated the danger of this expansive mediated 
sphere, a danger which Gordon Brown was most humiliatingly the victim of after 
mistakenly calling pensioner Gillian Duffy “a bigot” (Wardrop and Edwards 2010, 
‘General Election 2010: Gordon Brown versus Gillian Duffy: transcript in full’, The 
Telegraph, 28th April). As a result of Brown’s failure to remove his microphone 
following a TV interview which seemed to exemplify his lack of media-savvy, 
viewed by many as his great weakness, his private expression of irritation was 
recorded and almost immediately broadcast on all of the 24 hour news channels, 
followed by the online print media, commented on by bloggers, trending on twitter, 
within minutes this was an international news story which was beyond the control of 
campaign managers. Brown then continued to his scheduled interview on the Jeremy 
Vine programme on Radio 2, in which he was forced to listen to the recording and 
respond, as well as take questions from callers on the matter. Following this 
extremely public humiliation and in response to growing media-hype, by the end of 
the day Brown had returned to Gillian Duffy’s home to apologise personally and 
make a statement to cameras in time for the 6 o’clock news programmes. This was 
an incident which many sympathetically commented was probably caused by the 
intensity of the long day visiting various media outlets, and it was certainly propelled 
at break-neck speed by the same ferocious 24 hour networks, now buoyed by the 
ubiquity of online media. A day later every newspaper featured a now relatively 
dated version of the debacle on their front pages.  
These fast-moving events seemed to play out in their entirety in the instant-
news sources, causing the print press to seem sluggish and irrelevant in comparison. 
While newspapers have long battled with their increasing status as after-the-fact 
commentators, now languishing behind the instant news-providers, this election 
served to truly highlight the demise of the traditional power-houses in election 
media. Much commotion was caused by the Sun’s decision in September 2009 to 
state that Labour had lost their support and they would now be compelling their 
readers to vote for the Conservatives. But the altered media structures of this election 
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heralded the end of power for Rupert Murdoch’s vote; as the campaign progressed, it 
became clear that the TV debates, along with the requisite internet chatter, had 
catered for a large segment of society who did not identify in any tribal way with a 
party and who did not strongly subscribe to the views of a particular paper. As well 
as destabilising the power of the newspaper vote, an interesting phenomenon of the 
TV debates was that the initial spike in popularity that they had provoked for Nick 
Clegg seemed to fade away over time, with most polls suggesting that the Liberal 
Democrats had fallen back into third place by election day, having initially 
overtaken Labour in second place. What the polls surrounding the TV events 
actually show, therefore, is that the greatest effect was felt by the Conservatives 
(Telegraph Poll Tracker), who suffered a drop in their popularity and were unable to 
effectively target seats with Lord Ashcroft’s much-publicised marginal seat cash 
injections. This seemed to signify a loss of control in the parties, as traditional 
electoral campaigning techniques were weakened. 
As these conventional sources of power were gradually undermined, the 
strength of the online voice also seemed to accumulate, which in many cases had the 
effect of further challenging the resonance of established media conglomerates. As 
previously noted, the #nickcleggsfault hashtag on twitter for the first time provided 
strength to a more liberal voice which counteracted classically underhand and 
cynical tabloid tactics. These new voices not only provoked a degree of subversion 
of the traditional media, but they significantly allowed new public opinions to arise 
and flourish, which were in many cases the opposing views of much of ‘Fleet 
Street’. A more vocal criticism of media tactics was also largely present in this 
election, thanks to video sharing through YouTube and social networking sites. For 
instance, the Rupert Murdoch owned Sky News channel reacted strongly against the 
rise of the popularity of the Liberal Democrats, as was evidenced by visible outrage 
at times from their presenters Kay Burley and Adam Boulton. These clips were 
widely viewed online, and culminated in outrage throughout the blogosphere and 
social networking, leading to prominent expressions of distaste towards the channel 
which had seemed to become extremely partisan as the campaign had unfolded. 
While the #sackKayBurley hashtags and coverage of Adam Boulton’s argument with 
Alistair Campbell may have hardly dented the confidence of Sky News, it is notable 
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that an arena for protest of the media had clearly emerged and was functioning 
forcefully in providing a representation of these views which before would not have 
featured in the mainstream press.  
Shifting media structures continued to take control away from the parties as 
the TV debates and the increasing prominence of American-style polling indicated 
that the Liberal Democrats presented a significant threat to Conservative success. 
Awareness of these polling figures forced the candidates to dedicate many 
campaigning hours to discussing the potential pitfalls of a coalition. This had the 
effect of removing the power to control the debate and force preferred policy issues 
to the fore. Indeed, by the end of the campaign, the three leaders seemed so keen to 
finally regain control of this expansive news cycle that they took part in almost 
continuous, non-stop campaigning, with Cameron and Brown actually spending 24 
hours on the campaign trail on the last day.  
The political events of the 2010 election were truly remarkable, in that the 
results provided the first hung parliament in the UK since 1974. Quinn (2010) argues 
that “although the Conservatives required the second-largest post-war swing to win a 
majority, given the circumstances they might have expected to do so” (Quinn 2010: 
408). A tired Labour government, a discredited Prime Minister, the deepest recession 
since the 1930s, record levels of government debt and clamorous Conservative 
support in the traditional press could have combined to secure a win (2010: 408). 
Yet, the Liberal Democrats were required to take five seats in the coalition cabinet in 
order to form a government. This had not been guaranteed by ‘Cleggmania’, with the 
initial media interest eventually only manifesting a 1% increase. Rather, the results 
demonstrated an increased plurality, with many more votes going to minor parties: 
 
Together, they won a record 11.9 per cent (up 1.5 per cent), with the anti-
European UKIP winning nearly a million votes (but no seats) and the Greens 
winning their first ever seat in parliament. The BNP also saw a rise in its vote 





In the period since the election, a significant majority of academic literature has 
ruminated on 2010 as the ‘social media election’, while others considered how the 
hung parliament and the coalition came to be, despite being a rare feature of a first 
past the post system. 
 Gibson’s study of ‘UK Party Organizations and the Use of New Media in the 
2010 General Election’ (2010) takes us beyond a surface-level news-based analysis 
of the parties’ utilization of new media, by discussing the incorporation of these 
approaches into electoral politics and developing the term ‘citizen campaigning’. She 
suggests that the potential for political campaigns in light of the success of the 
Obama campaign is vast, placing “more direct autonomy and power in the hands of 
ordinary supporters… supported by a wider party-controlled virtual and physical 
infrastructure” (2010: 16). In aiming to observe the Obama model in the UK 
jurisdictions she finds that the UK approach certainly aimed to embrace these new 
media outlets and yet fell short for a number of reasons. She found that the UK sense 
of established hierarchy and formal membership entrenched a certain reluctance 
towards the informal ‘supporter’ model espoused by Obama. Furthermore, “activities 
such as donating to parties let alone fund-raising on their behalf that lie at the core of 
the new type of activism are not standard practices for UK citizens as they are for 
U.S. voters” (Gibson 2010: 16). Lilleker and Jackson (2010) contrast this point, 
suggesting that the influence of Web 2.0 in the UK general election did encourage ‘a 
more participatory style of election campaigning’. They suggest that the 2010 
election represents a turning point away from “election campaigning [which] tends to 
be synonymous with top-down, persuasive and propaganda-style communication 
which aims to win the support of voters crucial for the victory of a candidate or 
party” (2010: 1). They suggest that we ought to take seriously the reshaping of 
communicational hierarchies through this participatory culture. Indeed, while the 
new media platforms were tested, Wring and Ward (2010) observe that the 
speculation around Facebook and Twitter, as well as the integration of the American 
approach was, in the end, dwarfed by television media. They note that prior to the 
2010 general election that a significant excitement around online media as a tool in 
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electoral politics had been boosted by the “explosion of social media tools…Just 
prior to the election it was estimated that there were around 25 million Facebook 
accounts in the UK. The growth of public interest in social networking was also 
mirrored by UK politicians, by summer 2009 around one-third of MPs had a 
Facebook site and over 10% had a Twitter account” (Wring and Ward 2010: 811). 
Despite some skepticism around the eventual use of social media, Wring and Ward 
do provide some data which suggests that online voter engagement was noteworthy, 
in particular, that “post-election survey data suggests that the numbers of voters 
looking for information online more than doubled to around a third of the 
population” (2010: 815). Somewhat expectedly, they demonstrate that online 
electoral campaigning was prominent in the 18 – 24 demographic: “Across the 
board, the younger age cohorts, most notably the 18 – 24 years old group, were 
significantly more likely to have engaged with online information. Over two-thirds 
of 18 – 24 year olds claimed to have accessed MSM sites and 43% visited official 
party sites” (Wring and Ward 2010: 815). Wring and Ward are right to conclude that 
the main event of the 2010 election was indeed the televised Leaders’ Debates. 
However, what their data ultimately reveals is that, in accordance with Lilleker and 
Jackson (2010), there had been a significant reshaping of the communicative 
structures in place. They concede that “the leadership debates, whilst not necessarily 
influencing the outcome of the election, certainly helped shape the narrative of the 
campaign by elevating the status of the Liberal Democrat leader” (2010: 815). 
Indeed, in this research, when we are concerned not with the overall characterization 
of the election, or the outcome, but rather with the underlying communication 







Crime in the 2010 General Election: The Leaders’ Debates 
While the media landscape was being utilised in dramatically new ways and the 
parties jostled to form a coalition the 2010 UK General Election provided an 
unforeseen light-touch approach to crime which seemed to entirely contradict 
previous expectations. Where were the front page stories cataloguing the political 
tough sentences arms race and where indeed, was the public outcry demanding such 
strong crime rhetoric? The story of this election was instead one of policy issues; 
which party could stave off a double-dip recession and provide a convincing 
approach to dealing with immigration, of procedural issues; which party could form 
a stable government and which would reform politics, and of the subversion of the 
traditional media outlets; which party could negotiate the new media landscape, 
emerging triumphant from Leaders’ Debates and twitter scandals, while producing a 
poster which was fully vandal-proof.  
 Despite the relative obscurity of discussions of law and order, I have focused 
on those which did surface, in an attempt to assess the content of crime narratives in 
this election. As discussed, the Leaders’ Debates represented the most prominent 
moments of the campaign. The content of the debates was highly choreographed, 
after a detailed format had been agreed on by all three parties. It was decided that the 
three debates would be separated by topic into Domestic, International and Economic 
Affairs, although it was notable that a question on immigration featured in each of 
these debates. ‘Law and Order’ was therefore featured in the first debate only and the 
following was the only crime-related question to be asked throughout these intensely 
high-profile events: 
Good evening. I was born and still work in Burnley, Lancashire. The 
town has the highest burglary rate per head of population in the entire 
country. What confidence can you give me that towns such as this all 




This question is extremely important in attempting to understand the nature of the 
crime narrative here, as it undoubtedly represents the most high profile discussion of 
the ‘law and order’ issue that occurred throughout this election. Furthermore, with .4 
million viewers and the surrounding media coverage, it is likely to have made an 
incalculable impact on the public perception of crime. What is perhaps most 
interesting about this question, is the very tame approach taken by this question. 
Perhaps because crime figures had consistently fallen under Labour, with a 7% drop 
in England and Wales from 2008 to 2009 (Home Office 2009, ‘Crime in England and 
Wales 2008/2009’), the conventional approach of attacking the current government’s 
record is not adopted here. Furthermore, the question does not reach for an overtly 
emotive crime-related subject, nor does it even suggest that crime is high. Instead, the 
questioner has opted to discuss the highest burglary rate, which does not even 
presuppose that burglary itself is unusually high in this town; simply that it 
statistically has the highest occurrence. Of course, it is likely that the question was 
designed to allow the three leaders to discuss whichever broadly crime-related areas 
that they wished to tackle, which is how the debate progressed. 
 
 David Cameron began by summarising a broad-level analysis of the faults of 
the criminal justice system: 
 
We're not seeing enough police on the streets, we're not catching enough 
burglars, we're not convicting enough. Then we do, when we do convict 
them, they're not getting long enough sentences. 
 
This sets a precedent for the level of depth in discussion as the pressure to articulate 
a clear message in such a short time generally forces the three leaders to engage by 
utilising these condensed soundbites. Cameron then goes on to relate a personal 
anecdote, which will feature as a recurring theme throughout his various responses 
and seems to be utilised most frequently in the questions where he particularly aims 
to seem relatable: 
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I went to Crosby the other day and I was talking to a woman there who 
had been burgled by someone who had just left prison. He stole 
everything in her house. As he left, he set fire to the sofa and her son died 
from the fumes. That burglar, that murderer, could be out of prison in just 
four-and-a-half years. The system doesn't work, but that sort of sentence 
is, I think, just completely unacceptable in terms of what the public 
expect for proper punishment. 
 
Cameron’s response has altered the tone here from the neutral and measured question 
to an emotive atmosphere of alarm. Despite the fact that the point he makes here is 
about his view of sentencing, he has chosen to conjure up a picture of a wicked 
burglary which ended in the murder of a child; this is an example of the cynical crime 
narrative we have come to expect. Through the utilisation of fearful imagery it 
attempts to deliberately provoke our punitive urges.  
 The Liberal Democrat response in this scenario is a particularly interesting 
one. Much of the analysis of this first debate focussed on the increased publicity 
given to this smaller third party, which had in recent decades struggled to gain 
momentum due to the structurally reinforced power of the Westminster ‘two-party 
system’. As mentioned previously, this media event served to “break the duopoly in 
British politics” (Grice, Morris and Mendelsohn 2010, ‘Clegg smashes through two-
party system’, The Independent, 16th April) and gave the Liberal Democrat leader a 
surge in popularity. For our purposes, this sudden publicity put Nick Clegg in a 
position to comment on ‘law and order’ in a potentially significant way: 
 
Jacqueline, you asked, what can we do to stop burglary happening over 
and over and over and over again. Two things: firstly, quite simply, more 
police on our streets. This government wants to waste billions of your 
money on an ID card system so you have to pay for the privilege of 
having lots of your own details on a piece of plastic card that you carry 
around. For pretty well exactly the amount of money, your money, that 
the government is pouring into that, we could put 3,000 more police 
officers on the streets. That is the absolute priority for me. The second 
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thing is this: there are too many young offenders who start first getting 
into trouble with low-level nuisance anti-social behaviour who become 
the hardened criminals of tomorrow. What we've got to do is stop the 
young offenders of today becoming the hardened criminals tomorrow. In 
my city of Sheffield, where I'm an MP, we've done some great things to 
do exactly that. That's the way to get burglary and crime down. 
 
Notably, we see the Liberal Democrat aspiration for the protection of civil liberties 
highlighted here with a reference to the curtailing of plans to introduce ID cards 
suggesting that their approach to ‘law and order’ would be constructed in conjunction 
with this priority, and in line with necessary cost-cutting. While Clegg does opt for 
the popular ‘more police on the streets’ theme, there is also particular emphasis on 
tackling crime early by targeting young offenders. In comparison with the 
Conservative response, the narrative here is, at first glance, one of longer-term 
structural change and a civil libertarian approach to ‘law and order’. While Clegg 
does reach for some populism by promising more police on the streets, his choice of 
approach is far less forceful and does not seem to make claims to strengthen 
punishment. It is perhaps worthy of note that at a moment of such political 
significance for the Liberal Democrats, Clegg apparently does not feel it is 
worthwhile engaging in the kind of forceful ‘tough on crime’ punitiveness which has 
proven a vote-winner in previous years. This, in itself, must raise questions about the 
necessity of ‘law and order’ as integral to election campaigns. 
 In contrast, Gordon Brown’s characterisation of the Labour Party approach to 
‘law and order’ is more typical of those which had been expected, in that it refers to 
successes, yet deliberately diminishes them in favour of a fear-based narrative: 
 
Jacqueline, as long as anybody feels unsafe, and as long as anybody feels 
insecure, even although crime is falling - official crime figures show it's 




In recent decades, there has rarely been such an opportune moment for the Labour 
Party to reassure the public by stressing that crime is falling and that some of their 
policies have proven successful, but they seem to prefer that reassurance is provided 
through a promise ‘to do far more’. Brown also opts for a similar fear-based narrative 
as Cameron’s, but rather than painting a picture of the crimes which might befall us, 
he simply tells us that we feel unsafe and insecure. The Labour Party are now a 
victim of the ‘second-order consensus’ on crime, in that they are forced to continue 
with a narrative of fear and promises to increase punitiveness, despite their own 
successes and a fall in crime. This adheres to the rule that to cede ground on ‘law and 
order’ is to risk defeat. He continues: 
 
And that's why there's three things I want to suggest this evening that will 
make people safer. One is we've got to have effective policing on the 
streets. Police have got to spend 80% of their time now on the streets. 
We've got record police numbers in this country, and we want to maintain 
that level of police force over the next few years. The second thing is, 
parents have got to accept responsibility for their children. If an order is 
passed against a teenager, then the parent has also got to accept 
responsibility, and we're bringing that in now. The third thing I would say 
is this: if you are dissatisfied with the way the police are treating or the 
police are dealing with your case, and you are persistently denied the 
rights you have, then we'll give you the right to take an injunction against 
the police so you can be sure that your rights against anti-social behaviour 
and crime are upheld. 
 
We see Brown again contribute in the race to put more police on the street, this time 
superficially beating the others by promising 80% of police hours on the streets. We 
are then promised that parents will accept responsibility and that we may seek 
injunctions against the police, neither of which hint at long term plans towards 
dealing with crime, but both of which feed the sense of personal injustice and 
‘ontological insecurity’ of previous elections. 
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 The allotted time spent debating ‘law and order’ issues continues in a manner 
which is quite consistent with the positions set out. David Cameron laments the state 
of the criminal justice system through emotive anecdotes: 
 
I even went to a drug rehab recently in my own constituency, and met a 
young man who told me that he committed a certain amount of crimes so 
he could get in front of a judge who could then get him a place in a 
residential rehab centre. We must be mad as a country not to get people 
into that residential rehab to get them to clean up their lives, so we cut the 
crime on our own streets... 
I went to a Hull police station the other day. They had five different 
police cars, and they were just about to buy a £73,000 Lexus. There's 
money that could be saved to get the police on the frontline. The 
Metropolitan Police have 400 uniformed officers in their human resources 
department. Our police officers should be crime fighters, not form-fillers, 
and that's what needs to change... 
 
My mother was a magistrate in Newbury for 30 years. She sat on the 
bench, and she did use those short prison sentences that you're talking 
about. I've got to tell you, when someone smashes up the bus stop, when 
someone repeatedly breaks the law, when someone's found fighting on a 
Friday or Saturday night, as a magistrate, you've got to have that power 
for a short prison sentence when you've tried the other remedies. 
 
What is notable as Cameron progresses is that actually he does use his time to 
constructively challenge the proposed policies of the Lib Dems and Labour, while he 
also seems to voice some sympathy for a long-term approach to dealing with the 
social issues which cause crime. However, his line of questioning is framed by these 
emotive anecdotes, which illustrate his particular points but do not address the 
situation as a whole. As Gordon Brown progresses he also takes the chance to 
provide one example of Labour’s ‘tough on the causes of crime’ approach, citing a 
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young offenders’ institution in Reading which had reduced reoffending. However, 
this approach is once again couched in a punitive voice: 
 
Will you match our funding on the police? The answer is no from your 
manifesto. This is not Question Time. It's answer time, David... 
 
That's why there are 20,000 more people in prison as a result of the 
tougher sentences we've been passing. But you've got to answer this 
question: we will continue to match the funding of the police as of now. 
You are saying you're going to cut it. Now, be honest with the public, 
because you can't airbrush your policies, even though you can airbrush 
your posters. 
 
An interesting and somewhat novel element of the Labour narrative here is the 
introduction of the theme of old-fashioned family values. This approach employs 
penal populist rhetoric which evokes symbolically-charged ‘better times’ to provide 
some form of society-wide comfort. This is employed frequently when Brown 
presents a strong symbolic juxtaposition between old fashioned family values and the 
present day requirement for strength in ‘law and order’: 
 
When I was young, my father ran a youth club with my brother for young 
people, and the more people who do voluntary service and give their time 
in the community to getting young people off the streets doing purposeful 
activity, the better, whether it's sports, dancing or music or other activities 
that get people off the streets. But the one thing I'm absolutely sure of - 
we've got to maintain the numbers of police we have in this country.  
 
Labour demonstrate their weddedness to populist punitiveness here, as they reach for 
nostalgia for the past, fear for the present and unparalleled commitment to policing 
and imprisonment for the future.  
 Finally, observing Nick Clegg’s responses throughout the rest of the crime 
portion of the debate gives us an even clearer idea of how he may use his status as a 
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novelty to change the shape of the crime narrative. Building on his previous 
approach, he is careful not to seem inconsiderate to those concerned about crime, but 
in some way he attempts to use the current conventions of the crime debate to his 
advantage. Indeed, he does indulge in a fearful narrative, taking the opportunity to 
follow Cameron’s lead with a personal anecdote: 
 
I met a young man in London the other day. His flat had been burgled 
five times, and one of them, would you believe it, Jacqueline, was when 
he was away at his father's funeral. He said to me "Why can't this stop?" 
 
In a political debate in which the main aim is to make the fewest memorable 
mistakes, it is likely that all of the candidates learned the lesson of US Presidential 
Candidate Michael Dukakis (see Simon 2007), that to seem in any way 
unsympathetic to victims is extremely politically dangerous. This is a potent reminder 
that even as law and order recedes from the core of electoral politics, that the 
narrative of the ‘victim’ is one which still commands a certain immovable level of 
force from our leaders.  However, Clegg manages to parlay this necessity for 
punitiveness into a criticism of the other leaders, which allows him to successfully 
construct the seemingly powerful notion of Liberal Democrats as the only different 
party: 
 
I think what makes me so angry is that again, it's like the immigration 
debate: so much tough talk from different governments of different 
parties for so long has turned our prisons into overcrowded colleges of 
crime. Do you know that young men going into prison now on short-term 
prison sentences now come out, and nine out of ten of them reoffend, so 
we are reproducing more crime than actually cutting it. What I've seen in 
my city of Sheffield is that you get these youngsters not when they've 
done serious crimes, but when they're first starting to get into trouble, to 
face their victims, explain why they've done what they've done to their 
victims, apologise for what they've done, make up for what they've done 
in the community, cleaning up parks and streets. It has a dramatic effect 
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on their behaviour. I want to change people's behaviour before they 
become the criminals of tomorrow. 
 
For the first time, we see a very visible criticism of the established approach and in 
contrast to Gordon Brown’s assertion that 20,000 more are in prison as a result of 
Labour’s tougher sentences, the leaders are now forced to confront the issue of 
whether short sentences work, and ultimately whether the traditional punitiveness is 
the only effective approach.  
Thus, while this leaders’ debate did not seem to signal a shift in the ‘second-
order consensus’ of a fear-based narrative coupled with a punitive penal machismo 
for Labour or the Conservatives, the increased visibility of Nick Clegg in the debate 
has perhaps signalled a distinct interference with the pessimistic trajectory of today’s 
crime narratives. Indeed, the strongest discussion-point provoked by the first debate 
was: 
...the insertion of Nick Clegg and the Liberal Democrats into the nation's 
consciousness but [that] nothing the other leaders said had fundamentally 
altered the general election debate. The abiding memory of the contest 
could be "the other leaders saying 'I agree with Nick."  
(Robinson 2010, ‘Election 2010: Three way clashes in historic TV 
debate’, BBC News, 15th April) 
 
Therefore, while it was without doubt the most high profile discussion of crime in the 
election and does tell us a great deal about the party approaches to constructing their 
crime narratives, it remains a small part of the broader story.  
 
Example: Primary Empirical Material and Discourse Analysis 
 
What follows is an extract from field notes, honing in explicitly on crime issues in the 






15th April 2010 
 
 
• First election debate in advance of 6th May election 
• First televised debate ever 
• Uncertainty over rules so long preamble about the rules. 
• This debate will focus on domestic affairs, as all the issues have been 
split between channels to fit with broadcasting fairness rules 
• Audience told to participate via itv.com/electiondebate 
• Brief opening statement from each of the leaders, starting with Nick 
Clegg, focus on persuading that there is an alternative to usual two 
parties 
• Then Gordon Brown, global financial crisis is focus, strong economy 
• Then David Cameron, hopes that the debates will restore faith in 
politicians following MPs expenses scandal 
• First question about immigration, Gerard Oliver, retired toxicologist 
from Cheshire 
• Studio is very silent, audience seem to have been instructed not to clap 
or make any noise 
• Proceedings tightly controlled by the presenter, seems largely quite 
staged, leaders seem very prepared, very little off the cuff interaction or 




Our next question is on Law and Order and I need to point out that it is an 
area where powers are devolved to Scotland and the Assembly in 
Northern Ireland. 
 
• Presenter provides a lot of context and reminds everyone firmly of 
the rules. This is much more in the American Presidential style 
and feels very foreign to the usual British political setting. This 
looks like an episode of Question Time, but it’s much more quiet 
and regimented 
 
This question comes from Optician and mother of two Jacqueline. 
Jacqueline, your question… 
 
Good evening. I was born and still work in Burnley, Lancashire. The 
town has the highest burglary rate per head of population in the entire 
country. What confidence can you give me that towns such as this all 
over the UK can be made safer places to live and work?  
 
• Very general question, while she mentions burglary, this is clearly 
just a staged, broad question. Undermines the format a little that 
this whole approach is so staged and regimented. Not necessarily 
	  170 
allowing much free flowing debate, rather prepared questions and 
prepared answers. Still, this is what we can infer. 
 
 
[Silence, cuts to David Cameron] 
 
Well Jacqueline, the system isn’t working properly now, there’s no doubt about 
it, we're not seeing enough police on the streets, we're not catching enough 
burglars, we're not convicting enough. Then we do, when we do convict them, 
they're not getting long enough sentences. 
 
[cut to questioner, she nods] 
 
I went to Crosby the other day and I was talking to a woman there who 
had been burgled by someone who had just left prison. He stole 
everything in her house and as he left, he set fire to the sofa and her son 
died from the fumes… and that burglar, that murderer, could be out of 
prison in just four-and-a-half years. Now, the system doesn't work, but 
that sort of sentence is, I think, just completely unacceptable in terms of 
what the public expect for proper punishment. 
 
What have we go to do? Well we’ve got to get rid of the paperwork and the 
bureaucracy and get the police out on the streets… 
 
[DC begins to pound fist] 
 
• This is clearly a very thoroughly prepared answer, Cameron gets to say 
basically whatever he has prepared on law and order because the 
question was so general 
 
We need very clear signals from our criminal justice system that if you cross 
someone’s threshold, rob their home, you go to prison and you go to prison 
for a long time…. 
 
Interrupted by presenter….  
 
… Nick Clegg 
 
Notes for discourse analysis… 
 
1: DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS 
• Identifiable social relationship here is the formalized debate 





• At this stage the discourses are following the patterns established by this 
format in a very regimented way. 
• Possibly a sense that since this is the first debate, they might not want to 
shout over each other incase they put off audiences or prove that this was a 
failed experiment in the UK 
 
3: ACTION ORIENTATION 
• Here. DC speaks to Jacqueline, but in a formal, trained manner. She poses 
the question in a formal manner by necessity but his response is more like 
forced friendliness. It feels with this question and with the rest that they 
have all been told to say ‘yes Jacqueline’, repeat the person’s name 
• He pounds his fist or points his hand as he raises alarm about the 
burglaries, attempts to infuse emotion into his voice and communicate 
empathy and concern about the subject 
 
4: POSITIONINGS 
• Leader of the Conservative Party, presenter, member of the public, 
audience 
• ‘I went to Crosby the other day’ though, tries to lower DC’s positioning 
to man of the people 
 
5: PRACTICE 
• Each person acts exactly as we might expect in this situation, it seems to 
enforce formality 
•  There is an attempt to relate and use specific stories in order to step out 
of powerful position 
 
6: SUBJECTIVITY 
• The ‘went to Crosby’ theme is expected and commonly used 
• This is a method employed, as well as the repeating of the questioner’s 
name, to try to help DC seem more relatable and likeable and down to 
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earth, but any attempts in this direction are stifled by the formality of the 
setting 
 
Crime in the 2010 General Election: The Party Positions 
 
The extremely high visibility and perceived popularity of the debate format which 
had been piloted in the first Leaders’ Debate spawned several department-specific 
replicas as part of the daytime political commentary programme ‘The Daily Politics’. 
These featured representatives on each subject, again from the three largest parties 
and aired during the day on BBC 2. As a result, it should be noted that these were by 
no means high profile and received virtually no coverage in other press outlets. 
However, I include them here as they provided a unique opportunity for the potential 
Home Secretaries or Justice Ministers to outline their party narratives on specific 
elements of ‘law and order’, far beyond the sparse detail revealed by the 10 minute 
slot in the Leaders’ Debate. Therefore, while the content included can tell us very 
little about what the general public were able to receive and internalise on crime, it 
does provide us with more detail on what the parties were explicitly aiming to 
communicate.  
 The ‘Crime Debate’ took place on April 20th, soon after the first Leaders’ 
Debate and featured then Home Secretary Alan Johnson for Labour, Chris Grayling 
from the Conservative Party who eventually ceded the role of Home Secretary to Ken 
Clarke and Chris Huhne from the Liberal Democrats, who would go on to become 
Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change in the ensuing coalition 
government. A similar format to the Leaders’ Debates was adopted and thus each 
participant was allowed a short summarising opening statement. These were virtually 
identical in content and tone to the messages espoused by the leaders: Alan Johnson 
mentioned progress made while stressing the needs of victims and increased policing, 
while Chris Grayling reached for emotive catchphrases including “on your side rather 
than the side of the criminal” (all quotes taken from transcribed notes 20th April 
2010). Finally, Chris Huhne continued to construct the argument first posited by Nick 
Clegg that their “policies are based on the evidence of what works... the debate is too 
much about what sounds good in the papers”. Here we start to see a concerted effort 
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on the part of the Liberal Democrats to really progress with the notion that they could 
provide a useful perspective by altering the debate, a theme which had proven 
integral to the surge in Liberal Democrat popularity.   
 The questions posed here provoked an interesting debate, forcing each 
candidate to move beyond a general position and engage with the detail of issues like 
knife crime, the validity of certain crime statistics, antisocial behaviour, funding for 
policing and the DNA database. Furthermore, the nature of the crime narratives 
constructed by New Labour were called into question when BBC Home Affairs 
editor Mark Easton asked Alan Johnson; “Isn’t the real failure of your government 
actually that people are more frightened of crime now than they were when you came 
into office?” However, while the Liberal Democrats were keen to blame the other 
parties for participating in thoughtless punitiveness, they again seemed unwilling to 
go further and deconstruct the fear-based narrative that all parties have so willingly 
involved themselves in. The responses here demonstrate an unwillingness on the part 
of the three candidates to acknowledge that these increased levels of fear could be 
viewed as problematic; Johnson refutes the statement preferring to stress that 
confidence in the police has increased; Huhne diverts attention to escalating levels of 
knife crime and states that the public are right to be afraid, while Grayling ignores the 
point altogether: 
 
We need solutions. Recently a teenager was shot... there was a murder in 
a railway… a shopkeeper was beaten to death… we can talk all day about 
statistics but we need to nip this in the bud. 
 
The real shift away from the traditional populism in ‘law and order’ politics is most 
visible during the discussion of prisons, which has been prompted by the Liberal 
Democrat proposal that there “should be a presumption against short sentences” 
(Chris Huhne). Chris Grayling suggests: “We have to create a zero tolerance 
approach to carrying a knife, the Lib Dems want to release 50,000 prisoners a year” , 
while Chris Huhne attempts to discuss progressive penal policy:  
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We have the highest prison population in Europe per head and if prison 
was so effective it would be having a much bigger impact on crime. If 
you look across international criminological evidence, what really 
matters is what’s happening in prisons…If you look at short term 
sentences, for a young man the re-offending rate is 92%. These are 
colleges of crime, they are learning tricks… We must make sure there is a 
presumption against short sentences. Community Sentences can have a 
better effect. 
 
This trend, as set out by Nick Clegg and advanced by Chris Huhne would seem to 
mark a change in the position that to cede the ground on forceful crime policy, is to 
severely inhibit your electoral appeal. Furthermore, this debate did seem to prove 
that the leaders and potential justice ministers held rigidly to the same accounts and 
that therefore, the parties had seemingly articulated a strictly constructed narrative 
on crime. This is important because it shows a unity of message which would 
suggest a certain awareness of intent in adhering to the fear-based narratives which 
demonstrate an emotional connection to victims, while Labour and the 
Conservatives also continued with their preferred messages of more prison places, 
more police, more punishment. For the Liberal Democrats to specifically avoid this 
approach at a time of such political significance for them has to suggest a fading of 
the electoral power of established populism. Finally, while it is true that this short 
term boost in popularity for the Liberal Democrats did not translate into significantly 
more votes, Cutts, Fieldhouse and Russell suggest in their piece ‘The Campaign That 
Changed Everything and Still Did Not Matter’ (2010), that despite great campaign 
gains and perceived policy successes, that various parts of particular electoral 
politics combined to deprive them of much success. They suggest that as the 
prospect of a coalition emerged, the Liberal Democrats expressed a preference to 
align with whichever party was the largest. In doing so, they ruled out a centre-left 
alliance which had the effect of “put[ting] off soft-Labour or ‘floating’ voters from 
the centre left, who have traditionally formed an important part of the Liberal 
Democrat vote base” (Cutts, Fieldhouse and Russell 2010: 704). Furthermore, it is 
suggested that the popularity in polls failed to translate into votes because the polls 
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reflected a purer expression of what voters might do if their vote was “unfettered by 
the complexities of local competition and history” (Cutts, Fieldhouse and Russell 
2010: 705). As such, many voters who were constrained by the First Past the Post 
system opted to make best possible use of their vote by deciding between Labour or 
the Conservatives in their particular constituency battle.  
 As a result, we can conclude that the Liberal Democrats and their popularity 
which had been stoked by social media, had a significant impact in changing the law 
and order narrative and that this attempt at ceding the ground on populist 
punitiveness did not instrumentally damage their campaign. 
 
Crime in the 2010 General Election: The Traditional Media Outlets 
 
Within an election which saw a marked increase in the expression of views on the 
internet and through social networking media, we would perhaps expect the impact 
of traditional paper manifestos to be minimal. However, the Guardian (Flood 2010, 
‘Bookshop boom for political manifestos’, The Guardian, 28th April) reported a 
160% rise in total sales compared to the 2005 election, with the Lib Dem manifesto 
up by 250%, the Conservative manifesto up by 193% and Labour up 97%. What 
these figures most likely represent is an increased interest in the campaign following 
the high level of publicity generated by the Leaders’ Debates and in response to the 
feeling that a change in government was imminent. Indeed, we saw this 
augmentation translate into a somewhat improved voter turnout of 65.1%, up from 
61.4% in 2005 (UK Political Info: Voter Turnout). However, the unusually high 
jump in manifesto sales seemed to signify an engagement with party policies which 
had been distinctly lacking in the previous election, which had been viewed as un-
winnable by any party other than Labour. As a result, the content of the manifestos is 
perhaps worthy of note, in attempting to gain an understanding of what the public 
actively perceived of the parties’ crime stances. Furthermore, as previously noted, 
this election saw a marked increase in the consumption of party policies online and 
as such, the party approach to law and order has had a significant reach. 
 The three main party manifestos each proposed a theme which broadly 
indicated the kind of country they would like Britain to become. When they were 
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written it was widely believed that the Conservatives would gain a majority of seats 
and would comfortably be able to form the next government. As a result, the 
Conservative manifesto is titled ‘Invitation to Join the Government of Britain’ and 
details their idea of the ‘Big Society’, in which they essentially propose changes 
which move away from government intervention and instead highlight greater 
personal responsibility. The Labour Party manifesto is entitled ‘A Future Fair for 
All’ and features an art deco picture of a family in the countryside which was taken 
directly from their 1923 campaign poster (2010, ‘Labour launches election 
manifesto’, Channel 4 News, 12th April). This evoked Labour’s preferred theme of 
old-fashioned family-values and aimed to move the focus away from the unpopular 
policies of recent years. As I noted previously, Labour’s attempt to focus 
continuously on ‘family’ created a narrative similar to that of punishment; emotive 
and seemingly unchallengeable. Finally, the Liberal Democrat manifesto was 
entitled ‘Change that works for you: Building a Fairer Britain’ and emphasised their 
characteristic preference for tackling social inequality while maintaining forceful 
protection of civil liberties, as well as the argument that they represented a change 
from the old parties.  
 The role of ‘law and order’ within these broad themes was varied, with each 
party dedicating a chapter to the subject but not necessarily placing it at the forefront 
of their list of priorities. Indeed, in examining the priorities specifically detailed by 
the parties, it becomes apparent that various other political challenges have dwarfed 
any mention of crime and punishment: 
 
We will rebuild the economy to secure the recovery and invest in future 
growth and jobs. We will renew our society to further strengthen the 
communities that bind our country together. And we will restore trust in 
politics with greater transparency and accountability in a system battered 
by the expenses scandal. Over the next ten years we will confront major 
challenges - intensive global competition, climate change, an ageing 
society, and bringing stability to Afghanistan. (Labour) 
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Today the challenges facing Britain are immense. Our economy is 
overwhelmed by debt, our social fabric is frayed and our political system 
has betrayed the people. Only together can we can get rid of this 
government and, eventually, its debt. Only together can we get the 
economy moving. Only together can we protect the NHS. Improve our 
schools. Mend our broken society. Together we can even make politics 
and politicians work better. (Conservatives) 
 
Only Liberal Democrats will shake up the tax system to put £700 back in 
the pockets of tens of millions of low and middle-income families, paid 
for by ensuring the wealthy pay their fair-share. Only Liberal Democrats 
will break up the banks and start Britain building things again, creating a 
sustainable economy that no longer threatens our planet’s future. Only 
Liberal Democrats will invest in our schools to give every child, no 
matter their background, a fair start in life. And only Liberal Democrats 
will sort out our rotten political system once and for all. (Liberal 
Democrats) 
 
While law and order is certainly referred to under the guise of the Conservatives 
‘broken society’ and Labour’s ‘strengthening communities’, it is clear that issues 
like the economy and restoring trust in politics are now the issues which the parties 
feel they must address as priorities in order to win votes. This is clearly no longer a 
situation in which ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’ would be enough 
to inspire loyalty in voters.  
 An examination of the law and order policies detailed reveals that they 
consist of much of the same content as that expressed during the debates. Labour’s 
crime segment is combined with immigration and promises more frontline policing 
and faster action on antisocial behaviour in order to confront ‘fear of crime’. The 
other significant elements carry an expected tone of competitive toughness: police 
spending 80% of time on the streets, no-nonsense action to tackle dysfunctional 
families, a right to legal injunctions for repeat victims and expanding tough 
‘Community Payback’ for offenders who don’t go to prison. Again, while law and 
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order is not a priority, Labour emphasise the fear they have constructed and promise 
to tackle it with more punitive measures. 
 The Conservative chapter ‘Fight Back Against Crime’ presents a narrative 
that Britain is subject to a crime epidemic of which we are losing control and that 
more punitive approaches are the answer. The policies proposed to deal with this are 
as we might expect; tough measures against knife crime, a crack-down on binge 
drinking, more police on the streets and democratic control over policing, honesty in 
sentencing and private schemes to reduce re-offending. They suggest that the 
incumbent government have allowed the country’s crime situation to run out of 
control, the Conservatives even refute the statistics provided by the British Crime 
Survey which state that crime has fallen significantly since 1997. Furthermore, in 
this time of panic, the only option is supposedly an assuredly punitive response. 
Interestingly, the Conservatives seem to champion the idea that they have found the 
answer to ‘the crime problem’ in ‘New York style policing’. The cover of their 
crime chapter features a picture of a New York cop and states that: 
 
New York shows that it is possible to get a grip and cut crime. Over the 
past twenty years, serious crime in New York has fallen by 80 per cent, 
thanks to proactive community-based policing and the intelligent use of 
new technologies and crime data. (Conservative Manifesto 2010: 54) 
 
This highly visible, reference to New York is symptomatic of both the ‘we can fix it’ 
attitude of opposition parties and a tendency to look to America, which foreshadows 
the rest of the campaign. 
 The Liberal Democrat manifesto on crime sits far to the left of Labour on the 
political spectrum and of all the parties suggests the most alternative approaches 
which often follow their attitude to prisons. For instance, while they do join in by 
promising more police on the streets, they also adopt the quite controversial stance 
that they will “ensure that financial resources and police and court time, are not 
wasted on the unnecessary prosecution and imprisonment of drug users and addicts; 
the focus instead should be on getting addicts the treatment they need. Police should 
concentrate their efforts on organised drug pushers and gangs” (Liberal Democrat 
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Manifesto 2010: 74). Indeed, much of the Liberal Democrat narrative adheres to this 
tenor; whether or not these policies would work better than those of the other parties 
is uncertain, but it is at least clear that they wish to propose alternatives. 
 The impact of the Leaders’ Debates seemed to overshadow the role of the 
Party Election Broadcast as central to the communication of the party message. 
However, high viewing figures along with a series of controversies seemed to keep 
them relatively high on the public agenda. The first PEB from Labour was watched 
by 9 million viewers on the 12th of April (Deans 2010, ‘TV ratings: Party election 
broadcasts watched by almost 9m’, The Guardian, 13th April) and set the tone for a 
series of extremely dystopian, fear-inducing images of the future. This particular 
broadcast (see bibliography for link) consisted of a man walking down a country 
road while discussing Conservative opposition to Labour’s supposedly successful 
economic measures. The broadcast creates a sense of foreboding and shows a 
collapsing, flooded, dangerous road as a metaphor for Conservative economic 
policy. This theme of dystopia was continued throughout the PEBs, with the Liberal 
Democrats presenting a world littered with broken promises and the Conservatives 
listing all of the negative things that happen in a minute of Labour power including, 
among others; “7 incidents of anti-social behaviour, 2 violent crimes committed 
while more police officers fill in forms than walk the beat” (see bibliography for 
link). Most notable for our purposes was that crime did not feature on any of the 
broadcasts except this Conservative one, while the economy was the main focus of 
almost all of the rest. However, it is interesting that fear was the theme throughout, 
with Labour in particular attracting much negative attention from their advert which 
featured a Conservative bureaucrat telling a man he could no longer see his cancer 
specialist. Fear was apparently still a prominent political tool, although it was 
notable that the role of crime in this narrative seemed to have been replaced by 
economic concerns.  
 The presence of crime in campaign posters was minimal, with two notable 
instances (see bibliography for posters); a Conservative poster showed a picture of a 
smiling Gordon Brown and the words: “I LET 80,000 CRIMINAL OUT EARLY 
VOTE FOR ME”. Also, the Labour party issued a poster featuring David Cameron’s 
face on an ‘Ashes to Ashes’ character’s body alongside a caption which read; “Don’t 
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let him take Britain back to the 1980s”, which they later withdrew having realised 
that the particular character was a well-loved trustworthy policeman. Rather than 
functioning as a useful tool in electoral politics, the campaign posters throughout this 
election seemed to highlight the subversion of traditional media, as they became 
widely vandalized. As noted in the Independent:   
  
The subversion by online parodists of a succession of poster campaigns 
may have put paid permanently to the idea that electoral success can be 
bought. From the airbrushed Camerons on the eve of the campaign to 
Labour's "Ashes to Ashes" attack on the Conservative leader, it has 
seemed that, the more parties have spent, the more their opponents have 
benefited. 
(2010, ‘The People’s Election: 15 reasons to celebrate a campaign that 
could change the face of British politics forever’, The Independent, 6th 
May) 
 
Indeed, this election threw constant surprises at the parties and an enduring and 
inescapable theme was that the traditional, rigorously planned methods of 
electioneering seemed to be consistently undermined by events which could not have 
been predicted, or were confounded by an underestimation of the power of new 
media. In attempting to understand the diminished presence of ‘law and order’ in this 
election, I would suggest that perhaps the most significant contributing factor was 
the eventful nature of the campaign itself.  
 This was a campaign which quite uniquely was fought during a recession, 
which meant that the economy was consistently at the forefront of every discussion 
and policy proposal and may even have had an impact on the amount that the parties 
felt that they could claim to spend on ‘law and order’ issues. This was in evidence 
quite clearly in some cases, for instance, the Liberal Democrat proposal to increase 
policing was made in conjunction with a promise to scrap ID cards as a way of off-
setting the cost. This prominent issue, along with the public feeling of mistrust 
towards politicians in light of the expenses scandal, meant that there were two issues 
for candidates to answer for which were extremely immediate and significant in the 
public consciousness. This set the tone for much of the debate and in a large way 
accounted for a move away from traditional key areas of crime, health and schools 
as integral to the campaigns. As the election campaign progressed throughout April, 
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the content of economic debate took on new significance, as an independent think 
tank, the Institute of Fiscal Studies criticised the parties for failing to reveal in 
adequate detail how exactly they would make cuts to reduce the deficit. The 
Economist complained: 
 
The Conservatives, Labour and Lib Dems are joined in a conspiracy of 
silence. They are failing to disclose the gory details of how and where 
they would swing the axe on spending and the extent to which they may 
raise taxes after the election. 
(2010, ‘The hole in the election’, The Economist, 29th April) 
 
This had the effect of making the markets, as well as the public, extremely nervous 
and put extra pressure on the parties to provide economic assurances. 
 The first Leaders’ Debate also completely altered the tenor of subsequent 
exchanges as much attention turned to the increased popularity of Nick Clegg and 
the likelihood that there may be a hung parliament. The result of such predictions 
was that the parties were forced to argue around procedural issues, with the 
Conservatives in particular frenziedly constructing a rhetoric which aimed to make 
the public fearful of the uncertainty of coalitions. This was followed by an 
unprecedented focus on Parliamentary process, with the Liberal Democrats pushing 
their requirement for voting reform on to the agenda, hinting that proportional 
representation would be a requirement of any coalition. This seemingly overnight 
transformation of politics through ‘Cleggmania’ captivated the public and resulted in 
a huge increase in late voter registration. These conspicuous issues so engrossed the 
candidates, the media and the public that the everyday standards of electoral politics 
were now merely background noise against a tide of diverted enthusiasm. 
 
 
Law and Order in the 2010 General Election 
 
Having observed the detail of law and order discussion as part of the broader picture 
of the 2010 election, I have aimed to capture a comprehensive picture of criminal 
justice narratives along with their place in a broader linguistic realm. By focusing on 
the multidimensional elements at play, I have attempted to unearth the structures 
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which enable and can alter the political communication of crime in today’s electoral 
politics.  
It has been clear from this case study that there is some cause to question the 
certainty of penal populism. The lack of prominence of law and order politics in this 
election demonstrated that populist criminal justice narratives were no longer a 
feature at the forefront and were not instrumental to political success here. I have 
demonstrated that the Conservative Party and the Labour Party did revert to populist 
punitiveness and yet this was not a key feature in their electoral campaigns, nor did it 
ultimately secure a victory for the Conservatives. You could argue that the 
Conservatives were deferring to populist punitiveness themes in their treatment of 
crime and in the end they were the most successful party, but this would ignore the 
crucial nature of the crime debate; essentially it featured as background noise, a 
forceful allusion to victims rights in the Leaders’ Debates and little else in 
comparison with the many more prominent issues at stake in 2010. It has been useful 
here to take a rigorous approach to data collection in aiming to examine the 
microsociological detail of the construction of crime narratives; we have seen what 
the party positions on crime were and how exactly they were communicated. 
However, the most striking conclusion of this case study is that law and order was 
simply not a prominent feature of the campaign. Considering the history of law and 
order elections since the 1970s, this is an unprecedented moment and worthy of note 
in aiming to assess the role of crime in politics. If we wish to better negotiate the 
vote-driven political landscape in arguing for evidence-based rather than emotion-
driven criminal justice policy, it is hopeful to know that in truth, there is no 
insurmountable link between an irrationally ‘tough on crime’ approach and electoral 
success.  
Secondly, the huge uptake and substantial power of new media frameworks 
confirmed a blurring in the reception and generation of information in the 
construction of narratives. While I would not wish to suggest that social media has 
overpowered television media or has been employed with the same vigour as the 
American example, what the introduction of these new frameworks along with 
examples like Cleggmania and the Gillian Duffy controversy demonstrate, is that 
there is undeniably a new force in the construction of narratives; the public voice. It 
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is common to see academic discussions of social media view this realm with some 
skepticism. We have seen that the boost in popularity propelled by social media does 
not necessarily translate into an altered electoral landscape. We have also seen that 
the introduction of social media in politics has the biggest impact in the 18 – 24 
demographic. However, I would argue that rather than focusing on the potentially 
faddish and insubstantial nature of Twitter and Facebook, we ought to take seriously 
the opening up of a powerful and easily mobilized public voice through these 
evolving media structures. Certainly there have been swellings of public sentiment in 
the past, but it is true to say that any such ‘public opinion’ has been delivered 
through the editorialized voice of traditional media. The new media realm is vast but 
it is in many ways truly democratic. The most pressing issues of the day rise to 
prominence in social media and are fed back to politicians, the public are active 
participants rather than fearful, voiceless and manipulated. It is certainly possible 
that criminal justice issues will rise through social media, we will see how 
alternative perspectives on ‘crime’ were allowed to flourish in the phone hacking 
scandal and the riots. However, in this election, the economy took centre stage and 
there was little traction in the cynical crime narratives which were presented.  
The crucial difference between old media and new media in the construction 
of knowledge and ideas is that the public voice has an accessible outlet in which they 
can take part in naturally evolving Interaction Ritual Chains, in the process from 
small scale interaction to broader righteous anger which has not been preordained or 
manipulated. In the previous structure, the role of traditional media was to feed us 
powerful symbols which would trigger this anger. As such, criminal justice became a 
staple of this success; a victim, an atrocious act, would trigger the necessary mutual 
entrainment, the reaching for a Durkheimian sacred object which would sate us, give 
us something to defend. Today this escalation is natural, it is no longer part of the 
process of gaining electoral votes. As a public, we identify our mutual focus of 
attention, the traditional press is weakened and we have a voice with which we can 
powerfully unite behind a single idea. The power of Cleggmania was in that the 
public was able to say ‘we liked his answers, we liked how he dealt with issues in 
that debate and we have the power to voice that opinion’. It is true to say that this 
social media event did not materialize into increased votes, but for a week or so, it 
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did absolutely derail the expectations of electoral politics. The power of the penal 
populism dystopia has always been its unstoppable nature, its intrinsic links to the 
public need for reassurance. Here, the empowerment and redefinition of the public 



























While the 2010 election had presented an unparalleled opportunity for the collection 
of data on crime communication, as we saw, one of the key findings of the case study 
was that while we could utilise plenty of related data in this area, the topic of ‘law 
and order’ had not in fact proven instrumental or even relatively prominent in this 
instance. This has repercussions for the outcomes of this project which I have 
discussed, but in the short term, it did mean that I would also ideally require some 
demonstration of crime issues at their most contentious, at the forefront of public 
discussion. This would allow a different kind of observation of law and order 
narratives during highly pressurized moments in which the evolving sources of 
influence might intervene and flavour the narrative in some way.  
Therefore, despite the many advantages of studying electoral politics, for a 
richer body of evidence it seemed that I should ideally aim to conduct another case 
study which would fit the mould of the Policing the Crisis (1979) ‘Handsworth 
mugging’ example or the Folk Devils and Moral Panics (1972) case. These studies 
focused on unique criminogenic events or moral panics which allowed a distinct 
observation of the mechanisms which ultimately form the underlying framework in 
the construction of crime-related meaning. As previously noted, this imbues the 
particular insight of unveiling the most crucial elements of crime communication, the 
power sources, the strength of the public voice, the actual capacity for the media to 
flavour opinion at the time when criminal justice decisions are most likely to be 
made in haste, in which punitiveness ordinarily takes over as the political sentiment 
and in which evidence-based policy is discarded in favour of emotional reassurance.  
In essence this project is one which is concerned with the handling of crime 
issues at these extremes and as such, the study of moral panics or scandals, although 
impossible to prepare for or predict, is ideally suited to demonstrating how law and 
order is employed, what it comes to mean at these times. This project is not a study 
of the meaning of crime only within political cultures, it is concerned instead with 
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fully understanding how these chaotic exterior elements can wholly derail everyday 
political intentions. As such, it seemed appropriate that I would prioritise any such 
opportunity to study the extraordinary rather than the ordinary and this was an 
opportunity which was afforded to me by the Phone Hacking Scandal of July 2011.  
The Phone Hacking Scandal could not be considered a classic-type moral 
panic, as there was no dangerous violent act or typical folk devil. Here, the revelation 
of violations of human rights and Rupert Murdoch’s News International were the 
focus but there was arguably no disproportionate media-stimulated response which 
could have exacerbated levels of panic, rather, in this case, the tabloid press were the 
focus of public ire rather than the instigator. These events are better characterized as 
a scandal, but this renders them with no less weight for a case study which aims to 
understand the extremes of the construction of crime narratives. Indeed, as Durkheim 
(1893) suggested, the unfolding of scandals can tell us a great deal about the 
formation of ‘the public wrath’, that this moment allows citizens to express anger 
and share a common emotion, this is the crystallization of a public opinion at its most 
heightened. Similarly, as noted, Fine’s view of ‘scandal’ sees extraordinary moments 
of public attention to an issue as having an instrumental role in the construction of 
crime narratives, in which “The depiction of the scandal comes to symbolize the 
problem for the public and thus, the response to the scandal shapes the response to 
the social problem” (Fine 1997). Therefore, the unfurling of a scandal presents a 
unique case study opportunity, in which we might begin to assess the impact of the 
public voice on the response to the social problem.  
More specifically, one of the key findings of the 2010 general election study 
was that the media landscape seemed to be evolving in a way which might 
instrumentally alter the relationship between the public and the dominant narrative. 
As such, when the Phone Hacking Scandal began to emerge, the detailed focus on 
the media at the heart of this event seemed to provide a unique moment of insight 
into this shifting realm. One of the most resonant critiques of the power of social 
media had been that its prevalence ought to be viewed with some scepticism, that its 
faddish nature meant that it may not represent any significant long-term shifts in the 
political landscape. However, the early stages of the Phone Hacking Scandal seemed 
to demonstrate that not only had this shift towards a more democratized media truly 
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empowered the public voice, but that this had played a key role in the undermining 
of the traditional print press hegemony. Certainly, this scandal seemed to present an 
unparalleled opportunity in which I might conduct a case study of the shifting 
construction of narratives in today’s media, in which the true power structures at play 
were being uncovered daily and the ability for the public voice to mobilize around an 
issue independently was being demonstrated.   
 
 
The Case Study Data 
 
As previously discussed, the case study method provided unparalleled flexibility in 
allowing me to adapt to unfolding events and capture this data. In the early stages of 
the scandal, as these themes began to emerge, bearing in mind the methodological 
approach espoused by Yin, that the investigator “must remember the original purpose 
of the investigation but then must be willing to change procedures or plans if 
unanticipated events occur” (1994: 57), I began collecting data. Fortunately, having 
conducted a full case study on the 2010 general election, I was sufficiently familiar 
with the approach required and was able to reflect on which elements had proven 
useful and which could be omitted from this study. 
 In particular, at the beginning of the 2010 case study, I had prepared to gather 
data on any news source or crime-related communication available, which generated 
an overwhelming amount of data. The most significant difference in this instance 
was that the experience of following the particularly prominent narratives of the 
election had demonstrated to me that the best possible use of my focus in gathering 
case study materials would be to immerse myself in the events, follow the story, be 
aware of the resources available to me, but to take an approach which was primarily 
adaptive rather than constrictively thorough. As I have discussed, the methodological 
rigour in case studies comes not from an arduous documentation of the entire field of 
analysis, but in the researcher’s capacity to hone in on the most significant elements 
at play. This allows detail and nuance to be drawn from the sources of interest, rather 
than merely producing a broad set of data which lacks depth. 
	  188 
 More practically, in gathering data on an evidently expansive media 
landscape, in this instance, given this accumulated experience and the unexpected 
nature of the project, I also attempted to hone in on certain outlets, such as various 
online news commentary sources, which were able to capture the prominence of 
events quickly. Furthermore, I sought out studies which had aggregated information 
on social media, rather than attempting to accumulate data on twitter use myself, 
which had previously proven unmanageable.  
An added peculiarity of the phone hacking scandal was that it did eventually 
become a public excavation of fact with regard to the practices of the traditional print 
press outlets. The Culture, Media & Sport Select Committee as well as the hearings 
conducted by the Leveson Inquiry into the culture, practice and ethics of the press 
provided rich sources of data which I was fortunately able to utilise in this case 
study, along with some necessary reflection on the nature of these proceedings. In 
line with the discourse analysis approach of the previous case study, I employed this 
information as a source but did take account of the setting and power structures in 
play in these situations. This form of reflexivity with regard to sources is crucial in 
conducting a case study, as had been demonstrated by the 2010 election. I had found 
that the immersive experience of gathering data on a news event in today’s 
overwhelming media landscape had meant that some consideration of the legitimacy 
of sources was necessary in order to gather data effectively. This meant that the 
added requirement of assigning sources some level of normative value had become 
an important part of the process, particularly since I had taken on this case study with 
very little time to prepare. Therefore, the data utilised in this case study encompassed 
the broad range of online news, TV news and social media sources which had proven 
useful in the 2010 election, as well as the testimony given to the Culture Media & 










I cannot think what was going through the minds of the people who did this. 
That they could hack into anyone’s phone is disgraceful. But to hack into the 
phone of Milly Dowler, a young girl missing from her parents, who was later 
found to be murdered, is truly despicable  
(David Cameron 2011 Statement in Full- The Guardian, 8th July) 
 
The Guardian newspaper’s investigation into phone hacking at the News of the 
World provoked a moment of ferocious public outcry when it revealed that this 
practice had seemingly spread from eavesdropping on celebrity sex scandals to 
hacking the phones of victims of crime. What had been a human rights case of the 
privileged few now represented a damning indictment of the practices of the UK’s 
most powerful media conglomerate News International, its villainous figurehead 
Rupert Murdoch now synonymous with abuse of Britain’s most vulnerable. The 
scandal unfurled in a maelstrom of disgust and calls for punishment from newspapers 
and politicians who had previously quietly maintained a years-long alliance with the 
Murdoch Empire. The News of the World itself was deemed unsustainable and was 
forced to close after 168 years (2011, ‘News of the World to close amid Hacking 
Scandal’, BBC News 7th July), following the revelations that it had hacked the phones 
of families of soldiers killed in Iraq and Afghanistan (Hughes 2011, ‘Phone hacking: 
families of war dead ‘targeted’ by News of the World’, The Telegraph, 7th July), a 
group previously singled out for support by News International through the Sun’s 
‘Help for Heroes’ campaign. Along with exposure of the targeting of an increasingly 
shocking roster of crime victims, including the mother of Sarah Payne (2011, ‘Sara 
Payne on phone-hack list’, BBC News 29th July), the practices at News International 
became the subject of international scorn when members of the US Congress began 
to investigate claims that victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks had been subject to 
phone hacking by the News of the World (Stelter 2011 ‘News Corp Newspapers 
May Face US Inquiry’, New York Times, 13th July). With each case, the integrity of 
press attitudes towards victims seemed to deteriorate, however, the revelation that an 
employee of the News of the World had hacked into Milly Dowler’s phone and had 
deleted a message, giving the police and her family false hope that she may still be 
alive, seemed to crystallise in the public consciousness as a truly unforgivable act 
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that epitomised a distasteful lack of regard for the public sense of outrage towards 
abuse of victims, which tabloid newspapers like the News of the World had 
personally fostered with campaigns like ‘Help for Heroes’ and ‘Sarah’s Law’.  
While the uncovering of the ruthless and yet seemingly routine practice of 
phone hacking severely damaged the already tarnished reputation of the British 
tabloid press, some of the details unearthed during the subsequent investigation 
served to highlight an element of corruption and collusion in an unexpected source; 
the Metropolitan Police. Not only did “commentators and victims [accuse] the police 
of a lack of will to investigate hacking because officers were too close to the media” 
(2011 ‘News of the World Phone Hacking Scandal’, BBC News, 17th August), but 
evidence soon emerged that News International had made payments to the police in 
return for information, a charge which Met Commissioner Sir Paul Stephenson 
eventually conceded may be true and which led to both his resignation and the 
establishment of ‘Operation Elveden’, a Metropolitan Police investigation into illegal 
payments made by journalists to police, which as of April 2013 has resulted in 62 
arrests (Halliday 2013 ‘Operation Elveden: former Surrey police officer arrested’, 
The Guardian, 24th April). 
The reports of corruption quickly spread to Westminster when it was revealed 
that David Cameron’s ‘Director of Communications’ Andy Coulson had personally 
authorised the payments made to police while he was editor at News of the World 
(BBC News, 17th August 2011). The close relationship between Rupert Murdoch and 
British politicians had been a frequent source of consternation in public discourse, 
but with the phone hacking scandal came a drastic change in political rhetoric. 
Labour leader Ed Miliband led a high profile desertion of News International, stating 
that the British political system had failed to hold the company to account: 
 
News International was an organization which thought it was beyond 
responsibility. Its power was so immense, its influence so great, from Prime 
Ministers downwards. Nobody confronted them. Nobody held them to account. 
Nobody seemed willing to really challenge them. It was one of the great 
failures of politics that their power went unchallenged for so long.  
(Kirkup 2011 ‘David Cameron ‘hamstrung’ by hiring Andy Coulson says Ed 




The events of the phone hacking scandal had indeed revealed much about the 
internal workings of power within the British media and politics, not only through 
information gained by press investigations into News International and the 
Metropolitan Police, but through the subsequent attempts by politicians to win public 
confidence back. In the weeks following the scandal political parties released 
documents detailing all meetings involving members of the press, while the 
Parliamentary Select Committee for Culture, Media and Sport conducted a high-
profile hearing with Rupert Murdoch, James Murdoch and former News of the 
World Editor Rebekah Brooks.  
 During the testimony given to the committee on the 19th July 2011 the 
previously unfettered power of Rupert Murdoch was not only undermined by a 
cream pie to the face, but by the weight of public outrage. This was evident in his 
opening statement, in which he forcefully announced that he considered this “the 
most humble day of my life” (Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Statement in 
Full, The Guardian). As the BBC News website noted (‘Democracy Live’, 20th July 
2011), this moment was significant in that it represented the first instance of direct 
Parliamentary scrutiny faced by Rupert Murdoch in his wide-ranging 40 year career 
in UK media. Certainly, this was reflected in the surrounding old and new media 
coverage, which followed the MPs questioning of the Murdochs with frenzied 
interest, poring over Rupert Murdoch’s testimony, which notably conflicted with 
common opinion by portraying his control of News of the World as distant. Indeed, a 
significant amount of new information was revealed with regard to the Murdoch 
relationship with Prime Ministers, with the inner workings of tabloid journalism and 
their control over particular policy narratives. The committee also heard from former 
News International Chief Executive Rebekah Brooks whose testimony illuminated 
even further the methods of tabloid construction of narratives around victims and the 
role of editors in policy direction. These committee hearings significantly unveiled 
various influential power relationships at the most senior levels of UK politics, 
providing unique information on the construction of crime narratives in the UK print 
press. 
In the midst of the phone hacking scandal in July 2011, David Cameron 
announced that Lord Justice Leveson would chair a public inquiry into the culture, 
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practices and ethics of the press. An array of witnesses from politics, the media, the 
police and several high profile victims of press abuse provided oral evidence to the 
Inquiry about the workings of the UK media. The evidence given during the 
hearings, which lasted from November 2011 to February 2012, produced reams of 
expert testimony on the actual day to day practices of the media, on some of the 
criminal activities carried out regularly by the tabloid press and the perspectives of 
those who had been subjects of this destructive system on the construction of their 
personal narratives and how the force of these stories had affected their lives.  
On the 29th November 2012 Lord Justice Leveson published his report which 
condemned UK press behaviour as ‘outrageous’, finding that their practices had 
caused “real hardship and on occasion, wreaked havoc with the lives of innocent 
people” (Leveson Inquiry Executive Summary 2012: 5). He commented on the 
relationship between the press and UK politicians which was deemed “too close… in 
a way which has not been in the public interest” (2012: 4). The Press Complaints 
Commission which had been considered ‘toothless’ repeatedly throughout the 
Inquiry hearings was earmarked for replacement with a new regulatory framework. 
Campaigners such as the group ‘Hacked Off’ which represented victims of phone 
hacking, expressed disappointment that LJ Leveson had proposed an industry-led 
self-regulatory system which would be loosely backed by legislation, rather than a 
more forceful government-regulated approach. However, LJ Leveson argued that this 
approach had appeared to provide the most effective measure of regulation while still 
maintaining absolute freedom of the press.  
The events surrounding the phone hacking scandal and the months of 
testimony which would follow were significant in that the public mobilization 
around this issue seemed to have unearthed the true goings-on of the UK tabloid 
media. Throughout these hearings we were provided with expert witnesses who 
would reveal that which had previously been mere conjecture; the confirmation of 
absolute Murdoch power in UK politics, his unfettered access to Prime Ministers and 
his willingness to utilise his opinion-shaping power to influence policy decisions. 
Furthermore, we learned of the significant role of tabloids in the construction of 
crime narratives, and the propensity of editors like Rebekah Brooks to not only 
provide a mouthpiece for penal populism, but to actively attempt to shape criminal 
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justice policy. Beyond this high-level media influence, now structurally immobilized, 
we saw the force of the public voice and the ability to mobilize around the ‘Ideal 
Victim’ (Christie 1986). This seemed to crystallize the shift away from the notion of 
the public as weak and manipulable towards a public which is active in redefining 
crime narratives, with the tools for serious mobilization around these issues, they are 





In the wake of the phone hacking scandal, much academic literature has attempted to 
grapple with the new media landscape as we see it reflected in this fresh light. 
Providing discussions of the corrupt power relationships which were revealed, the 
particular journalistic cultures which seemed to have propelled these ingrained 
unethical practices and the future of media regulation, this work reframes our 
understanding of this realm and largely focuses on whether we can possibly infuse 
ethical practices back into this profession.  
Fenton (2012) expresses consternation at this vast upheaval, but highlights 
that the eruption of the scandal should be considered within the broader conditions of 
the UK media, which were undergoing significant structural upheaval in the 
preceding years. Indeed, falling newspaper circulation along with a growth in online 
news outlets and the subsequent redistribution of advertising revenue had taken such 
a toll on the corporate news world’s profit margins, that fewer journalists were 
employed and this considerably reduced workforce was required to alter their 
production in a way which was certainly detrimental to the facilitation of considered 
news journalism and has arguably engendered unethical practices. Fenton suggests 
that “fewer journalists with more space to fill means doing more work in less time, 
often leading to a greater use of unattributed rewrites of press agency or public 
relations material and the cut-and-past practice that is now referred to as Churnalism’ 
(Fenton 2012: 4). These fast-paced structural alterations had meant that in the 
months preceding the scandal, newsrooms starkly contrasted our conventional image 
of the journalist at work and were rarely governed by transparency and 
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accountability. As such, Fenton’s argument is compelling in that while it does 
acknowledge the enormity of the scandal itself, the high level corruption and the 
villainous figureheads of the Murdoch empire, it attempts to broaden our gaze 
towards some of the more broad economy-driven alterations which may have 
facilitated these practices.  
Carlson and Berkowitz (2013) develop this argument by asking how this 
single newsroom, or at least single jurisdiction, can raise important normative 
questions about journalism today and help to redefine the practice. Building on 
Zelizer (1992), they suggest that “incidents of deviance provide a moment of shared 
attention in which journalists reaffirm a cognitive geography of what is acceptable 
and what is professionally deviant and out of bounds” (Carlson and Berkowitz 2013: 
2). They see the phone hacking scandal as a moment for the reaffirmation of core 
norms globally, what they term a ‘synecdochic deviancy’ in which, as Fenton (2012) 
suggests, the actions of particular journalists come to represent a broader malaise. 
The rise of new media, the increasing pressure felt by old media who appeared to be 
haemorrhaging readers and advertising revenue seemed to have been compounded by 
the villainy of Rupert Murdoch. Therefore, Carlson and Berkowitz’s argument is that 
we ought not to view the incident as isolated, indeed there is a compelling argument 
here that if we aim to observe the functioning media landscape, that the phone 
hacking scandal takes us beyond a single instance of deviancy to an even more vital 
picture of an industry in chaos.  
Coleman (2012b) discusses the media cultures which have led to the scandal, 
enhancing this account by reflecting on the role of politicians in this sphere. Like 
Fenton (2012), he notes that “almost imperceptibly, a corrupted journalistic culture 
has emerged, normalizing a repertoire of routine practices that are wholly 
incompatible with the norms of democracy” (Coleman 2012b: 8). He suggests that 
the political role in this culture has evolved since the growth of television media, and 
that a traditional veneration of politicians by the media was undermined by this 
growth, wherein “television became the dominant public arena and the press became 
adept at aggressive framing and populist agenda setting” (Coleman 2012b: 7). He 
describes the ensuing political climate as engendering a “Machiavellian ethos that 
has become banefully entangled in the cultural relationships of political 
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communication” (2012b: 8). In Coleman’s estimation, then, the structural reframing 
of the media landscape facilitated an atmosphere of disrespect between our political 
figures and our media, that as the press became more ferocious, politicians duly 
adapted by becoming more openly manipulative, feeding into a general culture of 
cynicism in political communication. 
Similarly, the role of deteriorating political standards in the onset of the 
scandal is highlighted by Wring who outlines the “decades of government reluctance 
to act in a domain where there has been mounting evidence of press abuses” (2012: 
631). He links this reluctance to the particular power of the Murdoch press, 
delineating the Blair government’s courting of this relationship and subsequent 
public falling out of favour. Wring provides several compelling examples of Rupert 
Murdoch’s political power in action; his discussions with Tony Blair during the Iraq 
controversy and his later publication of a hand written letter from Blair which was 
thought to have severely demeaned the Prime Minister. Wring’s analysis of the 
Murdoch relationship with power was that this seemed to suggest an unrivalled 
access to the construction of policy decisions. Price notes that: 
 
Rupert Murdoch doesn’t leave a paper trail that could ever prove his influence 
over policy but the trail of politicians beating their way to him and his papers 
tells a different story… like the 24th member of the Cabinet… his presence is 
always felt (Price 2006 cited in Wring 2012: 636).  
 
 
This portrayal of Murdoch influence is one which will be further illuminated by the 
testimony provided during the phone hacking scandal and adds to a much more 
detailed understanding of the tangible implications of these power relationships on 
policy matters.  
As such, the body of academic work following the phone hacking scandal has 
tended to derive from within journalistic studies and its concerns are accordingly 
with the broader structural shifts that have allowed this gross injustice to occur. This 
work contributes to a richly contoured picture of the communication landscape, the 
recent shifts in UK media playing a crucial role in the practices which have emanated 
from this realm. In the context of this research project, this work helps to reconfigure 
our knowledge of the construction of crime narratives within this deeply fragmented, 
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economically unstable sphere and emphasizes the impact that this insecurity can 
have on media output. This combination of economic panic and political access has 
clearly created a uniquely insidious force in UK politics and this research will aim to 
examine the impact that this may have had on the construction of crime narratives. 
 
 
Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee 
 
The Westminster Select Committee for Culture, Media and Sport attracted the 
intense gaze of the world’s media on the 19th July 2011, when Rupert and James 
Murdoch as well as former News of the World Editor Rebekah Brooks were 
summoned to Parliament to answer questions concerning their involvement in the 
phone hacking scandal. Unlike the Leveson Inquiry, the evidence provided on that 
day was not under oath and has subsequently been challenged by MPs, by former 
Editors and by Legal Advisors to the News of the World who have questioned the 
validity of some of the claims made (Watt 2011 ‘James Murdoch likely to be recalled 
to face MPs after challenges to his evidence’, The Guardian, 29 July). Nonetheless, 
the hearings provided a unique opportunity for insight into the machinations of 
Britain’s most powerful media conglomerate, as well as their various underhand 
entanglements with the police. While much of the focus of the committee was on 
fact-finding around specific issues of legality, many of the incidental comments 
made by the Murdochs and by Rebekah Brooks provide a compelling insight into the 
intimacy of media and politics in the UK and when considered in some detail, can 
unearth new information on the construction of crime narratives.  
Considered within this methodological framework, using discourse analysis 
principles which encourage the appreciation of text and the employment of language 
within their specific social and cultural setting (Paltridge 2006), the analysis of 
evidence given here is conducted with an awareness of the context of the event. I 
would suggest that the employment of the discourse analysis technique is particularly 
useful in this instance, during which the gaze of the world enhanced a certain 
performativity in the hearing, while the event-like atmosphere infused tension, raised 
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ire and unveiled subtle power dynamics. It is therefore crucial in handling this 
specific data that an attempt is made to assess the contextual elements at play.   
 As such, capturing this data involved not only assessing the transcripts of this 
hearing, but also actively following the unfolding of events. As has been mentioned, 
in light of experience gained during the 2010 UK General Election, this case study 
attempted to utilise the most appropriate data, which meant that a complete cross-
section of all media sources could not be used. Beyond practical considerations, data 
taken from the media outlets of News Corp UK & Ireland Ltd, formerly News 
International, which includes the former News of the World, the Sun, the Times, the 
Sunday Times or Sky News, as well as News Corp affiliates The Wall Street Journal 
and Fox News, have not been unquestioningly utilised in the pursuit of fact-finding. 
While it is arguable that all data is contestable, in this case, the highly politicised and 
often biased presentation of stories in all areas of the media must mean that only data 
such as verbatim transcripts and statistical analysis are presented as somewhat 
neutral, while newspaper reporting is considered within its particular context. An 
assessment of the varying credibility of sources is an integral element of good case 
study research, however, in this instance this practise was particularly necessary. For 
example, it is generally acknowledged that news outlets owned by News 
International did not report fully on their own demise and so it is understandable that 
these should be omitted in certain circumstances. Similarly, the Guardian and the 
New York Times “were instrumental in cracking open the massive phone-hacking 
scandal” (Farhi 2011, ‘Guardian, NY Times worked to break News corp. Hacking 
case’, Washington Post, 21st July), both presenting huge journalistic efforts to reveal 
information against significant pressure and legal blocks from News International, 
and as such both the Guardian and the New York Times contain valuable backlogs of 
data on this issue and are referred to more frequently. This case study considers the 
events of July 2011, rather than a content analysis of press coverage and as such 
must prioritise these particularly relevant sources, rather than maintain a scrupulous 
equivalence in consideration of all media outlets.  
 The wide-ranging evidence that emerged from the Culture, Media and Sport 
committee hearings seemed to first and foremost provide a unique unveiling of 
previously closely guarded informal power relations. The phone hacking scandal 
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itself had focused the public gaze on the potential insidiousness of the close 
relationships that seemed to operate between the Murdoch-led News International 
journalists and high level politicians as well as senior officers at the Metropolitan 
Police. This general culture of impropriety had long been speculated upon since the 
growth of the former News International, however a lack of public challenge had 
been bolstered by the effective stranglehold over electoral politics enjoyed by the 
Murdoch media conglomerate, a power which had operated so forcefully that only in 
the wake of the phone hacking scandal did it eventually unravel.  
 
As noted, Ed Miliband’s comments on the unfettered power of the Murdoch 
press represented a significant break from tradition, whereby Westminster politicians 
had traditionally courted the Murdoch press with the aim of gaining electoral 
success, or similarly they had remained silent around the issue of the increasingly 
pervasive power of the organization, through fear of public reproach. The line 
between explicit deal-making and a more immaterial courtship had always been 
uncertain, with unofficial, speculative accounts lacking the weight of evidence and at 
their worst, stretching plausibility with an overtly conspiratorial tone. As noted, Price 
(2006) argues that the cause of this uncertainty is a lack of tangible proof, that 
Murdoch rarely leaves a paper trail “but the trail of politicians beating their way to 
him and his papers tells a different story” (Price 2006 in Wring 2012: 636).  
A detailed account of the inner workings of powerful media relationships had 
been somewhat outwith the reach of academic research, with most attempts to 
explain this phenomenon gesturing towards the drivers of economic growth in 
concurrence with a sense of opportunism in politics, particularly since the spin-heavy 
1997 General Election. Much media-oriented research naturally focused no higher 
than the newsroom and it was rare to find accounts which grappled with these kind 
of high level relationships. For instance, Arsenault and Castells (2008) apply 
Castells’ discussion of the ‘Network Society’ (2007) to the case of Rupert Murdoch 
in order to provide an updated picture of power in contemporary media which 
emphasizes the key elements of a “ruthless pursuit of market expansion and the 
leveraging of public and political-elite opinion” (Arsenault and Castells 2008: 491). 





NewsCorp Organizational Structure 
“Source: Ownership percentages were obtained from US Security and 
Exchanges Commission (SEC) filings. This chart is current as of December 
2007” 
(Arsenault and Castells 2008: 492) 
 
 
They detail the gradual acquisition of these various parts from Rupert Murdoch’s 
inheritance of the Adelaide News in 1952 to this five continent behemoth which 
“reaches approximately 75% of the world’s population, and has approximately 
US$68 billion in total assets and US$28 billion in annual revenue” (Arsenault and 
Castells 2008: 491). Within this structure, the figure of Rupert Murdoch looms large, 
as Marty Singerman of the New York Post suggested to Anand and Attea (2003): 
“[Murdoch] is at the front-line of execution, and dictates hierarchy. If he needs 
information, he will not hesitate to call your subordinates since they probably know 
more about the details of the project. Consequently, many employees think that 
Rupert is their boss” (Anand and Attea 2003: 14). This testimony, while taken from a 
high level employee, would contradict claims made by Murdoch himself at the 
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Culture, Media and Sport Committee and while Murdoch’s account ought not to be 
considered a neutral, more truthful version of events, it certainly highlights that 
speculation from below in these pieces of research can only tell us a fragment of the 
picture. Specifically, in aiming to understand the nature of the relationships between 
senior politicians and the press, even rigorous projects like that conducted by 
Arsenault and Castells can only infer details from the outside, from a broad overview 
of the business activities occurring.  
Regarding Murdoch’s power in politics, Greenslade (2007) emphasizes his 
ability to switch allegiances regularly, an empowering tendency bolstered by a 
general interest in who he might support, citing his high profile endorsement of Tony 
Blair in 1997 and his more recent shift to the Conservative Party, a move which was 
the subject of intense speculation in 2007. Arsenault and Castells portray this as a 
long-standing tactic, noting that “in 1972, Murdoch donated AUS$90,000 in legal 
but secret contributions to Australia’s Labour prime minister, Gough Whitlam. In 
1975, he aggressively campaigned for Whitlam’s ouster in all his publications” 
(2008: 497). Indeed, this kind of practice fostered a sense that support from the 
Murdoch publications was crucial in securing electoral success, a reputation which 
was reinforced by the print press elements of News Corp, the famous ‘Sun wot won 
it’ headline a key example of such grandstanding (Linton 1995). However, Curtice 
argued that in truth the ‘Sun effect’ was not quite as powerful as the perception 
suggested: 
 
British commentators are mistaken to assume that because the country’s press 
has a measurable impact on individuals it therefore can determine aggregate 
outcomes. Indeed, relative to the often highly evocative and strident manner 
in which the British press often conducts itself, its partisan impact is a small 
one… Above all, we have seen that a pro-Labour imbalance in the press in 
the 1997 election was insufficient to avoid a decline in Labour’s overall level 
of electoral support.  (Curtice 1999: 28). 
 
Essentially, the impact of Murdoch’s power on politics and potentially on policy 
decisions is difficult to define without broad analysis of electoral trends or a detailed 
knowledge of his business assets. Rather, more practically, a microanalysis of 
personal relationships as described through testimony can possibly provide some 
enhanced insight, qualified by an awareness of potential bias, into the role of these 
	  201 
high level media players in the construction of policy, and? into the broad definition 
of issues like crime, not only in media outlets but in society more generally, as 
delivered via political communication. 
The data unearthed during the events of July 2011 provides us with such an 
opportunity, via a unique glimpse into the boardrooms of the former News 
International and a great deal of new information on the structures that operate at the 
levels of power in British media and politics. Not only does the confirmation of these 
relationships allow us to understand more about the potential motivations behind the 
construction of crime narratives, through certain interactions between politicians, the 
media and police, but it can allow us to better view this field and move towards a 




The potential impact of News International on UK politics began to emerge 
in many of the immediate reactions to the phone hacking scandal. This chart, 
provided by the Guardian datablog (Rogers and Sedghi, 15th July 2011), represents 
David Cameron’s meetings with members of the media (by group) since becoming 
Prime Minister in May 2010 and is based on data released by the government 
following the phone hacking scandal. This information was notably divulged as part 
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of David Cameron’s “attempts to bring a new level of transparency between Britain’s 
elected leaders and the media” (Hope 2011, ‘David Cameron could publish meetings 
with all media executives, The Telegraph, 18th July) and, along with the disclosure 
that “the Prime Minister had met with Rupert Murdoch’s executives on no fewer 
than 26 occasions since last May” (Telegraph, 18th July 2011), provides us with some 
confirmation of the perceived importance of media executives to Prime Ministers 
and in particular, as had been suspected, Rupert Murdoch. What we can realistically 
infer from this information is that the courting of Murdoch’s support by political 
parties still took place as recently as the last election and Parliamentary term, thus 
supporting Ed Miliband’s assertion. This deference to Rupert Murdoch on the part of 
politicians and a willingness to court his favour certainly demonstrates a lack of 
complete autonomy in political decision-making and perhaps could support an 
explanation of the recent preference for tabloid-values in the construction of crime 
narratives. It may be a stretch to suggest that the moral agenda of the News of the 
World had ever leaked into policy-making, but at least in political communication, 
where an ill-founded perception that public support for Murdoch values is thought to 
gain votes, it seems plausible that this level of contact could have some impact. 
 The testimony provided at the Culture, Media and Sport Committee was 
particularly revelatory in this sense that the MPs on the panel were afforded the 
opportunity to publicly probe Rupert and James Murdoch on the substantive 
potential for influence by News International. This process unearthed a wealth of 
anecdotal evidence concerning Rupert Murdoch’s access to Prime Ministers, much 
of which was exhumed with some resistance. A particularly strained exchange 
between Rupert Murdoch and MP Jim Sheridan regarding Murdoch’s access to the 
Prime Minister revealed how au fait he had become with an unrivalled level of 
political access:  
Jim Sheridan: Mr Murdoch senior...Why did you enter the back door at No. 
10 when you visited the Prime Minister following the last general election? 
Rupert Murdoch: Because I was asked to. 
Jim Sheridan: You were asked to go in the back door of No. 10? 
Rupert Murdoch: Yes. 
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Jim Sheridan: Why would that be? 
Rupert Murdoch: To avoid photographers at the front, I imagine. I don't 
know. I was asked; I just did what I was told. 
Jim Sheridan: It is strange, given that Heads of State manage to go in the 
front door. 
Rupert Murdoch: Yes. 
Jim Sheridan: Yet you have to go in the back door. 
Rupert Murdoch: That is the choice of the Prime Minister, or his staff or 
whoever does these things...Which visit to Downing Street are you talking 
about? 
Jim Sheridan: It was just following the last general election. 
Rupert Murdoch: I was invited within days to have a cup of tea and to be 
thanked by Mr Cameron for the support. No other conversation took place. It 
lasted minutes. 
Jim Sheridan: That is the one when you went in through the back door? 
 
Rupert Murdoch: Yes. I had been asked also by Mr Brown many times. 
Jim Sheridan: Through the back door? 
Rupert Murdoch: Yes. And my family went there many times.” 
(Uncorrected Transcript of Oral Evidence of Tuesday 19 July 2011 at Q. 211 
– 220) 
 
The tone of the exchange is rather tense and infused with accusatory subtext. The 
implications being made by Jim Sheridan are that Rupert Murdoch enjoyed an 
astonishing level of access to the Prime Minister, one which exceeded that of various 
heads of state. The detail of Rupert Murdoch entering through the back door of 
number 10 immediately after the election was heavily focussed on in the subsequent 
media coverage and this seemed to highlight the sense that there was some sinister 
element to this relationship, and that both Rupert Murdoch and David Cameron did 
not want to reveal publicly exactly how influential this relationship was. In the 
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subsequent verbal exchange, we find that Jim Sheridan repeats the detail several 
times, namely that Murdoch had specifically entered through the back door, which 
has the effect of emphasising his surprise that this would occur. He repeats the words 
‘back door’ several times with the apparent aim of trying to have Rupert Murdoch 
address this detail, of trying to elicit some response on the unusual nature of this 
arrangement and its implications regarding his unfettered access. However, 
Murdoch’s response, in line with much of the rest of his testimony, aims to project 
innocence by addressing only the direct questions posed rather than speaking to any 
of Sheridan’s accusatory subtext. For instance, when Sheridan asks initially ‘Why 
did you enter the back door at No. 10 when you visited the Prime Minister following 
the last general election?’ he responds ‘Because I was asked to’. This exchange 
provides a fascinating example of the power dynamics at play here, wherein 
Sheridan really wants Murdoch to answer why he had entered through the back door 
rather than the front door, he really wants some elaboration on why this unusual 
arrangement took place and essentially what he wants to know is what the nature of 
this relationship is, what it means to be entering through the back door at number 10. 
The answer given is wholly unsatisfying because of the vast implications intertwined 
with this question and while Murdoch appears to answer honestly, his answer betrays 
a general unwillingness to engage, almost a belligerence. The root of Sheridan’s 
accusatory tone is that in essence by asking this question and by repeating it several 
times he is suggesting that Murdoch’s access and power is in some way underhand or 
undemocratic. As a result, when Murdoch refuses to engage with the true spirit of the 
question his response is jarring rather than honest and belies a discomfort with the 
inferences being made. As we see from the exchange, this dynamic continues, with 
Sheridan mentioning the back door again and again and yet never explicitly 
verbalising the implied accusations. Murdoch is able to deflect by mentioning 
innocuous details and yet the outcome is still a sense that there is something 
underhand at play here. Despite the fact that Murdoch suggests that his meeting with 
Cameron lasted only minutes, this fails to address the implication that he enjoyed an 
incomparable influence, one which is concerning enough to need to be hidden from 
the public. 
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 The questioning at the committee circles around these implications 
throughout, also honing in on Murdoch’s actual influence on policy matters: 
Rupert Murdoch: I never guaranteed anyone the support of my newspapers. 
We had been supporting the Thatcher Government and the Conservative 
Government that followed. We thought it had got tired and we changed and 
supported the Labour party 13 years ago, or whenever it was, with the direct 
loss of 200,000 circulation. 
Jim Sheridan: Did you ever impose any preconditions on either the Labour or 
Conservative party? 
Rupert Murdoch: No. 
Jim Sheridan: No preconditions whatever? 
Rupert Murdoch: No. The only conversations that I had with them—with Mr 
Blair that I can remember—were arguing about the Euro. 
(Uncorrected Transcript of Oral Evidence of Tuesday 19 July 2011 at Q. 222 
– 223) 
Again, Sheridan’s questioning belies a lack of belief at Murdoch’s testimony and 
while Murdoch aims to protest his innocence, some of the detail of his relationship 
with Prime Ministers is divulged here. Indeed, as we will see later, Murdoch’s 
protestations at having never made guarantees based on policy decisions is later 
heavily contradicted by former Prime Minister John Major giving evidence under 
oath to the Leveson Inquiry. However, basing analysis on this testimony alone, we 
do see a certain cavalier attitude towards support and a confirmation of the kind of 
policy discussions which had been speculated at by Price (2006) and Wring (2012). 
Murdoch reveals that he argued with Blair over the Euro, which confirms, along with 
the rest of the testimony, a surprising level of access wherein policy matters were 
routinely discussed.  
	  206 
Enhancing this evidence, further detail of the working relationship between 
the print press and 10 Downing Street during the previous Labour governments is 
also provided by Rebekah Brooks’ testimony: 
Philip Davies: Could you tell us how often you either spoke to or met the 
various Prime Ministers that there have been since you have been editor of 
News of the World, of The Sun, and chief executive of News International. 
How often would you speak to or meet Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and David 
Cameron respectively?  
Rebekah Brooks: The fact is I have never been to Downing Street while 
David Cameron has been Prime Minister, yet under Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown and Prime Minister Tony Blair, I did regularly go to Downing Street.  
Philip Davies: How regular is regular?  
Rebekah Brooks: On Prime Minister Gordon Brown, in the time that he was 
in Downing Street and also while he was Chancellor, I would have gone 
maybe six times a year. 
(Uncorrected Transcript of Oral Evidence of Tuesday 19 July 2011 at Q. 560 
– 561) 
It should be noted that the testimony provided by Rebekah Brooks, although 
extremely high profile in itself, occurred under slightly less tension than that of the 
Murdochs’ hearing, perhaps due to the intense public interest around the Murdoch 
testimony. As a result, the tone of this hearing could be described as much less 
emotionally-charged, more as a fact finding exercise, which was evident in that while 
much of the evidence given by Rupert and James Murdoch was tinged with a tone of 
contrition and innocence, of aiming to seem aligned with victims, here we are 
provided with a wealth of detail. Indeed, Rebekah Brooks seemed tasked with 
elaborating on the detail of the inner workings of News International. While the 
Murdochs generally suggested that they did not know that phone hacking was taking 
place, that they were sufficiently removed from the newsroom to mean that they 
	  207 
would have no knowledge of this, Rebekah Brooks took care to portray the 
environment at News International as ethical in its day to day workings.  
 In her testimony (above), we see a similar level of access available to 
working editors like Rebekah Brooks during the Labour governments of the last 15 
years. She is happier to confirm this influence than Rupert Murdoch, possibly with 
the aim of portraying the News International relationship with 10 Downing Street as 
an established tradition, rather than a sinister practise. However, when Phillip Davies 
went on to ask her if she believes that “there was a shift, and actually News 
International became part of the establishment, as opposed to being anti-
establishment?” she goes on to describe the kind of influence she could try to have 
over certain policies that the paper disapproved of: 
Rebekah Brooks: Throughout my editorship of The Sun, as you know, one of 
the main campaigns that we have had is for "Help for Heroes". I think The 
Sun is absolutely the paper for the military, and that caused us to have very, 
very uncomfortable conversations, particularly with Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown. One of the issues that still is apparent today, as it was back then, is 
the lack of awareness of other aspects of the media and of Parliament to 
acknowledge that currently we have soldiers fighting a war in Afghanistan, 
and people seem to forget that. I would not say that any Prime Minister would 
think that The Sun was not fighting for the right people. In fact, The Sun 
continues to fight for the right people. 
What is most powerfully demonstrated here is a sense of pride over the purported 
duty of the tabloid press to bring issues to the attention of the Prime Minister and to 
essentially utilise the high level of influence enjoyed by News International for a 
perceived good. Crucially, the sense that this is a force for good betrays a lack of 
understanding that this influential relationship could be perceived as destructive in 
any way. Rebekah Brooks as a former editor of a tabloid newspaper clearly 
subscribes to the views held within these publications, views which we have seen are 
often constructed under the pressures of economic decline and as such are 
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notoriously reactionary. Unsurprisingly, she admits that this approach regularly 
extends to criminal justice issues: 
Rebekah Brooks: The one thing that I would say is that under my editorship 
we had a series of terrible and tragic news stories, starting with Sarah Payne, 
Milly Dowler's disappearance and subsequent murder and then of course the 
Soham cases. As you know, part of the main focus of my editorship of the 
News of the World was convincing Parliament that there needed to be radical 
changes to the Sex Offenders Act 1997 which came to be known as Sarah's 
law and were very similar to laws imposed in America under Megan's law. So 
I suppose, if I had a particular extra involvement in any of those stories, then 
it would have been on the basis that I was trying to push and campaign for 
readers' rights on the 10 pieces of legislation that we got through on Sarah's 
law, and campaigning for those to be put forward. 
Again, Brooks portrays herself as campaigning in a noble way for certain criminal 
justice issues. However, it is telling that here she focuses on much-maligned 
coverage of the Sex Offenders Act 1997 and takes the opportunity to redefine those 
events as worthy. Savage and Charman (2010) describe the News of the World 
campaign as later being abandoned by the mother of murdered schoolgirl Sarah 
Payne due to their controversial ‘naming and shaming’ tactics: 
The problem was that the naming and shaming campaign was alienating those 
we needed on our side the most: the police and probation services, the 
professionals who dealt with child safety issues on a day-to-day basis. We 
decided that if the proper authorities would back us and help Sarah’s Law, we 
would drop naming and shaming. (Payne 2004: 98) 
When prompted on the appropriateness of these laws and her place in promoting 
them, she reflects on her role as someone who guides public interest:  
Rebekah Brooks: Like I said, many people disagreed with the campaign, but I 
felt that Sarah's law, and the woeful Sex Offenders Act 1997 that needed to 
be changed to protect the public, I felt was absolutely in the public interest. 
	  209 
We see that in these kinds of criminal justice issues, that even in the face of opposing 
public opinion, there is still a level of confidence in the righteousness of intervention 
at this high level. These pieces of evidence confirm that not only did News 
International executives regularly enjoy an audience with Prime Ministers, regardless 
of their political allegiance, but that they felt comfortable using the forum to discuss 
issues like the Euro and provocative matters of criminal justice. We see from the 
tone of the claims made here that this appears to have been done in the assumed best 
interest of the public, but that these assumptions were made based on tabloid-
oriented views. It seems that these power relationships must be considered an 
integral part of the construction of crime in the media, but also in political discourse. 
Finally, Rebekah Brooks is asked: 
Q576 Paul Farrelly: Would you agree, Ms Brooks, that part of the public 
concern here is about the closeness of the police and now politicians to News 
of the World and News International?  
Rebekah Brooks: I have seen that the News of the World has been singled out 
for that closeness. I think if you were going to address it, it is wholly unfair in 
discussing the closeness of police and politicians to the media to single out 
the News of the World.  
Q578 Paul Farrelly: Okay, but it is a fact that this has been a criticism, yet 
you, on your watch as chief executive of News International, manage a triple 
whammy, because you employ the former Director of Public Prosecutions to 
advise you on your approach to evidence and handing it over to the police. 
While he was the DPP, and along with his successor, Ken Macdonald was not 
above criticism for frankly rubber-stamping the complacent police approach 
to the inquiry. Do you think that was an error of judgment given the 
circumstances?  
Rebekah Brooks: Just to clarify the Ken Macdonald issue, which I think is 
important: he was hired by News Corporation and he has been rigorous in his 
separation of payments to police and the illegal interception of voicemail. He 
has not commented in any shape or form on the illegal interception of 
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voicemail, and if that conversation has arisen, he has withdrawn himself from 
the room and the conversation. I hear what you say but—  
Q579 Paul Farrelly: But you can forgive people for shaking their heads, can't 
you?  
Rebekah Brooks: Well, I can forgive people for shaking their heads if they 
believe that the question you put to me was true, but I think if people 
understand that he was hired by News Corporation, not News International, 
that he is reporting directly into the board and that he is only discussing 
payments to police officers, then I do not think people would shake their 
heads. He has been rigorous in not involving himself in the illegal 
interception of voicemail. 
We see here the beginning of a still on-going unveiling of wide-scale power relations 
which stoked the sense of public outcry that was mobilised not by the tabloid voice, 
but by the symbolic resonance of the nature of the revelations. Indeed, throughout 
the phone hacking scandal, the high profile Culture, Media & Sport Committee 
hearings and the year-long Leveson Inquiry, we saw confirmation of almost absolute 
power of the Murdochs alongside disintegration of the singular tabloid voice. We see 
in these examples the unfettered access to Downing Street enjoyed by News of the 
World executives, a relationship which had consistently been the subject of 
speculation and was now expounded in minute detail. 
 The Leveson Inquiry’s hearings and findings were vast and are still ongoing, 
however, within the context of a greater appreciation of the power structures which 
had been at play in the media, I would highlight the example of former Prime 
Minister John Major, who in his testimony to the Leveson Inquiry was the first 
person to state categorically under oath that Rupert Murdoch had utilised his power 
for policy changes. Mr Major states: 
It became apparent in discussion that Mr Murdoch really didn’t like our 
European policies, which was no surprise to me, and he wished me to change 
our European policies. 
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If we couldn’t… his paper would not and could not support the conservative 
government. 
It is not very often that someone sits in front of a Prime Minister and says ‘I 
would like you to change your policy and if you don’t change your policy my 
organisation cannot support you. 
(John Major, Leveson Inquiry, 12th June 2012) 
The implication made by John Major was that Murdoch was willing to utilise his 
power as the singular tabloid voice at this time and that this unfettered access to 
Prime Ministers was indeed being taken advantage of. I build this argument, despite 
the recent alterations in the media landscape, not only because tabloid forces do still 
exist today and operate under various new forms, but also because this locates the 
source of manipulative criminal justice narratives of the past in these individuals, 
these high level power relationships. As such we can view their dismantling as 
significant in moving forward with an optimistic account of the crime narrative 
landscape and these pieces of evidence also provide significant explanatory force 
regarding the source of power in previous incarnations of ‘crime’ in politics. 
 The revelations of the Phone Hacking Scandal also very potently reinforce 
the notion of the ‘Ideal Victim’ in the public imagination. It is clear from the 
evidence provided by this scandal that Christie’s (1986) depiction of the Ideal Victim 
as a “person or category of individuals who – when hit by crime – most readily are 
given the complete and legitimate status of being a victim” (Christie 1986: 1), is the 
modern day equivalent of the Durkheimian sacred object. This is the power source 
which feeds into our Interaction Ritual Chains, as we are tempted to protect our 
symbolically-laden ‘Ideal Victims’ and are provoked into uproar. We saw this uproar 
mobilised forcefully in this scandal with the shutting down of the News of the World 
and the shift from human rights violation to ‘crime’, to scandal, following the Milly 
Dowler revelation. I will discuss the conclusions of this case study in more detail 
within the context of the broader project in my final conclusion, although it is apt to 
note at this point that the revelation of power sources and confirmation of the force 
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of the ‘Ideal Victim’ lend significant explanatory force to our accounts of the crime 
narrative landscape. 
 
Example: Primary Empirical Material and Discourse Analysis 
FIELD NOTES 
19TH JULY 2011 
Rebekah Brooks at Commons’ Culture Media and Sport Committee. 
Notes: This committee follows the high profile Committee hearing of the Culture, 
Media and Sport Committee in the morning/ afternoon with Rupert and James 
Murdoch, in which the whole room was full of interested parties, reports, members 
of the public. This committee was where Rupert Murdoch memorably had a pie 
thrown at his face. In essence, this committee follows the Murdoch committee and so 
is far less high profile. 
The coverage on social media is far less busy. 
Note of the members present: 
1)  Mr John Whittingdale (Chair) 
2)   Dr Thérèse Coffey 
3)   Ann Coffey 
4)   Damian Collins 
5)   Philip Davies 
6)   Paul Farrelly 
7)   Cathy Jamieson 
8)   Alan Keen 
9)   Louise Mensch 
10)   Mr Adrian Sanders 
11)   Jim Sheridan 
12)   Mr Tom Watson 
 
The full transcript will be available from Parliament.uk in the week or so after, for 




• RB adds own personal apologies to those made by James and Rupert 
Murdoch. 
• Calls voicemail intercepts abhorrent. 
NOTE ADDED: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=87pXFH7gTZw 
Find as ‘Rebekah Brooks apologises’  
 
 
Rebekah Brooks: The one thing that I would say is that under my editorship 
we had a series of terrible and tragic news stories, starting with Sarah Payne, 
Milly Dowler's disappearance and subsequent murder and then of course the 
Soham cases.  
As you know, part of the main focus of my editorship of the News of the 
World was convincing Parliament that there needed to be radical changes to 
the Sex Offenders Act 1997 which came to be known as Sarah's law and were 
very similar to laws imposed in America under Megan's law.  
So I suppose, if I had a particular extra involvement in any of those stories, 
then it would have been on the basis that I was trying to push and campaign 
for readers' rights on the 10 pieces of legislation that we got through on 
Sarah's law, and campaigning for those to be put forward. 
 
Notes for discourse analysis… 
 
1: DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS 
• Identifiable social relationship here is the Commons committee 
chamber, in which RB is required to answer questions posed by table of 
MPs (see above) 
• In this instance she’s not under oath 
• Lexical references indicate lots of planned statements. Tends otherwise 





• At this stage the discourses are following the patterns established by this 
format in a very regimented way. Back and forth of question and answer.  
• There is some variation and emotion when RB wants to seem to express 
empathy towards victims 
 
3: ACTION ORIENTATION 
• The identity of the questioner doesn’t seem to matter much, doesn’t shift 




• The unspoken issue at play here is the level of power really afforded to 
RB, whether she was in charge of/ encouraged staff members to 
perpetrate this crime. 
• There is also some interest around where the blame may lie at the top 
level of News International, so the power positions here are unspoken, but 




• General air of formality and politeness 
•  Attempts to appear to care for victims through Megan’s Law, aim to 
frame RB as caring and to deflect a sense of criminality, she is an 
enforcer of victims’ rights 
 
6: SUBJECTIVITY 
• Prior knowledge about RB gleaned from newspaper/ journalistic 
commentary at the time tells us more about her potential criminality. 
• Crucially, though, in aiming to defend or protect herself, here she 
reveals much of her day to day work around criminal justice issues. 
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• For our purposes this is quite revealing, telling us more about a 
different issue, the level of access available to high ranking journalists 

























Following the analysis of two major political media events of recent years, this 
chapter consists of a third case study, namely the UK riots of August 2011. In 
keeping with the case study format already established, I will provide some context 
for the events of the riots, as well as a full chronology of the unfolding of rioting 
activity and attempts to control the ‘crime’ narrative. In this chapter I will focus on 
political statements, particularly those which were made by high profile political 
figures such as the Prime Minister, the Mayor of London, the Home Secretary and 
the Justice Minister. It will be argued that the riots represent an empowerment of the 
public voice, enhanced by the ability to protest through new forces for 
communication.  
 
By August 2011, a series of revelatory events had generated a conspicuous 
sense of public despair towards seemingly untrustworthy, manipulative authority 
figures, the developing outrage having begun years previously with the fallout from 
the 2008 financial crisis. The events of this period had rendered bankers as reckless, 
particularly through their seemingly widespread practice of trading using callously 
constructed financial instruments, such as subprime mortgages and ‘short-selling’ 
which profited from increasing private debt and general economic demise (Larsen 
2008, ‘FSA bans short-selling of banks’, Financial Times 19th September). 
Meanwhile, governments worldwide were accused of having been largely inattentive 
to the regulatory requirements necessary to avoid these actions resulting in a 
crippling recession (2008, ‘Financial Crisis shows bank regulation is broken’, The 
Telegraph 22nd December). The apparent lack of liquidity of the banks due to these 
practices resulted in the trading of debt and subsequent bailout of £500 billion in the 
UK alone (Swaine 2008, ‘Bank bailout: Alistair Darling unveils £500 billion rescue 
package’, The Telegraph 8th October). Among the wide-ranging consequences of the 
financial crisis and the subsequent recession was the legacy of outrage felt at the lack 
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of meaningful punishment delivered upon those who had played an integral part in 
the country’s economic downturn. A YouGov poll of the UK public in 2010 
demonstrated the extent of the anger towards bailed out banks such as the Royal 
Bank of Scotland who, despite 84% of its shares being owned by the taxpayer and 
having achieved a £5 billion loss, had still set aside £1.3 billion for bonus payments 
(Asthana 2010 ‘New poll reveals depth of outrage at bankers’ bonuses’, The 
Guardian 21st February). The poll found that “76% of people would support a cap on 
bonuses” (The Guardian 21st February 2010) and confirmed the pervasive sense of 
injustice felt in the public towards elites of the financial sector and those in 
government who seemed to endorse these rewards, rather than providing any 
meaningful support for a more punitive approach. 
 The public trust in politics was subsequently damaged almost irrevocably by 
the MPs expenses scandal of May 2009, in which The Telegraph newspaper 
published leaked uncensored information on outrageous abuses of the Westminster 
system by opportunistic Members of Parliament. Memorable claims such as the 
maintenance of a moat (Prince 2009 ‘MPs expenses: clearing the moat at Douglas 
Hogg’s manor’, The Telegraph 12th May) and a duck island (Allen 2009, ‘MPs 
expenses: Sir Peter Viggers claimed for £1,600 floating duck island’, The Telegraph 
21st May) became vivid, symbolic reminders of the detachment between the public 
struggling under a lengthy recession and almost cartoonish elites enjoying publicly 
funded luxuries. As Pattie and Johnston note, this scandal “unleashed a powerful and 
highly vocal tide of public anger with elected politicians” (Pattie and Johnston 2012: 
730), which would end numerous political careers, reinforce class divisions and have 
a long-lasting impact in undermining the public sense of positive democratic 
representation in Parliament. 
 July 2011 and the Phone Hacking Scandal served to impair the perception of 
politics even further, enhancing cynicism by portraying high level politicians as in 
servitude to the Murdoch press, embroiled in the insidious betrayal of victims of 
crime and widespread violations of the civil liberties of the unknowing, helpless 
public. As has been discussed, the reputation of the police was also severely 
undermined, with revelations that officers from the London Metropolitan Police 
(hereafter Met) had not only regularly accepted bribes from the News of the World in 
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exchange for information (2011,‘News of the World paid bribes worth £100,000 to 
up to five Met officers’, The Guardian 7th July), but that Met investigations into 
phone hacking had dismissed criminality after only an eight hour investigation, 
instead officers were found to have enjoyed champagne lunches with newspaper 
executives (Dodd 2012, ‘Leveson report criticises Met police over phone-hacking 
investigation’, The Guardian 29th November).  
 A month later, when Mark Duggan, a 29 year old black man from Tottenham, 
North London was fatally shot by Metropolitan police officers in circumstances 
which provoked wide-scale criticism of the excessive police response and are 
currently the subject of an Independent Coroner’s Inquest (see 
dugganinquest.independent.gov.uk), the unprovoked nature of the attack and the 
subsequent mishandling of events by the Independent Police Complaints 
Commission (2012, ‘IPCC should be scrapped, says family of Mark Duggan’, The 
Telegraph 28th June), raised tensions between locals and the police which led to a 
violent protest. (2011 ‘Riots in Tottenham after Mark Duggan shooting protest’, BBC 
News 7th August). This event sparked five days of rioting across England, in London, 
Birmingham, Manchester, Salford, Liverpool and Nottingham which resulted in five 
deaths, £220 million of property damage and 3,100 arrests (Langston 2012, 
‘Remembering the UK riots’, VICE 6th August). The causality of events was widely 
debated, creating diffuse consternation at issues of racialization, consumerism and 
“criminality pure and simple” (David Cameron speech, 9th August 2011). I will 
discuss the events of the riots in some detail as part of this third case study, however, 
I would note initially that within the context of this research, it quickly became clear 
that these events could serve as a vital additional case study and would go some way 
towards expanding on some of the findings discussed as part of the 2010 election and 
the Phone Hacking Scandal. As noted, one of the defining elements of these riots was 
that they could not easily be captured with one single explanation, or blamed on a 
particular social ill. However, what was prominent at the time was an unavoidable 
sense of challenge towards society’s accepted norms, a fighting back from the blatant 
mistreatment of recent years, the youths looting shops and protesting violently a 
powerful public reaction against corrupt authority figures, against unjust policing, 
mistrustful politicians, bankers, the upper class, against the brutal powerlessness of 
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those not in the elite. As we will see, this was by no means an organized anti-
capitalist protest, the aims were not focused around one issue, nor did events unfold 
in this manner. However, looters and rioters testified/argued? that their actions were 
regularly justified under some form of regaining control, or a disregard for the rules 
of the elites, of the police, of those who had so thoroughly betrayed public trust in 
the years leading up to Mark Duggan’s death.  
In the case study of the 2010 election, I discussed the vast uptake and 
substantial power of new media frameworks and the mobilization of non-elite 
narratives, supporting the public voice as a new force in the construction of crime. 
We saw in the Phone Hacking Scandal the potential strength of expression through 
these new outlets to derail destructive, manipulative, dystopian narratives and to 
allow public outrage to have a serious impact on previously unfettered power 
relationships. Not only did the riots provide a potent example of this kind of 
mobilization of public voice through new media, in which rioters congregated 
through Blackberry Messenger and clean-ups were organized via Twitter, but it 
demonstrated the force of these new formats as a challenge to established power. As 
a result of these shifts we also saw panicked calls to shut down social media and 
mediated elements of youth culture were invoked in an attempt to pin down the ‘folk 
devil’ (Cohen 1972) as a racialised underclass, rabid in pursuit of consumerist 
tokens, speaking in Jamaican patois and relating to one another through text speak 
and rap (Quinn 2011, ‘David Starkey claims the whites have become black’, The 
Guardian, 13th August). What was immediately evident amidst this flurry of activity 
was that there seemed to be an unequivocal demonstration of the power of these new 
media structures as well as a fearful, disproportionate response. 
As such, this seemed like a vital opportunity in which to observe this realm in 
action at a moment of intense extremes, to attempt to capture the full potential of the 
new media landscape in taking control of the meaning of crime. Similarly, in 
observing the construction of crime narratives, the riots presented perhaps the most 
prominent example of classic-type political communication of law and order during 
my research period. In many ways because of the uncertain nature of the riots, the 
political response was one in which strong statements of the meaning of crime and  
criminality were brought to the fore. I will consider these statements in detail, 
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however, at this point it is apt to note that the riots presented a reframing of the 
meaning of crime in action and this flurry of criminal activity provided a unique 
opportunity to develop some answers to the questions posed by previous case 
studies. In the 2010 election we saw that an uncertainty around shifting priorities put 
politicians in a responsive mode, constantly adapting to evolving pressures. We saw 
that classic-type populist narratives were not overly prominent, that they had not 
truly been an essential part of the campaign or at the forefront of strategy. Similarly, 
the use of crime in the riots was employed in order to seem responsive, to appear not 
to be ceding the ground or losing control. With their brutal and almost random acting 
out, rioters infused a sense of powerlessness which politics dealt with using crime 
narratives as a tool for legitimacy. In essence, while these events arrived very much 
out of nowhere and unfolded in chaos, even in their early moments they seemed to 
present an invaluable opportunity to develop some of the discussion touched upon in 
previous chapters and as a result, I began collecting data in order to form a case 
study of the riots. 
 
 
The Case Study Approach 
 
Once again, the inherent value of the case study approach was evident in light 
of the seemingly rich body of data available and the opportunity for insight into the 
core questions of this project. In similar circumstances to the phone hacking scandal, 
while the activities around the riots erupted quickly and without warning, the 
adaptive nature of this kind of case study research allowed me to begin immersing 
myself in the data as events unfolded. While experience from previous data 
collection had underscored the value of a broad view of events, I was also able to 
take advantage of having a more detailed perspective on some of the themes that had 
become prominent in the research so far. As a result, I made an effort to focus on 
prominent instances of political communication, which did occur on several high 
profile occasions during the riots, as well as aiming to capture the utilization of new 
media outlets, which was as varied and chaotic as before but also became a key 
element of criminal activity. As Yin noted, case studies ought to be considered the 
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most appropriate approach “when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed, when 
the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon with some real-life context” (Yin 1994: 1). In this 
instance, the broad view of the activities around this time does help us to 
contextualize the political response to criminal activity and the employment of new 
media, while the lack of control afforded to the researcher is viewed not as 
problematic, but as integrated into the methodological approach.  
The ongoing criminality occurring during the riots lent a slightly different 
tone to this case study than the phone hacking scandal, which was also an 
unpredictable event and was captured as it unfolded with little time for preparation. 
However, while the phone hacking scandal was more of a media event, with 
evidence of previous criminal activity emerging as I conducted the case study, in the 
case of the riots an analysis of the meaning of crime and its development through 
new media required an awareness of criminal acts occurring while the research was 
ongoing. While this might have presented an ethical challenge in research which 
required participant observation, fortunately the case study method meant that I 
could avoid these issues while still being able to capture the unfolding of events and 
the detail of the political construction of crime during this highly charged time.  
My approach to gathering data here built on experience gained during the 
phone hacking scandal, particularly since once again the nature of this event allowed 
for almost no preparation. As such, I employed similar techniques of prioritizing 
sources and honing in on key events, I followed the unfolding of activity using a host 
of media sources, which included print press, television news and commentary such 
as the UK nightly current affairs television programme ‘Newsnight’ and online news 
sources. In particular, I will focus here on public political statements made by Prime 
Minister David Cameron and Kenneth Clarke (the then Justice Secretary), made both 
in speech form and in newspaper articles. I will also aim to capture the particular use 
of social media in the riots, which unfolded in various chaotic ways and which 
served to expand my discussion on the purpose of this realm in criminal justice 
narratives. Finally, retrospective evidence on the riots will be added using the 
detailed and large-scale body of data provided by the Guardian/LSE project Reading 
the Riots.  
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This unique research partnership between the London School of Economics 
and The Guardian represented an opportunity to conduct, as Guardian editor Alan 
Rusbridger suggested  “high-quality social research at a speed and in a way that 
maximizes its likelihood of affecting public and political debate without sacrificing 
any of its rigour” (Lewis et al, Reading the Riots Report 2011: 2). Taking advantage 
of these resources, their project employed 77 researchers and data analysts to attempt 
to fill the perceived gap created by the lack of an inquiry like the Scarman report that 
had followed the 1981 Brixton riots. Confidential interviews with 270 people who 
were directly involved in riots in London, Birmingham, Manchester, Salford, 
Liverpool and Nottingham were conducted, producing 1.3 million words of first 
person accounts. Furthermore, around 2.6 million tweets were analysed. 
 Researchers involved in the social media element of the project found that a 
significant amount of innovation was required in order to grapple with this data. 
Procter, Vis and Voss (2013) take on the vast challenge of advancing research in 
social media, suggesting that “the rapid growth over the past 10 years of the Web as 
a publishing tool, and the recent explosion of social media such as blogs (and micro-
blogs such as Twitter) and social networking sites (such as Facebook) presents both 
an opportunity and a challenge to social researchers” (Procter, Vis and Voss 2013: 
197). Their work builds on Thelwall and Stuart’s (2007) research into 
communication technologies in crisis situations, which found from a study of 
responses during Hurricane Katrina that new media was useful for sharing 
information as the event unfolded and hat the more traditional media outlets built on 
this in covering the aftermath (Thelwall and Stuart 2007). In advancing this research, 
Procter, Vis and Voss (2013: 198-199) focus on the transmission of information in 
the riots, using a vast and privileged body of data which would likely not have been 
available had they not been a part of such a high profile, wide-ranging project: 
 
The Twitter corpus was provided to the Guardian newspaper and its 
collaborators under an agreement with Twitter. The sampling frame was 
public tweets sent during the period 1pm on 6 August and 8pm on 17 August 
2011. The corpus was defined by those tweets matching one or more of 
54hashtags drawn up by the team of Guardian journalists who covered the 
riots. The resultant corpus contains 2.6 million tweets and 700,000 distinct 
user accounts. User profiles for all the accounts in the corpus were also 
provided by Twitter. 
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Not only were the researchers grappling with a huge amount of data, a vast number 
far beyond any level of media research previously conducted, but they were faced 
with a form of communication which was completely distinct from any other. 
Considering these issues, it is unsurprising perhaps that they suggest “the volume 
makes it impossible to analyse using conventional media research methods and 
tools” (Procter, Vis and Vas 2013: 199). Instead they constructed a built for purpose 
coding system using a continuous integration tool which generated groups of code 
frames and facilitated large scale analysis. The project grappled with an issue that I 
had also encountered and had approached from a different perspective throughout 
my research, namely that while the use of social media was widespread and in a 
constant process of evolution, this meant that these significant alterations in the 
communicative sphere were extremely difficult to capture. Ultimately, this heroic 
attempt to use quantitative methods to define this infinite pool of data does provide a 
summary of activity and some insight into the function of Twitter during the riots 
and I will utilise this as part of an approach which aims to analyse the role of social 




The August 4th shooting of Mark Duggan provoked uproar between residents of 
Tottenham (a district in northern London) and the police. While the knowledge that 
Duggan had not actually discharged the weapon on his person was not yet public, 
insinuations that the police had falsely claimed that Duggan initially shot at them and 
a failure on the part of the police to liaise properly with Duggan’s family in the 
aftermath of his killing stoked tensions and resulted in a protest in Tottenham two 
days later that quickly became violent: “Senior officers refused to meet the crowd 
and provide the answers the community were demanding, and when rumours started 
that a police officer monitoring the protest had assaulted a young girl, the crowd got 
angry” (Langston 2012, ‘Remembering the UK Riots’, VICE 6th August). Much of 
the discussion surrounding the August riots focused on an uncertainty around the 
actual causes of the spread of the rioting. A sense of chaos was pervasive and was 
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subsequently reproduced in riots coverage due to a lack of understanding over how 
this single protest could provoke a series of similar events and widespread looting: 
 
The fact that it was birthed from a very spontaneous and personal sense of 
grief, by people who likely had no riot experience, made things very 
unpredictable. And then of course there was the basic severity of it all, 
practically unheard of amongst a generation of British kids who many had 
assumed to be sullen and pissed off but ultimately apathetic (‘Remembering 
the UK Riots’, VICE 6th August 2012). 
 
As this protest escalated, rioters threw bottles and set fire to police cars, while 
looting began on Tottenham High Road which spread to shops in Wood Green and 
continued until dawn (Reading the Riots 2011: 16). These actions seemed to set a 
precedent, as the next day looting occurred in the Enfield and Brixton areas of 
London, sending the message that this kind of theft was easily mobilized in the 
current mood and with large enough groups. The 8th August was described by 
Reading the Riots as “one of the most intense 24 hours of civil unrest in recent 
English history” (Reading the Riots 2011: 17), with 22 of London’s 32 boroughs 
affected, large scale battles against the police occurring in Hackney and widespread 
arson in Croydon. Similar looting and clashes with the police continued over the next 
three days, spreading to other cities in the UK including Manchester, Salford, 
Liverpool, Nottingham and Birmingham, where three young men were fatally injured 
by a car while protecting their property (2011 ‘Three killed protecting property 
during Birmingham riots’, BBC News 10th August). The activities of the rioters 
caused widespread consternation among the general public? over the seemingly 
unpredictable, uncontrollable violence and what the causes of these eruptions could 
be. In some cases, individual incidents seemed to have been provoked by small-scale 
incidents against a backdrop of existing tensions, general violence and opportunism. 
For instance, a first hand account from the second day of rioting suggests that 
exacerbated local tensions between the community and the police and overly 
assertive policing seemed to escalate quickly in the sensitive circumstances: 
 
After running around East London for a while, I found a large crowd on Mare 
Street. For some reason, the police decided to stop and search two black guys 
seemingly at random, highlighting the racial profiling that has been driving a 
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wedge between the authorities and ethnic minorities for decades and 
contributed to the unrest in Tottenham. The police found nothing but their 
actions had wound up the crowd, and when they pulled another young kid 
aside for a pat down, someone lobbed a paving slab at them (Langston 2012, 
VICE, ‘Remembering the UK Riots’ 6th August). 
 
 
Following the inciting incident that had inflated tensions between minority groups 
and the police, race was regularly focused on as an issue at the heart of the riots. 
Murij and Neal (2011) suggest that race was brought to the fore in reflective and 
explanatory discourses due to “the ‘familiarity of the topologies of urban disorder 
[being] profoundly disrupted in the period... when the unrest… mutated into 
something less recognizable and something much more socially and spatially 
surprising” (Murij and Neal 2011: 2.6). However, while Ministry of Justice data on 
ethnicity revealed that ethnic minorities were not necessarily overrepresented; “37% 
of those appearing in the courts on riot-related charges were white, 40% were black 
and 6% Asian” (Reading the Riots 2011: 13), Murij and Neal argue that nonetheless, 
“the 2011 riots were racialised because the events in North London most visibly 
involved young African-Carribean men… and because the unrest that was used as a 
reference point was the racialised disorders of the 1980s rather than the culturalised 
disorders of 2001” (Murij and Neal 2011: 2.7). Building on these general 
misconceptions, race was prominently featured in historian David Starkey’s 
notorious rant on Newsnight in which he referred to Enoch Powell’s ‘rivers of blood 
speech’ in support of a spurious argument that the riots could be attributed to what he 
portrayed as an insidious shift towards the dominance of black culture: 
 
 
The problem is that the whites have become black… His [Powell’s] prophecy 
was absolutely right in one sense. The Tiber did not foam with blood but 
flames lambent, they wrapped around Tottenham and they wrapped around 
Clapham. But it wasn’t inter-community violence. This is where he was 
absolutely wrong. What has happened is that a substantial section of the 
chavs that you wrote about have become black (‘David Starkey claims ‘the 
whites have become black’, The Guardian 13th August 2011). 
 
This high-profile media incident served to sustain focus around race issues as a 
talking point despite the fact that, as Murij and Neal comment, “What the disorders 
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provided insight to was the extent and depth of the super-diversity of England’s 
urban spaces in which rioters, victims, bystanders, youth workers, commentators and 
residents were utterly multicultural and heterogeneous” (Murij and Neal 2011: 2.9). 
 Similarly, early estimates of gang involvement were later re-evaluated and 
played down as the riots unfolded, with increasing awareness that some more 
nebulous force had prompted the spread of rioting rather than any kind of traditional, 
coordinated gang activity. Reading the Riots details this shift, noting that, “After 
initially claiming that as many as 28% of those arrested in London were gang 
members, the Metropolitan police revised this to 19%, a figure that dropped to 13% 
countrywide” (Reading the Riots 2011: 21). The study suggests that while some gang 
members were present, they were not as David Cameron claimed on 11th August 
2011 “at the heart of the protests [or] behind the co-ordinated attacks” (Reading the 
Riots 2011: 21). We can see that to blame gang activity would have provided a 
handy narrative here, explaining the unusual spread of looting and violence and the 
quite fast-moving co-ordination among rioters. 
 However, it was later revealed that this level of organization had been 
primarily facilitated through widespread social media tools. For instance, Reading 
the Riots found that a particular message had been easily spread around particular 
personal communication networks using the ‘Blackberry Messenger’ (BBM) instant 
text message service available to Blackberry mobile phone users and had “pinged 
out, first on to a few phones, then dozens, then hundreds across north London: 
‘Everyone in edmonton enfield wood green everywhere in north link up at enfield 
town statin at 4 o clock sharp!!!!” (Reading the Riots 2011: 30, emphasis in 
original). As information unfolded linking riot gatherings to a spread of BBMs, 
commentators lashed out at social media communication more generally. High 
profile calls to close down Twitter were made by David Cameron and Conservative 
MP Louise Mensch (Halliday 2011,‘Tory MP Louise Mensch backs social network 
blackouts during civil unrest’, The Guardian 12th August) and were largely aimed at 
the wrong outlet, with authorities such as the Greater Manchester police claiming 
that on the contrary, Twitter had been useful in “allow[ing] authorities to correct 
rumours before they gather[ed] momentum” (The Guardian 12th August 2011). 
However, the ability for large, unconnected groups to mobilise in particular areas had 
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indeed been facilitated by this spread of BBMs and had allowed rioting to take place 
without the input of gangs, adding to the sense of panic around the unknown, a new 
uncertainty around the cause and spread of such activities.  
 With no singular cause or particular narrative to follow, along with the 
prominence of looting, many commentators turned to ‘consumerism’ as the driving 
force behind riots. Zygmunt Bauman suggested that “this particular social minefield 
has been created by the combination of consumerism with rising inequality” 
(‘Interview- Zygmunt Bauman on the UK Riots’, Social Europe Journal 15th August 
2011). He spoke of the rioters as ‘frustrated consumers’ in revolt: “This was… a 
mutiny of defective and disqualified consumers, people offended and humiliated by 
the display of riches to which they had been denied access” (Social Europe Journal 
15th August 2011). Indeed, the vivid scenes of high street looting seemed to support 
this theory, in which the consumerist-in-nature choices of the theft of items such as 
trainers and TVs were cited as evidence of a widespread social ill that could be 
linked to increased inequalities: “This is what happens when people don’t have 
anything, when they have their noses constantly rubbed in stuff that can’t afford, and 
they have no reason ever to believe that they will be able to afford it” (Lyons 2011, 
‘The UK riots: the psychology of looting’, The Guardian, 9th August). While a 
certain level of confusion had arisen initially around the motivations or political 
focus of the rioting, the looting element seemed to crystallise opinion around this 
general, rabid consumerism and along with the enhanced communicative capacity 
provided by social media, helped to redefine these as a wholly new type of rioting.   
 While reports emerged that those involved had not necessarily come from an 
impoverished background and that consumerist looting seemed not to be framed as a 
direct attack on corporations, discussion around the opportunistic nature of rioters 
emerged and became an integral element of the political narrative on rioting. I will 
consider the various political statements made at this time in some detail in this 
chapter. However, it is worth noting here that this time of uncertainty and panic 
provoked several strong statements, attacking in tone, which defined the acts of the 
rioters in memorable, bold soundbites: “This is criminality pure and simple” (David 
Cameron, 9th August 2011). We saw the Conservative ‘Broken Britain’ theme 
revived and Ken Clarke deemed those involved “a feral underclass” (Kenneth Clarke 
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blames English riots on a ‘broken penal system’, The Guardian 5th September 2011). 
While Clarke took the opportunity to argue for penal reform, most attacks from the 
Prime Minister adopted a moralistic tone and served to define the acts as 
opportunistic, rather than structurally-rooted, or in any way an anomic response to 
broader societal issues of inequality.  
 The research conducted by Reading the Riots confirmed that the rioters 
themselves viewed the cause of looting as opportunism, concluding that “a perceived 
suspension of normal rules presented them with an opportunity to acquire goods and 
luxury items they could not ordinarily afford” (Reading the Riots 2011: 5). Phase 1 
of the findings also suggested that as had been indicated, the role of gangs had been 
initially overstated, that a local anger at the treatment from police had played an 
integral role in exacerbating tensions, and that Twitter and Facebook had not been 
used by the rioters themselves, but rather BBMs were “used extensively to 
communicate, share information and plan in advance of the riots” (Reading the Riots 
2011: 4). Furthermore, while some reports highlighted instances of rioters who were 
socioeconomically secure, Reading the Riots found that 59% of rioters were from the 
most deprived 20% of areas of the UK (Reading the Riots 2011: 5). Notably, while 
consumerism and opportunism had featured heavily in rioters’ accounts, several 
other ‘motivating grievances’ were given: “from the increase in tuition fees, to the 
closure of youth services and the scrapping of the education maintenance allowance” 
(Reading the Riots 2011: 5). The study paid particular attention to the grievances 
cited in interviews, with the particular aim of asserting whether copycat instances 
had truly been as mindless as suggested. As was reported after analysis of the 
interview data, “what a great many shared, and talked animatedly about, was 
injustice and inequality” (Reading the Riots 2011: 24), many citing more general 
grievances with the government and the economic situation: 
 
I think some people were there for justice for that boy who got killed. And 
the rest of them because of what’s happening. The cuts, the government not 
doing the right thing. No job, no money. And the young these days needs to 
be heard. It’s got to be justice for them. [A woman in her 30s, involved in 
riots in North London.] (Reading the Riots 2011: 25). 
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The events of the riots represented social unrest at its most modern; a lashing out that 
seemingly had its roots in economic injustice, that manifested itself through an 
expression of consumerism and which was facilitated by youth-orientated new 
media. As we will see, the response to the riots was panicked and aimed to 
criminalise the participants in order to redefine them as a knowable force. The 
communication of crime was used here not only to reinforce legitimacy, but 
subsequently? as a tool to reframe the issue, to redefine rioters as criminals 
motivated by the kind of criminal urges that come from a lapse in moral judgement, 
rather than to acknowledge an endemically frustrated youth, worn down by a harsh 





Beyond Reading the Riots (2011), various strands of academic work have aimed to 
explain the chaotic events of August 2011. The unfolding of political debate and the 
honing in from widespread confusion to a stance of overt certainty was detailed by 
Murij and Neal (2011), who argued that the ambiguity of the time was eventually 
dealt with through a political adoption, particularly from the coalition parties, of 
“totalizing explanations sought in relation to criminality and morality” (Murij and 
Neal 2011: 3.1). They suggest that Home Secretary Theresa May initiated a 
forcefully simplistic explanation of events, deeming them “‘pure thuggery’ and the 
rioters as ‘criminals’” (Murij and Neal 2011: 3.1). This narrative was continued by 
Mayor of London Boris Johnson who adopted a similar tone, maintaining that “It’s 
time we stopped hearing all this (you know) nonsense about how there are deep 
sociological justifications for wanton criminality and destruction of peoples’ 
property” (Murij and Neal 2011: 3.1). Ultimately, they argue that we see a new 
approach emerging, in which a ‘complexity viewpoint’ is in play along with these 
initially dominant ‘simplistic causal explanations’.  
 Baker (2011) agues that “the recent unrest was significantly enhanced by the 
development of new social media, requiring new understandings of mediated crowd 
membership in the twenty-first century” (Baker 2011: 1). Building on Thompson 
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(2000), Baker argues for a recognition of the ‘media age’ in which new media 
developments have redefined emotional relations and “have had a considerable 
impact on mediated forms of crowd membership by increasing the speed of public 
communication, and the scope of social networking to a plurality of non-present 
others” (Baker 2011: 1.2). She discusses the lack of necessity for ‘the crowd’ to be 
defined by bodily co-presence, or in a “spatial and temporal proximity”, rather the 
influence of new media on the political realm and on the public ability to gather 
round an issue, now represents “an interactive community that both traverses and 
intersects geographical public space and the virtual public sphere” (Baker 2011: 1.2).  
Baker argues that in opposition to Giddens’ (1991) contention that these new media 
forms can act as “disembedding mechanisms, that dislocate social relations from the 
confines of time and space” (Baker 2011: 2.2), crucially we ought instead to view 
these technologies as not replacing traditional group gatherings or face to face 
communication, but extending these to enhance our communicative experience. A 
further obvious benefit from this augmented virtual-real realm is the capacity to draw 
in a much wider net of participants. Particularly, as we have seen in the activities of 
the 2010 election, the democratic nature of public debate is enhanced by increased 
public participation and in acts of protest, whether peaceful as in the Occupy 
Movement or as in the more chaotic riots, there is certainly an ease of large-scale 
mobilisation. Indeed, Baker’s vision of the mediated crowd and the fusion of real 
space and virtual space in the crowd develops our understanding of the riots, in that 
we see an initial act occur as part of a very traditional crowd gathering, the tensions 
rising from established community issues and the heating up and production of 
chaotic bursts of energy through the physical congregation. We then see that the 
particular demographic involved in this initial event is one which enjoys a certain 
comfort level in the mediated realm. In this case, the Blackberry Messenger function 
is the extension of the geographical crowd into the mediated crowd and while the 
spread of the riots baffled many commentators, for those involved, the intimacy of 
communication now regularly experienced through these modes meant a natural 
progression. In essence, the riots demonstrate more than ever that the new media 
realm must be appreciated as a forceful element in present day communication, 
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particularly in times of political tension, of outrage, of protest and of democratic 
exchange. 
    
 
‘Criminality Pure and Simple’: The Development of a Narrative 
 
The chaos of the riots and the surrounding fear stirred by a lack of focus for public 
ire provoked political responses that reached initially for force. The panic created by 
the unpredictable spread of such acts and their accompanying violence, vandalism, 
looting and altercations with the police was tackled by politicians with a deployment 
of traditional crime narratives that aimed to reframe the events as a known force 
rather than something completely outwith the experience of our public authority 
figures. Rather than exploring the complex motivating factors at play here, most 
initial public statements adopted moralistic ‘us versus them’ themes, reaching for 
legitimacy by framing the rioters as the villainous ‘other’.  
 As Murij and Neal (2011) discussed, Home Secretary Theresa May was first 
to frame the riots in these terms through her statement from the Home Office on 8th 
August 2011 (2011, ‘Theresa May: London rioters will be brought to justice’, BBC 
News 8th August). What was particularly noticeable in political communication 
during the riots was the various attempts by politicians to both reinstate order 
through authority and in various examples attempting to seem to be addressing 
public needs by speaking from the affected areas. Both approaches yielded varying 
levels of success, but here the government response is launched by the Home 
Secretary, from the Home Office, with Home Office insignia visible behind her, 
projecting a certain air of authority from which she makes several assertive, 
repetitive statements. She begins:  
 
The riots that took place in Tottenham on Saturday night and the subsequent 
disturbances in other parts of London are totally unacceptable. 
 
We hear several political expressions around this time of the riots being 
‘unacceptable’ and the majority of the statement given by Theresa May stays in this 
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realm, offering general denigration of the acts and stating forcefully that they are 
disapproved of, while skilfully avoiding addressing any of the complex issues at the 
heart of the riots. 
 
Once again I would like to pay tribute to the brave police officers who put 
themselves in harms way to protect the public, their property and local 
businesses… 
 
Here there is an attempt to reinforce the police as a body who are wholly in service 
of the public and are on the side of the public, against the rioters who are ‘othered’. 
This introduces an attempt to re-establish state legitimacy and project some 
confidence that the government can take control of the spiralling situation. 
 
Let me be absolutely clear. Those responsible for this violence and looting 
will be made to face the consequences of their actions. 
 
So far there have been at least 215 arrests and 27 people have been charged, 
but as the police take statements from witnesses, as they look at CCTV 
evidence, then more arrests will be made. 
 
This mention of CCTV evidence and the gathering of witness statements is included 
as an attempt to suggest to the public and to rioters that the police do have an upper 
hand in tackling criminal activity. One of the significant struggles for the 
government and the police at this point in the riots was to regain some level of 
control over a situation they seemed not to be on top of, they seemed not to 
understand at its root and they seemed unable to stop. In this small way, Theresa 
May attempts again to reframe these events as a traditional crime, with which the 
police have experience and technological capabilities to best the wild criminal 
activities occurring on the streets of London. 
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Since Saturday night, Londoners have made clear that there are no excuses 
for violence and I would call on all members of local communities to work 
constructively with the police to help them bring these criminals to justice. 
 
Again, this aims to reframe ‘Londoners’ as victims of a rogue criminal cohort rather 
than in association with this disaffected group and implores them to associate with 
the police effort to tackle this traditionally defined ‘crime’. An interviewer goes on to 
ask: 
 
Home Secretary having said all of that there is trouble again tonight in 
London… Why couldn’t you or the police stop this? Is there going to be more 
trouble tonight? 
 
In the question and answer segment of this statement we see that the Home Secretary 
is pressed on the chaos and the seeming lack of control held by the police, but her 
response is to repeat again and again that these acts are inexcusable: 
 
Let’s be absolutely clear that there is no excuse for violence, there is no 
excuse for looting, there is no excuse for thuggery. The police will obviously 
deal with any emerging situations as they consider best.. appropriate for those 
situations. But I am absolutely clear there is no excuse for looters or thuggery 
or violence on the streets. 
 
The phrase ‘let’s be absolutely clear’ is used here several times and by other 
politicians throughout the riots in an attempt to hammer home some legitimacy 
through clarity in this unruly situation. The phrase ‘there is no excuse’ is repeated 
again and again to emphasise indignation at these events but also to define the acts as 
clear, as criminal, as unrelated to complex socioeconomic factors. Throughout the 
riots we see a frustration from politicians at such claims and a forceful deflection 
away from any laying of blame at their own feet. The emphasis on clarity and ‘no 
excuse’ helps rhetorically to maintain a position of legitimacy and it seems to 
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provide a way forward that might not necessarily deal with the rioting but will at 
least serve to calm public nerves. The interviewer continues: 
 
Do you understand for some people the perception may be… there are kids 
going round on bikes, there are youths arranging to meet across London on 
their phones, it looks lawless out there, the police look like they’re on the 
back foot. 
 
This mention of lawlessness directly contradicts the Home Secretary’s rhetoric and 
results in an assertive repetition of these themes of ‘othering’ the rioters, of evoking 
a deceptive level of clarity and of pushing away complex explanations as ‘excuses’ 
which ought to be dismissed in favour of force: 
 
The police have been policing our streets and again I say I pay tribute to the 
officers who are putting themselves in harm’s way to protect people, their 
property and local businesses, but I say let’s be clear, there is no excuse for 
violence, there is no excuse for looters, there is no excuse for thuggery on our 
streets and those who are responsible will be brought to justice and they will 
face the consequences of their actions. 
 
Violence, looters and ‘thuggery’ are evoked in direct contrast to the officers putting 
themselves in harm’s way to protect the public. A clear line is drawn in constructing 
these events into helpless communities and honourable police officers versus the 
thuggery of the criminal rioters. Again, focus is put on bringing rioters ‘to justice’, 
which deflects away from considerations of why the riots might be occurring, 
allowing no room for consideration of motivating factors, brushing this aside as 
simple thuggery, basic understandable, unavoidable inherent criminality. ‘No 
excuse’ is repeated again and again in an attempt to say that there will be no 
consideration of causal factors, a point that the interviewer presses again: 
 
Final point, the deputy mayor for London Kit Malthouse thinks this is 
basically criminals using this for cover to just quote ‘steal trainers and steal 
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TVs’. Do you agree with that or is it about something deeper, economy and 
jobs? 
 
Theresa May responds: 
 
I think this is about sheer criminality, that is what we have seen on the streets, 
the violence we’ve seen, the looting we’ve seen, the thuggery we’ve seen, 
this is sheer criminality and let’s make no bones about it and that’s why I say 
that these people will be brought to justice, they will be made to face the 
consequences of their actions and I call on all members of local communities 
to work with the police constructively to help the police to bring these 
criminals to justice. 
 
Violence, looting, thuggery, repeated again, ‘thuggery’ the added descriptive word, 
defining the acts again as the inevitable actions of the thugs of our society. ‘Sheer 
criminality’ emphasises this point again, while the focus on being ‘brought to justice’ 
deflects attention to the punishment rather than tackling the cause. It is clear from 
Theresa May’s very forceful, repetitive statement, deflecting from causal factors and 
towards reframing the debate, that very little is being given away here. What is most 
telling about the noticeable level of repetition here is that it uses up time while giving 
away very little. May’s statement cedes very little control by utterly refusing to 
engage with broader causal factors. Indeed, the higher purpose of wanton criminality 
is invoked to facilitate this denial, presumably because to focus on criminal acts and 
the need for immediate action would undermine the argument that broad 
socioeconomic factors or wide-scale dissatisfaction with the status quo could have be 
at the heart of this unrest. We see here that in times of panic and of narrative chaos, 
that ‘crime’ is a powerful tool in clutching at legitimacy and in deflecting from 
accusatory complexity. 
 David Cameron continues this theme of force and of dismissing nuance in his 
first address to the public, in this case utilizing all of the ceremony of the office of 
Prime Minister to emanate control. He delivers a written speech, with no questions 
taken, from a podium in front of 10 Downing Street and with a police officer visible 
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behind him. He begins by citing some of the official agencies with which he has met, 
invoking COBRA and high-ranking officials to assert authority: 
 
I’ve come straight from a meeting of the government’s COBRA committee 
for dealing with emergencies, where we’ve been discussing the action that we 
will be taking to help the police to deal with the disorder on the streets of 
London and elsewhere in our country. I’ve also met with the Metropolitan 
Police Commissioner and the Home Secretary to discuss this further (‘UK 
riots are sickening’, ITN 9th August 2011). 
 
He then turns his attention to reinforcing the ‘us versus them’ theme, the ‘othering’ 
of the rioters: 
 
And people should be in no doubt that we will do everything necessary to 
restore order to Britain’s streets and to make them safe for the law-abiding. 
 
This not only aims to calm public fears by promising order but by defining the 
rioters, as Theresa May had done, as a known force, as clearly in opposition of the 
law-abiding, rather than allowing for the possibility that their might be some fluidity 
in definition here. Absolute condemnation is then invoked: 
 
Let me first of all completely condemn the scenes that we have seen on our 
television screens and people have witnessed in their communities. These are 
sickening scenes, scenes of people looting, vandalizing, thieving, robbing, 
scenes of people attacking police officers and even attacking fire crews as 
they’re trying to put out fires.  
 
Notably, Cameron addresses ‘the scenes’ that the public have witnessed. This 
statement, more explicitly than ever, is not just for the victims of crime, nor merely 
aimed at rioters themselves, but it is for the fearful public, those who have merely 
seen or heard of events and have felt personally insecure. Again, pitting rioters 
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against fire crews aiming to put out fires makes the distinction between ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ clearer than ever and certainty is restored. 
 
This is criminality pure and simple and it has to be confronted and defeated. 
 
Perhaps Cameron’s most iconic statement of the riots, ‘criminality pure and simple’ 
dismisses nuance and instead suggests that there is some unavoidable, instinctive, 
choice-driven notion of criminality that is revealed when the opportunity is provided. 
This deflects blame or even discussion away from socioeconomic issues, away from 
dissatisfaction with unemployment. ‘Confronted and defeated’ rather than 
understood and treated is utilised here as a theme that tells us a great deal about the 
potency of the notion of ‘crime’ in today’s political realm. More than ever, when the 
opportunity to control events or to command the narrative shifts towards a vocal and 
empowered public, a public who by their nature infuses multiple, uncontrollable 
narratives into the discourse, the fallback position of the government in desperate 
need of a boost in legitimacy is a crime narrative that is active, panicked, that relies 
on a simple, classic good versus evil theme. This isn’t really about populism, since 
there is no developed, manipulative construction and satisfying of public fears here; 
penal populism requires political control, and it requires the deployment of cynicism 
through willing media forces that just doesn’t exist in this realm. This is a fall-back 
position in a time of panic, that seeming to cede the ground, to fail to employ this 
one-note, last resort attack on criminality at least provides certainty in a time of mass 
confusion. Along with falling back on punitiveness, we also see familiar allusions to 
victimhood, themes which again are drawn into simplistic ideal victims versus the 
‘other’ criminal element, an approach which does not under any circumstances allow 
for consideration of broad-scale victimization which may have had a hand in these 
events: 
 
I feel huge sympathy for the families who suffered, innocent people who 
have been burned out of their houses and to businesses who have seen their 




I also feel for all those who live in fear because of these appalling scenes that 
we have seen on the streets of our country. 
 
Again, the public are drawn in and reframed as victims rather than outraged citizens. 
This turns any ire towards the government or towards broader causal factors instead 
against the apparently knowing, blameworthy element of our society. We see the 
justice system employed in defence of this forced dichotomy: 
 
People should be in no doubt that we are on the side of the law-abiding, law-
abiding people who are appalled by what has happened in their own 
communities… I am determined, the government is determined that justice 
will be done and these people will see the consequences of their actions. 
And I have this very clear message to those people who are responsible for 
this wrongdoing and criminality. You will feel the full force of the law. And 
if you are old enough to commit these crimes you are old enough to face the 
punishments. And to these people I would say this, you are not only wrecking 
the lives of others, you’re not only wrecking your own communities, you are 
potentially wrecking your own life too. 
 
The ‘force of the law’ is employed here to satiate the fearful public. The Prime 
Minister and the government have very little credibility in this debate and yet they 
have at their disposal the full force of the criminal justice system. As such, this is the 
tool employed here to send out the message of control, to calm nerves and end the 
chaos. 
 
 This thorough and high profile rhetorical assault that aimed to regain control 
over events continued later that day in Clapham Junction on the 9th August when 
London Mayor Boris Johnson took to the streets to address crowds, flanked by Home 
Secretary Theresa May. A great deal of criticism at the time had circulated around 
various politicians continuing to holiday during what would ordinarily mark a 
Parliamentary recess and an uneventful time in politics, but which had clearly 
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descended into an emergency state. Johnson in particular received a certain amount 
of criticism for not seeming to have returned quickly enough (Hardcastle 2011, 
‘Boris Johnson unwisely refused to cut short his holiday when the riots broke out in 
London’, Daily Mail 10th August) and as such, headed immediately upon his return 
on to the streets of the affected areas of London to make public statements. This act 
was possibly intended to visually reframe Johnson as back at the heart of the issue, 
although the practicalities of conducting a media event of this nature clashed with the 
obvious tensions still felt in these communities and resulted in a raucous, muddled 
back and forth with locals that challenged Johnson’s intended approach of seeming 
forceful, of aiming to regain control.  
 At 15.10 Johnson arrives at his first destination in Clapham Junction with 
Theresa May, met with a crowd erupting in heckles. His body language emanates 
discomfort, he asks for quiet, he directly faces crowd members with arms folded and 
incensed facial expressions, crowd members themselves ask other bystanders for 
quiet which seems to symbolically undermine any power held by Johnson in this 
situation. He begins by thanking those who have been involved in the cleanup effort, 
stating “That is the real spirit of London… how very sorry I am for the loss and 
damage you have suffered” (Davies 2011, ‘Boris Johnson heckled in Clapham 
Junction over London riots’, The Guardian 9th August). Hecklers in the crowd 
continue to interrupt his speech shouting;  "What happened… Where were the 
police?" (The Guardian 9th August 2011). The unruly nature of this situation stands 
in direct opposition to the control exerted by May from the Home Office. Here, 
Johnson aims to take advantage of this positioning to regain authority, yet the 
visceral fury of those locals who had felt victimized by the riots and fearful of 
continued chaos used their voices to undermine his authority, to force him to directly 
engage with their true complaints. This puts Johnson in the difficult position of not 
being easily able to control the narrative as May and Cameron had and is a poignant 
reminder of the gradual erosion of the political capacity to do so. Indeed, again and 
again we see in politics that public figures are forced to hear the public voice and this 
is an instance in which the collective public wrath is unavoidable.   
 Johnson ignores the questions posed and continues to try to elevate his voice 
to shout over the hecklers, stumbling and repeating several times; “I also want to say, 
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I also want to say… can you hear me at the back?” (Taken from notes on televised 
speech, 9th August 2011):  
 
I also want to say to the people who have been involved in instigating these 
riots, those who have been robbing and stealing, that they will be caught, they 
will be apprehended and they will face punishments that they will bitterly 
regret. 
 
This builds on Cameron’s message that the full force of the law will be deployed as 
the most  powerful tool in the government’s arsenal to try to calm the chaos. Johnson 
uses less neutral wording, that the rioters will ‘bitterly regret’ their involvement and 
this only belies a certain level of panic behind the intent. The heckling continues and 
it’s notable that much of the public questioning does not focus on punishment or the 
criminal justice system or in laying blame, but in issues of policing. Johnson 
eventually responds by shouting over the crowd: 
 
I know there are questions about the police response and about police 
numbers, I understand that, and we are certainly going to be dealing with 
those 
A woman then forcefully interrupts: 
You talk about robust policing. What does that actually mean? 
To which Johnson responds: 
Tonight, we are going to have huge numbers of police on the streets…  
… he begins until he is interrupted again: 
But where were they? By 5pm, we knew they were going to hit. I was in my 
salon when a brick came through the window, and no one was there to defend 
me. 
At this point, Johnson is being drowned out by heckles, he runs his hands through his 
hair, he sounds severely lacking in confidence in the claims he makes about policing. 
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Someone in the crowd starts to ask about Mark Duggan which he stutters over and 
starts to become panicked as he loses control of the situation. His voice lowers and 
lowers until he seems to address a totally different point, at which point he becomes 
animated again and bellows a forceful statement:  
I think it is time that people who are engaged in looting and violence stopped 
hearing economic and social justifications for what they... for what they’ve 
done. 
 
He ends the statement on this note, having largely failed to communicate in any 
meaningful way with the angry residents around him and having also failed to take 
command in the manner that Cameron or May had done so previously. What is 
interesting about Johnson’s last minute denigration of ‘economic and social 
justification’ is the confirmation that these kind of broad level discussions around 
causality have been positioned by the Conservative party in direct opposition to their 
forceful law and order stance. Despite failing to deliver this certainty, we can see the 
political position-taking here is pre-emptive against attacks on the government for 
being to blame for these riots. Again, this is a crucial element of the nature of 
criminal justice rhetoric in politics today, that the main aim seems most prominently 
to avoid blame. 
 
Shifting the Narrative 
In the early stages of the riots, in which this forceful public order protection narrative 
was at the heart of discussion, no party wished to cede the ground or take blame for 
seeming not to be forceful enough on dealing with criminality. On the 9th of August 
Labour leader Ed Miliband stated “Different people have different views but there 
are no excuses” (2011 ‘Ed Miliband: No excuses for rioting’, BBC News, 9th 
August), which alluded to the notion that there were broader discussions to be had, 
but that the Labour party would not be the scapegoat for Boris Johnson’s outrage at 
the economic and social debates which were being framed as justifications.  
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 Indeed, on the 11th August, in his House of Commons speech, Ed Miliband 
went on to explicitly state “there can be no excuses, no justification” (Ed Miliband 
speech, 11th August 2011), again semantically avoiding becoming the ‘soft on crime’ 
party here. He also took the opportunity to seem to be pushing for tough sentences: 
Does the prime minister agree that magistrates and judges need to have those 
circumstances at the front of their mind so that those found guilty of this 
disgraceful behaviour receive the tough sentences they deserve and the public 
expect? 
In this instance, Miliband refers to ‘aggravating circumstances’ which might make 
sentences harsher, rather than ‘mitigating circumstances’ which might aim to explain 
why the crimes had been committed. Again, there is an ‘acting tough’ that happens 
here for show, to technically maintain the position of just as ‘tough on crime’ as the 
other parties. We see then that once this necessary justification of position has taken 
place, that Miliband attempts to mention the unmentionable, to suggest that there 
may be some complex causality at play here: 
The prime minister said in 2006 "Understanding the background, the reasons, 
the causes. It doesn’t mean excusing crime but it will help us to tackle it. To 
seek to explain is not to seek to excuse. Of course these are acts of individual 
criminality. But we have a duty to ask ourselves why there are people who 
feel they have nothing to lose, and everything to gain, from wanton 
vandalism and looting. 
In reaching to a quote from the past, we see that Miliband is aiming to reframe the 
debate not in terms of these panicked times, but rather with reference to broader 
ideological stances on crime. In essence, this demonstrates the force of the moral 
panic or the high profile criminal event in defining criminal justice approaches in 
politics and in subsequent policy. It is in moments such as these that parties are 
forced to individually reframe and publicly restate their stance on approaches to 
crime. In political decision making on crime, there is rarely a behind the scenes, 
carefully orchestrated policy approach in which long term research projects are 
considered. Particularly in Westminster politics, we see that high profile events such 
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as this, such as the Bulger murders and the subsequent ‘Prison Works’ phenomenon, 
these unpredictable criminal events and the reactions they elicit are integral in the 
formation of criminal justice approaches. Miliband’s careful assertion that to attempt 
to understand does not excuse is necessary in this fearful environment and it does 
aim to push the dialogue towards longer term considerations: 
The causes are complex. Simplistic responses will not provide the answer. 
We need to look at and act on all the issues that matter: The responsibility we 
need from top to bottom in our society, including parental responsibility. The 
take what you can culture, that needs to change from the benefits office to the 
boardroom. A sustained effort to tackle the gangs in our cities, something we 
knew about before these riots.  
We see longer term approaches referred to here and even allusions to the ‘take what 
you can culture’ of the boardroom, connecting the street-level acts of the riots to 
broad frustrations at the abuses committed by UK elites and the subsequent strain 
created by inequality. This narrative was further developed by Ed Miliband on the 
12th August when he explicitly linked the riots to various recent scandals: 
There is an issue which went to all our souls - this is an issue not just about 
the responsibility and irresponsibility we saw on the streets of Tottenham. 
It's about irresponsibility, wherever we find it in our society. We've seen in 
the past few years MPs' expenses, what happened in the banks, what 
happened with phone hacking (‘Riots and looting? Blame expenses cheat 
MPs, phone hackers and bankers for society losing its ‘sense of right and 
wrong’ says Miliband’, Daily Mail, 12th August 2011). 
 
The speech given by David Cameron to the House of Commons on the 11th stuck 
rigidly to the forceful ant-crime, anti-criminal ‘othering’ of his initial statement, 
using harsh, evocative wording, repeating some of his previous comments: 
The whole country has been shocked by the most appalling scenes of people 
looting, violence, vandalising and thieving. It is criminality pure and simple. 
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And there is absolutely no excuse for it (‘UK riots: text of David Cameron’s 
address to commons’, The Telegraph, 11th August 2011). 
 
This speech served to repeat much of what had been previously said and was 
expanded upon in what became referred to as the ‘fightback’ speech on August 15th 
in which he outlined the various ways in which this problem ought to be tackled: 
 
It is time for our country to take stock. Last week we saw some of the most 
sickening acts on our streets. I’ll never forget talking to Maurice Reeves, 
whose family had run the Reeves furniture store in Croydon for generations. 
This was an 80-year-old man who had seen the business he had loved, that 
his family had built up for generations, simply destroyed. A hundred years of 
hard work, burned to the ground in a few hours. But now that the fires have 
been put out and the smoke has cleared, the question hangs in the air: ‘Why? 
How could this happen on our streets and in our country? 
 
We see a familiar anecdotal approach that had been widely adopted during the 2010 
electoral campaign and which was often used to allow the politicians to seem to 
relate in a human way to the struggles of victims of crime. Cameron then addresses 
the broader causality at play while sticking rigidly to his rhetoric of individualistic, 
rational criminality as the core motivation: 
 
But what we know for sure is that in large parts of the country this was just 
pure criminality. 
So as we begin the necessary processes of inquiry, investigation, listening 
and learning: let’s be clear. 
These riots were not about race: the perpetrators and the victims were white, 
black and Asian. These riots were not about government cuts: they were 
directed at high street stores, not Parliament. And these riots were not about 
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poverty: that insults the millions of people who, whatever the hardship, 
would never dream of making others suffer like this. 
No, this was about behaviour… 
…people showing indifference to right and wrong… 
…people with a twisted moral code… 
…people with a complete absence of self-restraint. 
We see that eventually there has been a breakdown of the simple criminality rhetoric 
and Cameron has been forced to address these arguments and does so by answering 
them with a reaffirmation of this ethos. There is some reference to the bad example 
set by elites: 
But politicians shying away from speaking the truth about behaviour, about 
morality… 
…this has actually helped to cause the social problems we see around us. 
We have been too unwilling for too long to talk about what is right and what 
is wrong. 
We see the Prime Minister still aim to reaffirm his original ‘criminality pure and 
simple’ rhetoric, but that his ability to do so with traditional, uninterrupted vigour 
has been stymied by the development of the popular narrative, that there has been 
some level of support for nuance infused into the debate.  
 I have argued since the outset of this project that following the development 
of crime narratives with an enhanced awareness of the public voice is a way by 
which we might better understand criminal justice decision-making in the public 
realm. I would suggest that this example, of the development of crime narratives in 
the riots can tell us a great deal about the sometimes contradictory stances taken by 
politicians on law and order. For instance, following the various political speeches I 
have discussed, one of the most prominent political ‘communications’ of crime that 
followed was the article written by Justice Secretary Ken Clarke in the Guardian on 
the 5th September 2011, which famously categorized rioters as a “feral underclass, 
cut off from the mainstream in everything but materialism” (Clarke 2011, ‘Punish 
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the feral rioters, but address our social deficit too’, The Guardian, 5th September). 
This is political rhetoric at its most contradictory. Firstly, Clarke employs forceful 
language of denigration: 
  
The riots in August shocked me to the core. What I found most disturbing 
was the sense that the hardcore of rioters came from a feral underclass, cut 
off from the mainstream in everything but its materialism. Equally worrying 
was the instinctive criminal behaviour of apparently random passers-by.  
 
We see the ‘second-order consensus’ still in operation here, where even in a 
relatively liberal setting, in a comment page in The Guardian, he still feels the need 
not to give the sense that he isn’t shocked and appalled by the ‘criminal’ acts. He 
uses evocative words like ‘disturbing’ and ‘worrying’ to give a sense that he is in 
touch with the public sense of fear.  
 
What are the lessons for the justice system? 
The first is that disorder on our streets must be met with a firm, fast and  
sustained response.  
 
The ‘second-order consensus’ continues to remain prominent here, with the firm, fast 
response to criminal activity the priority. This is a particular trend of law and order 
politics in recent years and throughout this case study; that before any allusion to 
approaches such as rehabilitation can be made, a token statement is made which both 
relates to the emotions possibly felt by the public and taking swift action to stay on 
top of any unfolding situation. This is a new certainty of the second-order consensus.  
 
The second lesson of the riots is that they reaffirm the central point of any 
sane criminal justice policy: where crimes have been committed, offenders 
must be properly punished and pay back to the communities they have 
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damaged. The scale of the violence and looting was new, but crimes like 
arson and burglary are not – and our courts do deal severe punishments to 
serious offenders. 
 
Here we see Clarke develop this ‘on the side of the public’ narrative, alluding to 
‘sane’ criminal justice policy as proper punishment. Again, the use of ‘sane’ in his 
language here frames punitiveness as the natural approach, the least that can be done. 
 
Needless to say, sentences have been variously attacked as too soft and too 
tough. I could draw the conclusion that in the main, the judges have probably 
been getting it about right – but, of course, only those in court know the full 
facts of each case. The judiciary in this country is independent and we should 
trust judges and magistrates to base decisions on individual circumstances. 
Injustices can occur in any system: but that's precisely why we enjoy the 
services of the court of appeal. 
 
There is a standard defence of the judiciary here, an upholding of the legitimacy of 
the arms of the state, an approach also frequently favoured in discussions of the 
police in political statements. In the face of disproportionate sentencing, it would 
disturb the second order consensus, it would create panic to suggest any displeasure 
with the courts. Notably, we then see Clarke’s position shift slightly, having ensured 
sufficient coverage of all of the requisite elements of an acceptable law and order 
statement, he moves on to address some of the underlying causes attributed to the 
criminal activity: 
 
It’s not yet been widely recognised, but the hardcore of the rioters were, in 
fact, known criminals. Close to three-quarters of those aged 18 or over 
charged with riot offences already had a prior conviction. That is the legacy 
of a broken penal system – one whose record in preventing reoffending has 
been straightforwardly dreadful. 
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This framing of the penal system as anything but the absolute answer to criminality 
represents a significant shift in penal rhetoric. It is clear that these are the views held 
by the Justice Secretary and that he has seized the opportunity of crisis, of the calls 
for nuance motivated by the chaotic public voice to shift the political approach to law 
and order. As I have discussed throughout this project, speaking in favour of 
rehabilitation or against prisons is an unprecedented move, one which further 
undermines deterministic Neoliberal accounts and the intrinsic link of ‘Penal 
Populism’. Clarke continues: 
 
I am introducing radical changes to focus our penal system relentlessly on 
proper, robust punishment and the reduction of reoffending. This means 
making our jails places of productive hard work, addressing the scandal of 
drugs being readily available in many of our prisons and toughening 
community sentences so that they command public respect. And 
underpinning it all, the most radical step of all: paying those who rehabilitate 
offenders, including the private and voluntary sectors, by the results they 
achieve, not (as too often in the past) for processes and box-ticking. 
 
‘Radical changes’ are once again not what we would expect to hear in this time of 
crisis. It is worth noting that Clarke did not remain as Justice Secretary for long and 
by no means was any kind of rehabilitation revolution prioritized. However, what has 
clearly shifted here is the ability to move discussion in this direction. Throughout the 
unfolding of the riots we saw politicians attempt in vain to regain control and 
legitimacy by standing by a ‘criminality pure and simple’ approach, one which 
emphasized ‘simple’ as a means of saying that this was not the time to discuss 
underlying causes or rehabilitative approaches. As we saw, the vociferousness of the 
public voice saw this approach meet a hostile, chaotic environment, keen for answers 
which were not only more nuanced but also related better to those who found 
themselves in the midst of the chaos, those who did not see punitiveness and rioters 
defined as criminals as the sole answer. Clarke continues even further: 
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However, reform can't stop at our penal system alone. The general recipe for 
a productive member of society is no secret. It has not changed since I was 
inner cities minister 25 years ago. It's about having a job, a strong family, a 
decent education and, beneath it all, an attitude that shares in the values of 
mainstream society 
 
Addressing unemployment means making progress on the economy by 
getting the deficit under control and pressing ahead with welfare reform and 
work programmes. Building stronger families means gripping the 120,000 
most problematic ones and really addressing their problems, not leaving them 
in touch with, but untouched by, dozens of different agencies. A decent 
education means liberalising our schools system so that more students can 
benefit from high standards and discipline. 
The coalition has a renewed mission: tackling the financial deficit, for 
certain. But also, importantly, addressing the appalling social deficit that the 
riots have highlighted. 
 
This final piece of political communication is noteworthy and represents an apt 
moment to conclude this project. My aim from the outset has been to move 
criminological accounts of the crime communication landscape away from dystopias 
and towards a sense of optimism. I will discuss in detail the implications that these 
case study findings have when considered together and within the context of this 
project. Here, I would note that it might have seemed previously unthinkable for a 
Conservative Justice Minister to argue in favour of ‘addressing the appalling social 
deficit” within a criminal justice context. This shift has been enabled by an enlivened 
and mobilised public voice, one which clearly has the capacity to derail established 
narratives and to infuse a move towards optimism into the construction of crime. 
Most prominently, as we see the inevitability of ‘Penal Populism’ fade, moves 
towards new perspectives and less punitive approaches are facilitated by the ‘second-
order consensus’. We have seen that to cover oneself is still a necessity in law and 
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order politics, but one which is comforting and which once fulfilled, can shepherd in 
a new range of approaches to criminal justice.  
 
 




9th August 2011 
  
David Cameron ‘UK riots are sickening’ speech outside 10 Downing Street 
DC emerges from 10 Downing Street, walks over to a podium in front of press, a 
policeman stands behind him in shot, very authoritative imagery. 
 
• Has come straight from COBRA 
• Discussing action to help police deal with disorder 
• Met with MET commissioner and home Sec 
• People should be in no doubt 
• Everything necessary to restor order 
• Safe for law abiding 
• Completely condemn the scenes on TV screens / communities 
• Sickening scenes 
• Looting 
• Vandalising 
• Thieving  
• Robbing 
• Attacking poice offcers and fire crews 
• Criminality pure and simple 
• Confronted and defeated 
• Huge sympathy for families and businesses 
• We all live in fear 
• People should be in no doubt, we are on the side of law abiding 
• Police officers shown bravery 
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• Confronting thugs 
• More robust police action 
• Discussing in COBRA 
• 6,000 last night 16000 police tonight 
• all leave cancelled 
• aid from forces across country 
• strengthen and assist 
• 450 arrests already 
• court procedures will be speeded up 
• more arrests in days to come 
• justice will be done 
• consequences of actions 
• clear message 
• you will feel the full force of the law 
• wrecking your own life too 
• parliament recalled for a day for a statement and debate 
• stand together in condemnation and determination 
 
NOTE added later, find at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UohyrhMKou0 
 
 
Notes for discourse analysis… 
 
1: DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS 
• Identifiable social relationship here is the statement, Prime Ministerial 
• Lexical references indicate firm condemnation, strong language used 
throughout, strong tone, steady 
 
2: DISCOURSES 




3: ACTION ORIENTATION 
• Prime Minister directed first at the public and then at the rioters 
• Safety 
• Then assurances of punishment 




• Positioned as Prime Minister very obviously through visual imagery of 
policeman in background, door of 10 Downing Street, podium. 
• Set up has constructed authority 
• David Cameron speaks with authoritative tone here also 
  
5: PRACTICE 
• Not much extra to observe in this instance, body language is quite 




• In this moment of panic it is crucial that this speech do the job of assuring 
members of the public that they are safe 
• This reinforces the legitimacy of government and of DC and the 
Conservatives; criminality is sickening.  
• No discussion of causes, just simply that punishment will be swift and 
forceful 
• Policing will be increased. This is all about sending the message that the 
government are absolutely in control 
• This is projected by the firmness of the speech, no questions no wavering, 
short, sharp, unequivocal statements. No aim to understand why the rioting 






‘The Political Communication of Crime’ as a subject of analysis has posed certain 
immediate questions, while at the same time prompting the exploration of 
unexpected structural and conceptual shifts. Throughout this research I have adopted 
an approach that has forcefully prioritized fluidity with the aim of capturing this 
evolving realm. I have argued from the outset that a logical requirement in pursuit of 
the meaning of crime in society and of criminal justice outcomes is an enhanced 
understanding of the construction of crime narratives in the political realm. We have 
seen on innumerable occasions that the public and political use of crime is in stark 
opposition to accepted criminological understanding; we have grown accustomed to 
criminal justice policy that can be arbitrary, that can override developed bodies of 
work and irrefutable research findings. Similarly, we remain in consternation of 
reports of ever-increasing levels of fear of crime that seem to present no correlation 
with the statistical picture of criminal acts. Unquestionably there is a process taking 
place in today’s society in which the meaning of crime is transformed, where its 
force, its symbolic weight is appropriated, in which this distorted use of ‘crime’ 
overrides our focus on the objective reality of the criminal act. This has typically 
been viewed as a troubling mishandling of the crime problem, a damaging distraction 
from the project of crime reduction. Furthermore, the treatment of crime in politics, 
in the media, in the public has been characterized as ill-informed, as reactionary, at 
its worst the great, unconquerable villain of rational approaches to criminal justice. 
The findings of this project suggest instead that a more detailed, fluid understanding 
of this realm gives us significant cause for optimism. While previous approaches 
decry a perceived culture of cynicism, this research aims to move beyond 
perceptions and generalizations. Rather, this research finds that an appreciation of 
this fluctuating relationship reveals a politics that is shiftable and a public that is 
democratically engaged, that is empowered beyond brash overreaction and 
intolerance.   
 While this project has focused on a subject matter that could be considered 
unwieldy and intangible, the research approach was designed with this task in mind 
and has generated a rich body of compelling, modern data with findings that speak to 
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both the enduring question of how important political communication is in the 
construction of crime, as well as evolving issues around the breadth of today’s media 
and the enhanced voice of the public. Although I initially employed the case study 
approach to capture the wealth of expressive crime communication in the 2010 UK 
general election, this established a research ethos of flexibility and provided a 
framework for capturing the unpredictable events of the Phone Hacking Scandal and 
the Riots of July and August 2011. As a result, this approach facilitated a focus on 
new media technologies as they became prominent in political communication and 
meant that the research could push considerations in this area beyond a gap in the 
literature, towards a genuine evolution in the field. 
 The prominent questions posed by criminological literature in this area 
remain and I have aimed to use this project to challenge these overly deterministic 
criminal justice dystopias. Indeed, the case studies in this project were aimed 
specifically at capturing political communication in its most potent forms, in order to 
test these assertions within criminological literature; that the power of Neoliberalism 
had solidified the links between populist criminal justice narratives and electoral 
success and that this immoveable connection had and would continue to define 
‘crime’ in service of this destructive relationship. At the heart of this inquiry was a 
challenge to the notion that this cynical political task, this manipulation of law and 
order in ruthless pursuit of success had been reinforced or even driven by a shadowy 
co-conspirator, the profit-driven tabloid press. Initially, the suggested single-
mindedness required for this narrative seemed logically problematic, conspiratorial 
almost. If electoral success and financial gain were indeed the absolute aims of 
Westminster politics and UK tabloid media then can we say with any certainty that 
crime issues will always be cynically constructed and utilised in this pursuit and 
furthermore, would these behemoths continue interlocked in their mutual goal of 
punitiveness? This literature is grounded in the outlook of its time, of hopelessness, 
of long-standing entrenchment in this cycle and so a certain amount of dissatisfaction 
with these accounts today comes from the privilege of perspective. For instance, the 
argument of ‘Penal Populism’ and of accounts focused on Neoliberalism was that 
populist assertions of law and order would henceforth be an immoveable feature of 
criminal justice due to the resonance of such approaches and the continued successes 
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enjoyed by those who would wield them. We have seen that this resonance, this 
connection has shifted which has served to undermine these arguments. Furthermore, 
suggestions that the media as mouthpiece and co-conspirator in ‘Penal Populism’ 
will always have the capacity to control the debate seemed to relinquish too much 
power to the notion of the singular tabloid narrative. We have seen that certain 
broad-ranging structural shifts in this realm have resulted in an unquestionable 
weakening of the potential to construct and control, yet even during the time in 
which the UK press was portrayed as a cartoonish oligarchy, accounts of the media 
communicating a singular voice are reductive.  
 I would argue that functionalist accounts which aim to speak generally about 
an overarching quality or trend of a number of years are particularly ill-suited to the 
study of UK politics or the functioning of the media. We have seen that this realm is 
fickle in its inherent drive for success and prone to total transformation at the whim 
of economic forces or technological development. These are the absolutes of 
criminal justice politics and media; that politicians must be re-elected and that the 
media must be able to financially support their existence. From this basis, we can 
better understand the construction of crime in this realm by further examining the 
structures within which narratives are formed and by assessing how the inherent 
power of ‘crime’ might unfold within them. As a result, I have aimed to view this 
realm using a lens which moves away from macrosociology towards microsociology. 
It is with this approach that I have attempted to refocus our analysis of this area on to 
the public consumption and regeneration of crime, to examine what is the enduring 
force of crime in today’s society that feeds into this fickle realm. Ultimately this is a 
project that argues for greater emphasis on the blurring of boundaries between 
reception and generation of information and in doing so, the aim is to present an 
account that can capture the nature of this realm. 
 While these initial, inherent questions around understanding the political 
communication of crime formed the basis of my project and remained a focus 
throughout, the unignorable shifts in the media also demanded a complete 
reevaluation of its role in the construction of crime. We have seen that today’s 
hypertechnological media sphere, far from projecting a singular voice is endlessly 
pluralistic and has dispersed control to a multiplicity of public-driven formats. I have 
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discussed the immediacy of today’s news creation and consumption, in which a 
hyperactive deviancy amplification can occur, in which there exists a vast amount of 
choice available to empowered media consumers who can control the narratives that 
they regularly receive. I have detailed the symbolic force required by news to gain 
attention, to stake their place in the news landscape and the developed interactivity 
which has infused a democratic voice into the newsroom and empowered the public 
as newsmakers. I have aimed to incorporate these shifts into a microsociological 
account of the public and the construction of crime knowledge today and crucially, 
have adopted a model that can understand the public modes of creating meaning 
within these technology-enhanced shifts.  
 Before I outline my key findings, I would note that several of the original 
contributions of this project can be located in its design. This project aims to further 
research in this area by challenging dystopian trends in the literature on politics and 
crime, by updating accounts on the media and its interaction with crime and by 
adapting a particular theoretical model, a microsociological approach integrating 
Durkheim’s account of symbolic power and Goffman’s view of ‘the self’ and 
‘negotiated meaning’, namely Randall Collins’ Interaction Ritual Chains (2005) in 
order to better understand the blurring of boundaries between reception and 
generation of information in the construction of crime narratives. This project uses a 
case study method in order to capture a rich body of data on the political 
communication of crime, one which prioritizes a view of the construction of 
narratives in action, at the extremes, during moments of heightened emotion and 
activity. The subject matter of ‘communication’ has always been viewed here as 
more than political speeches or perspectives on Westminster culture. As a result, the 
research design was constructed to complement the aims of the project, that in order 
to view intangible relationships, power structures and the evolution of a sphere in the 
process of transformation that flexibility and adaptability was required. I would 
argue that case study research and discourse analysis have provided the best possible 
framework for capturing this subject matter and as we have seen, have allowed for 
crucial but completely unexpected events to be fully integrated into my research.  
Having conducted these case studies, I would argue that this approach is 
particularly well suited to the analysis of media today. A reflection on my project 
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aims and the rapidly evolving subject matter suggested that I could not utilise 
traditional approaches to media research to fully capture a sense of this vast realm in 
its present condition. Tellingly, the researchers tasked with analyzing media 
coverage in the Guardian/ LSE riots study also suggested that any consideration of 
this realm requires an entirely new methodological approach. While in Reading the 
Riots (2011), key researchers Procter, Vis and Voss (2013) set about designing a new 
quantitative methodological approach that would facilitate the analysis of social 
media forums such as Twitter, I adapted by taking a broader view of the shift in 
power in the media. I found that with evolving structures rapidly dispersing power 
that a newsroom ethnography or newspaper content analysis for instance could not 
provide a picture of the source of power in the same way that it could have in the 
past. Similarly, there was no particular interview or series of interviews that would 
have given sufficient insight into what is now such a forcefully public realm. A key 
argument of this project is that the power at the heart of political communication is 
no longer in the hands of a particular group and as such a research approach with a 
broad view was necessary. The focus of this study is political communication as a 
contested act, in which input is key and in which messages are delivered but are 
regenerated in a vibrant, empowered realm and this project has been designed 
specifically to capture this fluid dispersal of power.  
 
 
Case Study Findings 
 
The 2010 election provided an undeniable contradiction to literature that would 
suggest that the power of crime to deliver electoral success must place it consistently 
at the heart of electoral politics, making it vulnerable to reactionary views, to cynical, 
emotionally charged rhetoric. The notable lack of prominence of law and order 
politics in this election is a significant challenge to the certainty of ‘Penal Populism’ 
and suggests that there is no insurmountable link between reactionary law and order 
politics and electoral success. Furthermore, in this case study we saw new media in 
action, the force of technological advancements having reshaped the political 
communication landscape. I have argued that the public voice began to have an 
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impact on derailing entrenched narratives in this election. Indeed, events like the 
Gillian Duffy scandal and even ‘Cleggmania’ prompted a consideration of new 
media forums that takes seriously their impact and ability to dominate control of 
electoral politics and which challenges accounts that view these forums as faddish or 
limited to certain demographics. We saw that despite these objections, the impact of 
these new structures and the diminished presence of ‘crime’ in the election supported 
the mobilization of non-elite narratives, presenting the public voice as a new force in 
the construction of crime.  
The second case study on the Phone Hacking Scandal of July 2011 presented 
a unique opportunity to develop these findings in that the events provided 
unparalleled access to information on the power structures at the heart of traditional 
tabloid forces. Furthermore, we saw distinctive data on their impact on the 
construction of crime and their sometimes direct influence on the formation of 
criminal justice policy. This scandal also represented a swelling of public outrage 
through the new media structures observed in the 2010 election and so presented an 
opportunity to consider their impact in this setting. I have argued that this unveiling 
of power at the heart of previously populist crime narratives coincided with a 
disabling of these traditional monolithic forces; that while new media enabled the 
dispersal of power in communication it also played a crucial role in breaking down 
the singular tabloid narrative, the strength of the Murdoch-led voice. Indeed, we saw 
a demonstration of the potential strength of public expression through new media 
outlets to derail destructive, manipulative, dystopian narratives and to allow public 
outrage to have a significant impact on previously unfettered power relationships. 
The Phone Hacking Scandal both confirmed the new power of the public and 
signified an end to arguments that viewed the tabloid narrative as wholly influential, 
as the bearer of an effective and destructive power. 
The empowerment of the public voice was conspicuous in the riots of the 
following month. We saw widespread consternation over the specific source or cause 
of rioting, that there seemed to be an indefinable nature to the acts of looting and 
public gatherings. These riots were motivated by disparate aims, from outrage at the 
shooting of Mark Duggan to a more nebulous sense of despair at the actions of elites, 
at society more generally. We saw that in some cases, it had been arguable that 
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looting was motivated not by any kind of outrage but indeed by simple opportunism. 
What seemed to figuratively connect these rioters was the enhanced ability to protest 
and be heard, to utilise these new forces for communication to express something, 
anything in opposition of the established narrative. 
 Symbolically, the riots represent the violent upsurge of the public voice, now 
forcefully empowered to be heard in its multiplicity. There may not have been a 
unified intent, but in many ways this absolutely reinforces a key argument here; that 
the evolution in media structures has forced a plurality of views back into political 
debate on crime. In criminal justice issues this is most prominent, in which the 
political construction of crime had previously been controlled with an iron grip, had 
been wielded as a tool in building legitimacy. However, with the destabilization of 
this control and the potent nature of ‘crime’ in society, we have seen a shift in which 
the wild, divergent public voice is now apparent. It is significant that forms of social 
media in the riots were used both to organize violence and looting and to organize 
local clean-up efforts. Where once ‘the public’ was viewed as being unified in fear 
and in relative silence, accepting populist narratives with the aim of sating rabid 
ontological insecurity, now we see a public that is acting out, that is derailing efforts 
to subsume their plurality. As we have seen, this new order was played out not only 
in the media but in the destabilization of political efforts to define the acts as 
‘criminality pure and simple’, in which the impact of traditional cynical politicking 
petered out while nuance was forced back into the debate. 
The case studies when viewed as a progression over time cumulatively paint 
a picture of significant evolution in both contemporary media-scapes and the 
political communication of crime. In terms of media, the three case studies taken 
together demonstrate ‘the huge uptake and substantial power of new media 
frameworks [which] confirmed a blurring in the reception and generation of 
information’. Beginning in the 2010 election, the case study begins among the 
traditional election landscape and follows the derailing and energizing of the 
campaign by the intrusion of the public voice through new media on numerous 
occasions. The success of the Leaders’ Debate, the accidental capturing of audio, the 
online campaign highlighting vandalized posters, beyond just social media, we see 
real mobilization through new media here, which is built upon as the second case 
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study demonstrates. The data captured in the phone hacking scandal tells us the story 
of the power of the public, lashing out with this now amplified voice and shutting 
down major traditional media institutions. Along with the wave of public power in 
the new media-scape, comes a destabilization of traditional media which had begun 
to erode in 2010, this is a crucial moment observed in case study 2 and together, 
these two studies provide more than similarities, the second case study shows us the 
next stage in the trajectory. Finally, the case study data of the riots develops this 
further by presenting the media as now unruly in the hands of the public, now easily 
mobilized around the commission of crime. Taken together these three bodies of data 
form the beginning of a new realm and an opportunity to see it be mobilized both in 
support of victims and in increasing victimization. This body of research can neither 
be viewed as objectively similar or opposing, they neither entirely support nor 
disprove a given finding. Instead, they tell us a story about how both the media-scape 
and following this, the political communication of crime, are developing new roles.  
 
 
The Role of Politics in the Communication of Crime  
 
Simply put, the events observed as part of this research suggest a shift in the political 
capacity to control crime narratives. The findings of the project suggest both that this 
was previously overstated and that structural shifts have eroded any capability for 
such forceful, knowing construction that may have existed. We have seen that a 
realm which had been portrayed as inextricably bound by a potent “sense of 
insecurity, of insubstantiality, and or uncertainty, a whiff of chaos and a fear of 
falling” (Young 2007: 12), to allow “the electoral advantage of a policy to take 
precedence over its penal effectiveness” (Roberts et al 2003: 5), now exhibits 
behaviour which significantly undermines this link. The ‘Penal Populism’ argument 
is weakened by the notable lack of law and order featured in the 2010 election and so 
too is any argument that asserts an intrinsic truth about the enduring nature of ‘crime’ 
in politics. Undeniably, when the meaning of crime is constructed in such a fickle, 
fluctuating realm, we can only aim to understand its construction by better 
appreciating these structures and their tendency towards fluctuation.  
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 On the meaning of crime in politics at this time, we have seen that these 
variations in prominence do not necessarily produce a change in emphasis. Indeed, 
we saw in the 2010 election that while law and order was not at the forefront of 
political debate, that there was still a similar tone to criminal justice narratives, one 
which reverted to what could more convincingly be portrayed as the ‘second order 
consensus’ (Downes and Morgan 2002: 317). Furthermore, each of the Party Leaders 
spoke of criminal justice issues in emotive terms, utilizing relatable storytelling 
approaches. The tone of much of the law and order rhetoric was not evocative 
punitiveness, it was rather a covering of all bases; there were allusions to the plight 
of the victim, there was an economically-guarded hesitant discussion around policing 
figures. We have witnessed the crystallization of ‘victimhood’ as a must in criminal 
justice politics, but a reversion from overt punitiveness. There was a sense in the 
2010 election that as the ‘second order consensus’ dictates, the parties engaged in a 
strategic ticking of boxes, in which aiming not to cede the ground on issues like 
sympathy towards victims is the main aim, rather than any overt, aggressive control 
of the crime narrative. In this climate, we don’t quite see the emergence of anti-
populist values, nor do we see a resurgence in liberal criminal justice ideals or even 
in research-grounded approaches. Overt cynicism is no longer inevitable, but nor is 
optimism. Instead, in a time of political uncertainty, in which the public voice and 
evolving media structures erode the power to manipulate, certainty is found only in 
aiming not to slip up or offend.  
 We saw these themes develop in the riots, in which the chaos of these events 
prompted politicians to attempt to revert to previous overt, bold punitiveness and in 
which their ability to deliver such narratives was largely undermined. The shift in 
media structures, away from a powerful, singular tabloid voice and towards vast 
pluralism meant that simplistic, punitive narratives fell flat, met with challenge and 
found little support in the broader public sphere. The image of Boris Johnson taking 
to the streets of London to deliver a government-mandated message of ‘criminality 
pure and simple’ and being forcefully challenged, shouted down by outraged 
members of the public is a memorable, potent representation of this shift in power. 
Today, the public have a voice and it is chaotic and confusing and it is often wildly 
articulated, but it is one which inadvertently serves to completely undermine political 
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efforts at cynical punitiveness. The role of politics in the construction of crime, 
therefore, is one which is no longer sure-footed, in which familiar themes are merely 
reverted to in order to avoid that most damaging label, the ‘soft on crime’ party and 




The Role of the Media in the Communication of Crime 
 
It would be reprehensibly simplistic to suggest that the rise of social media alone has 
acted as a check against punitiveness. This is emphatically not the argument of this 
project and imbues too much legitimacy to what is ultimately a wildly chaotic, 
indefinable realm in which a tapestry of reactionary, uncensored bile and 
meaningless chatter is freely published. But white noise is still noise and the upsurge 
in social media is instead symptomatic of a broader shift that this research suggests is 
well worth noticing. The findings of this project indicate that the recent undermining 
of populist punitiveness has occurred due to wide-scale evolutions in the media from 
capital-driven mouthpiece and beneficiary of populism, to technology-driven 
democratic outlet. What is most significant about this upsurge in new media (which 
as I have described spans well beyond social media), is that it has coincided with a 
groundbreaking destabilization of traditional tabloid forces.  
In a project which focuses on the communication of crime, this development 
is crucial. The 2010 election was a demonstration of force for this new order, with 24 
hour news, social media and televised events reframing the landscape in a manner 
which left politicians breathless, confused, unable to take back control. Already at 
this point the tabloid narrative was a background player, being forced to take on a 
diminished role in which new media reported news faster and television media 
played a more prominent role in creating the news. However, in the Phone Hacking 
Scandal we were able to observe the relics of the past described in new detail, as well 
as a brutal reminder of their weakened position through the force employed by public 
outrage, delivered through anti-tabloid forces, broadsheets and new media. Again, 
this is certainly not an argument that proffers the demise of tabloid journalism, this 
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would also serve as a naïve oversimplification in the face of continuing Murdoch 
influence through the rebranded News of the World, the Sun on Sunday, his 
influential reach through television networks like Fox News, or the new model of 
online tabloid success enjoyed by the Daily Mail. Instead, what the 2010 election and 
the Phone Hacking Scandal together demonstrate is the impact of the strengthening 
of democratic media outlets, that while they may be prone to hyperactive deviancy 
amplification, emitting bursts of outrage that can peter out quickly, that the force of 
these eruptions put not only politicians but also tabloid journalists on the back foot. 
This wave of chaotic new activity has dramatically altered the way in which former 
powerhouses in narrative construction can conduct themselves. The Culture, Media 
& Sport Committee and the Leveson Inquiry were revelatory in that they outlined 
explicitly the ways in which high ranking media figures once had the capacity to take 
a stance on an issue and forcefully pursue it, ensuring that policy and the tabloid 
narrative were one in a barrage of undemocratic, often punitive ideals. This data did 
provide the detail required to understand the mechanisms behind ‘Penal Populism’ 
and yet at the same time the Phone Hacking Scandal demonstrated how this power 
could be utterly disabled, in creating a stir that could shut down the News of the 
World. I have previously noted that many commentators at the time of the scandal 
suggested that the demise of the News of the World could be attributed to cynical 
business practices, a savvy attempt to improve the NewsCorp bid for BSkyB. 
Nonetheless, the motivations behind the scenes do not alter the fact that without the 
mobilized public outrage there could not have been such a thorough unearthing of 
malpractice, of criminality. While The Guardian and The New York Times conducted 
investigations into these widespread abuses, the public response and vocalization of 
outrage was essentially what drove Rupert Murdoch to apologise to the family of 
Milly Dowler.  
The formidable reshaping of the media at this point came not from the end of 
the News of the World but from the assertion of the force of new media, a bold 
declaration of its vast capabilities, confirmed wholeheartedly by the events of the 
riots. The riots potently demonstrated the surprising ease and comfort with which the 
public adopted new media technologies and demonstrated a willingness to 
communicate beyond just competency. While youths around London used BBM to 
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connect with large groups, to innovate and gather to express themselves, politicians 
and the police responded in a bumbling, confused fashion, calling for other networks 
to be shut down and largely failing to grasp the nature of this communication. 
Similarly, concerned citizens took to Twitter to organize clean ups and construct a 
narrative of community pride based on genuine shared emotions rather than the 
manipulative, faux-nostalgia of ‘community’ rhetoric in recent years. Finally, we 
saw that when punitiveness was employed, where in a more tabloid-dominant media 
realm this approach may have held strong, in this instance nuance was forced back 
into the debate, undermining attempts to hammer home ‘criminality pure and 
simple’. This account doesn’t aim to portray a vocal left-wing as suddenly 
empowered, although voices which would aim to counter those of reactionary tabloid 
values certainly do now have a more potent outlet than the comments pages of The 
Guardian. These alterations have instead moved the potential construction of 
narratives away from a simple duality of left versus right wing or tabloid versus 
broadsheet. We now consume and communicate a vast plurality of views, the effect 
of which is a crude, chaotic, powerful form of democracy. Those who view new 
media as ‘just white noise’ fail to see the impact that this noise can have on a 
conversation that was previously so controlled. 
 
 
The Role of the Public in the Communication of Crime 
 
Having paid particular attention to developments in political rhetoric-building and 
the evolving media sphere, these alterations naturally raise questions around the 
developing role of the public in the construction of narratives. For instance, we might 
question how a crime issue can become the particular focus of public ire in this realm 
of vast information exchange. This is a crucial aim of this project, in which I have 
attempted to not only develop our understanding of functioning narrative structures 
today, but also to enhance our account of the public relationship with crime and how 
this manifests itself through today’s media. So far we have seen the public as 
adaptive, expressive, violent at times, we have seen the impact of their voice and 
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some evidence of the kind of issue that can provoke uproar, in particular that the 
theme of the ‘Ideal Victim’ is still provocative in the public imagination.  
However, distinguishing this account from those which have preceded it is 
the view of the public as more than just receptive. I have argued throughout this 
project that a key aim here is to emphasize the blurring of boundaries between 
reception and generation of information and it is in the public realm that we see this 
alteration most prominently. I have discussed the Interaction Ritual Chains (2005) 
model as enhancing our view of the public connection with crime issues and when 
applied to the case study research conducted, this approach renders the account of the 
public in crime communication greater explanatory force. We have seen the public 
employ their collective, chaotic voice, the case studies here also display the variety 
of issues that can prompt this vocalization. Perceived injustice in relation to an ‘ideal 
victim’, the political expression of shifting preferences, the provocation of 
community tensions around police practices, these disparate, unpredictable criminal 
justice issues have all risen to the top of the agenda on a wave of emotive, intense 
expressions of opinion. In light of these developments, Collins’ model provides a 
sufficiently fluid account which can explain this process and fits particularly well 
with the conditions outlined in this project. 
As we have seen, the focus of Interaction Ritual Chains (2005) is the 
microsociological process observed in the natural escalation from small scale 
interaction to broader righteous anger. Within this escalation, Collins defines the 
conditions in which an initial IRC can take place; that co-presence, a group defining 
barrier, a mutual focus of attention and a shared mood combine to set in motion this 
natural progression. In the case of the Leaders’ Debate, for instance, we saw that the 
common focus was constructed by the heightened anticipation stoked by its status as 
a unique televised event. Collins’ definition, that “people focus their attention upon a 
common object or activity, and by communicating this focus to each other become 
mutually aware of each other’s focus of attention” (Collins 2005: 48) also seems to 
fit well with the interactivity afforded by today’s evolved media structures, that the 
communication on Facebook through status updates, through Twitter using hashtags, 
through the posting of articles to walls and all of the public processes of sharing 
information that are available today and often occur in real time, allows us to 
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develop a sense of mutual focus of attention, an awareness of which issue is 
important in society at that specific moment in time.   
 I have previously noted that Collins’ model specifically called for physical 
co-presence, although I would argue that the findings of the case studies in this 
project make a case for an extension into the non-physical realm, as facilitated by 
new media. The role of physical co-presence in Collins’ model is derived from 
Goffman’s assertion that we construct our sense of self through the physical reaction 
of others and that the emotional impact of interacting physically is crucial in opinion-
making. I have already argued that on this basis we can certainly extend the model to 
the virtual realm, we need only apply the tenets of The Presentation of Self in 
Everyday Life (1959) to new media. I have argued that a theatrical posturing as 
described by Goffman now operates in the virtual realm, in which a 
hypertechnological construction of self is finely honed, indeed the formats provided 
by Facebook and Twitter allow for an even more empowered Goffman-esque 
presentation of an ideal self. There is an argument for physical co-presence when we 
consider how much more can be derived from body language and from the gauged 
reaction of another member of our community. There are certainly functions by 
which we may react in new media but they do not extend far enough to fully adapt 
Goffman’s theory; there is still a unique value in physical co-presence at the heart of 
this discussion. However, within the context of the construction of crime narratives, I 
would argue that Collins’ model ought to be extended to include the non-physical. 
 We saw in the 2010 election that the mutual focus of attention on the 
Leaders’ Debates was accompanied by a new form of communal discussion and 
shared emotion through social media and undoubtedly this series of Interaction 
Ritual Chains had an impact on stoking public reaction, enabling the development 
from small scale interaction to a broader feeling, not of anger, but certainly of revolt 
against the established narrative. I would argue that while these forms of Interaction 
Ritual Chain are missing the element of gauging reaction and redefining your self 
according to cues picked up from physical co-presence, that there is a unique quality 
to new media which replaces this element. Indeed, the awareness of new media 
outlets as visible forums in which we share our lives, in which we communicate 
within various communities and in which issues are discussed infuses them with a 
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sense of performance that is in keeping with Goffman’s original work. It is more 
than likely that those who discussed the 2010 Leaders’ Debate publicly on Twitter 
did so in a highly produced way, through a theatrical construction of words and 
images to maintain a sense of self as informed.  
Furthermore, I would argue that the evidence of the case studies here 
suggests that new media has been integrated into our daily lives in such a meaningful 
way that it ought to be considered almost as significant as physical co-presence to its 
users. As we have seen from the election, from the scandal and the riots, a great 
many members of our society take to social media and online news media long 
before they will come into contact physically with another member of their 
community. Indeed, the infrequency of physical co-presence arguably relegates it to 
the status of the print press, a last minute voice on an issue in which views are 
already crystallised. While this does not negate physical co-presence and the impact 
that an influential member of the community and their physical reaction can have on 
the swaying of opinion, it seems reasonable to argue that new media can be 
considered an important realm within which ideas are formed. The argument here is 
that the extension of physical co-presence is still in keeping with the Goffman-esque 
Presentation of Self argument and furthermore, it has a meaningful role to play both 




The Political Communication of Crime 
 
To summarise, the key findings of this thesis begin with an argument for moving 
criminological accounts away from criminal justice dystopias which have been 
overstated and undermined by their determinism. Furthermore, this research suggests 
that structural shifts have enabled a redistribution of power in the construction of 
narratives, in which political attempts at punitiveness have been overwhelmed and 
have prompted a reversion to the ‘second order consensus’. Undeniably the 
developments in new media have featured heavily in this research and together with 
an undermining of the singular tabloid narrative they have empowered the public 
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voice and have infused political debate with a forceful, chaotic plurality of views. 
The symbolic weight of crime issues remains prominent in this landscape and I have 
utilised Collins’ framework to demonstrate how a small scale narrative can escalate 
to broad righteous anger in today’s communicative sphere. I have argued that these 
case studies present a compelling argument to extend the Interaction Ritual Chains 
approach beyond physical co-presence, that to take into account the legitimacy of 
virtual communication unlocks an appreciation of meaningful debate in today’s 
public realm. Ultimately, I have proposed that this is a fluid and modern depiction of 
our narrative landscape and that it is an inherently optimistic one. 
An alternative approach to a project entitled ‘The Political Communication of 
Crime’ might have focused narrowly on the political culture surrounding criminal 
justice communications and how exactly they are formed by today’s political elites. 
However, to take this approach here would have understated what has become one of 
the most prominent sources of power in this realm, namely the ability for the media-
enabled public to overwhelm political efforts. As we have seen, the augmented 
‘noise’ facilitated by the evolution of media structures has infused a sense of chaos 
back into the construction of narratives, enough to override political attempts at 
control. It is the assertion of this project that ‘The Political Communication of 
Crime’ ought to be viewed as a conversation. A detailed understanding of political 
speech writing and high-level criminal justice decision-making can only divulge one 
side of this conversation, because as we have seen, the untethered force of the public 
voice now determines the development of the criminal justice narrative as much as 
any polished party rhetoric could.  
 This account aims to move away from criminal justice dystopias and instead 
to highlight significant cause for optimism. As I have explained, the argument here is 
not that the boom in social media heralds the rise of a new rationality to counteract 
punitiveness. I have outlined that shifts in the media have been wide-ranging and 
have scope beyond just new media although in essence, we have not quite arrived at 
the Habermasian ideal of “active citizenship that can not only articulate its political 
will but also work to ensure that it is implemented by the government” (Habermas 
1984: 86). I have already argued that while cynicism is not inevitable, neither is 
optimism in criminal justice narratives. Indeed, we are far from the rational-minded 
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research-based ideal that would serve as a staunch opposition to destructive 
punitiveness, this has not enabled an opposing influence. Yet there is certainly 
optimism to be found in the shift towards a vibrant plurality of chaotic voices, 
specifically when we consider the impact of structural shifts, which reveal such 
significant long-term implications that they indicate the potential for a move towards 
rationality in criminal justice in the future. As such, the narrative landscape that I 
have portrayed is one in which the certainty of punitiveness, indeed the certainty of 
an ability to control crime narratives is no longer assured and in which the chaotic 
public voice brings with it untold potential. 
 The mapping of this narrative landscape has optimistic implications both for 
criminal justice policy research and for the more general criminological project of 
the production of knowledge. There are countless bodies of criminological research 
dedicated to applying the accumulation of groundbreaking research to refining our 
treatment of the criminal act, whether in prisons, in policing, in rehabilitative 
approaches or some other arm of the state. Those researchers interested enough in 
social justice to dedicate themselves to this work may better communicate their 
findings, may better usher their research towards implementation with a more 
optimistic view of the narrative landscape. Indeed, this depiction of today’s realm of 
political communication is one in which the plurality of voices can counteract 
arbitrary criminal justice decision-making and can provide a more empowered space 
for alternative perspectives. It might be overly optimistic to suggest that research-
based knowledge could capture the public imagination, but what this does suggest is 
a move away from a stagnant situation in which cynical politicking and destructive 
tabloid narratives are the dominant force and in which the measured approach to 
criminal justice must fight against these unreceptive singular narratives.  
 An optimistic approach to the narrative landscape, however, means 
embracing the notion of academia as part of the vocal public, rather than as a silent 
elite. One of the key findings of this research has been to emphasize the significance 
of the empowered public voice. This is an account which actively contradicts 
previous perspectives of the public as reactionary, as complicit in the creation of 
punitive criminal justice policies, by emphasizing the value of the intuitiveness and 
adaptability of the public. As we saw in the case study on the riots, the younger 
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demographic of the rioting population demonstrated their comfort with new 
technology and their ability to organise chaos and derail established norms with 
striking ease. Similarly, some of the most unexpected developments in the past year 
have focused around the use of technology in the unraveling of established economic 
and social forces. Most notably we have witnessed the high profile release of details 
of classified US government surveillance programmes by Edward Snowden, as well 
as the forceful and continuous release of classified information through Wikileaks. 
These innovative, challenging movements based on an ‘open source’ ethos provide 
examples of the increasing control over the narrative landscape that is being claimed 
by skilled non-elite individuals. It is salient to observe that many of these 
groundbreaking efforts by hackers and open source activists have undertaken anti-
elite acts with the aim of breaking down destructive, controlling narratives and 
enhancing the accessibility of knowledge.  
The impact of these shifts have enormous implications for the future of the 
creation of knowledge in criminology. The case of Aaron Swartz demonstrates this 
quite poignantly, in which a 26 year old computer programmer and developer of the 
innovative social news site Reddit, was arrested for sharing academic journal articles 
from JSTOR and charged with violations which would have carried a sentence of $1 
million in fines, 35 years in prison, asset forfeiture, restitution and supervised release 
(US Attorney’s Office District of Massachusetts 19th July 2011), an excessive, 
disproportionately punitive sentence that resulted in Swartz’s suicide. In the context 
of this project, the case of Aaron Swartz reveals a great deal about the future of 
crime and criminology in the narrative landscape. This case demonstrates the 
capacity for a radical democratization of knowledge that is threatening to an 
academia which is so economically-motivated that it would stringently maintain 
barriers to the research it creates. This case provides an example of punitiveness as 
an enemy of the public voice, as a method of oppression which demonstrates a deep 
fearfulness towards the potentially liberating chaos hinted at by this ‘crime’. Indeed, 
as the competence with which public activists can undermine these barriers 
increases, the legitimacy of these barriers will be subverted in much the same way as 
has occurred in the film and television industry. The unraveling of economic barriers 
to access through technological innovation in this industry provides a notable 
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example of the force of the empowered public and their capacity to derail established 
norms which have been economically motivated or constructed in pursuit of political 
success. ‘The Political Communication of Crime’, then, is ultimately a realm in 
chaos, but in which the public voice is empowered by shifting media structures to 
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